Cross-border differences in the prevalence and risk factors for carriage of antimicrobial resistance in children attending daycare centers: a point prevalence study in the Netherlands and Belgium.

BACKGROUND: Day care centres (DCCs) are ideal settings for drug-resistant bacteria to emerge. Prevalence numbers of faecal carriage of antimicrobial resistant bacteria in these settings are rare. We aimed to determine the prevalence of faecal antimicrobial resistant bacteria carriage in children attending DCCs and to assess and identify infection risk factors within DCCs in The Netherlands and Belgium. METHODS: A point-prevalence study was conducted in 28 Dutch (499 children) and 18 Belgian (448 children) DCCs. Stool samples were taken from the children's diapers and a questionnaire was filled in by their parents. Hygiene related to stool and toilet use, hygiene related to food, environmental contamination, hand hygiene and hygiene guidelines were assessed conform a standardized questionnaire by the infection prevention and control expert visiting the DCC. Multilevel logistical regression analyses were used to define which characteristics predicted the presence of extended-spectrum beta-lactamase-producing Enterobacterales (ESBL-E), carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales (CPE), vancomycin-resistant enterococci (VRE), and ciprofloxacin-resistant Enterobacterales (CipR-E). RESULTS: The ESBL-E prevalence was 16% (n = 71) in Belgium and 6% (n = 30) in the Netherlands. The CipR-E prevalence was 17% (n = 78) in Belgium and 8% (n = 38) in the Netherlands. Antimicrobial use (RR: 0.30; 95% CI: 0.33-0.48) and hospital admissions (RR: 0.37; 95% CI: 0.25-0.54) were lower in the Netherlands. Children travelling to Asia were at higher risk of being an ESBL-E carrier. Children using antimicrobials were at higher risk of being a CipR-E carrier. Cleaning the changing mat after each use was found as a protective factor for CipR-E carriage. CONCLUSIONS: We established a significant difference in ESBL-E and CipR-E carriage and antimicrobial use and hospital admissions between the Netherlands and Belgium among children attending DCCs. The differences between both countries should be further studied to improve the policy on anti-microbial use and hospital admissions in children.

SARS-CoV-2 infection in farmed minks, the Netherlands, April and May 2020.

Respiratory disease and increased mortality occurred in minks on two farms in the Netherlands, with interstitial pneumonia and SARS-CoV-2 RNA in organ and swab samples. On both farms, at least one worker had coronavirus disease-associated symptoms before the outbreak. Variations in mink-derived viral genomes showed between-mink transmission and no infection link between the farms. Inhalable dust contained viral RNA, indicating possible exposure of workers. One worker is assumed to have attracted the virus from mink.

Severe acute respiratory infection caused by swine influenza virus in a child necessitating extracorporeal membrane oxygenation (ECMO), the Netherlands, October 2016.

In October 2016, a severe infection with swine influenza A(H1N1) virus of the Eurasian avian lineage occurred in a child with a previous history of eczema in the Netherlands, following contact to pigs. The patient's condition deteriorated rapidly and required life support through extracorporeal membrane oxygenation. After start of oseltamivir treatment and removal of mucus plugs, the patient fully recovered. Monitoring of more than 80 close unprotected contacts revealed no secondary cases.

Adaptation, spread and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in farmed minks and associated humans in the Netherlands.

In the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic (April 2020), SARS-CoV-2 was detected in farmed minks and genomic sequencing was performed on mink farms and farm personnel. Here, we describe the outbreak and use sequence data with Bayesian phylodynamic methods to explore SARS-CoV-2 transmission in minks and humans on farms. High number of farm infections (68/126) in minks and farm workers (>50% of farms) were detected, with limited community spread. Three of five initial introductions of SARS-CoV-2 led to subsequent spread between mink farms until November 2020. Viruses belonging to the largest cluster acquired an amino acid substitution in the receptor binding domain of the Spike protein (position 486), evolved faster and spread longer and more widely. Movement of people and distance between farms were statistically significant predictors of virus dispersal between farms. Our study provides novel insights into SARS-CoV-2 transmission between mink farms and highlights the importance of combining genetic information with epidemiological information when investigating outbreaks at the animal-human interface.

Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 on mink farms between humans and mink and back to humans.

Animal experiments have shown that nonhuman primates, cats, ferrets, hamsters, rabbits, and bats can be infected by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2). In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in felids, mink, and dogs in the field. Here, we describe an in-depth investigation using whole-genome sequencing of outbreaks on 16 mink farms and the humans living or working on these farms. We conclude that the virus was initially introduced by humans and has since evolved, most likely reflecting widespread circulation among mink in the beginning of the infection period, several weeks before detection. Despite enhanced biosecurity, early warning surveillance, and immediate culling of animals in affected farms, transmission occurred between mink farms in three large transmission clusters with unknown modes of transmission. Of the tested mink farm residents, employees, and/or individuals with whom they had been in contact, 68% had evidence of SARS-CoV-2 infection. Individuals for which whole genomes were available were shown to have been infected with strains with an animal sequence signature, providing evidence of animal-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2 within mink farms.

Tracing Back the Source of an Outbreak of Salmonella Typhimurium; National Outbreak Linked to the Consumption of Raw and Undercooked Beef Products, the Netherlands, October to December 2015.

INTRODUCTION: On 23 October 2015, six related cases with gastroenteritis called the Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority. They suspected filet américain, a raw beef spread, to be the source of infection. Leftovers and stool samples tested positive for Salmonella Typhimurium. Multiple locus variable-number of tandem repeat analysis (MLVA) revealed a MLVA pattern (02-23-08-08-212), which had not been detected in the Netherlands before. Concomitantly, an increase of this MLVA type was observed in the national Salmonella surveillance, amounting to 46 cases between 26 October and 9 December. METHODS: To investigate whether filet américain or an alternative (related) source could  be linked to surveillance-reported cases, cases (n=38) were invited to complete a questionnaire and upstream source tracing to map the food supply chain was initiated. RESULTS: Rapid interdisciplinary action resulted in identification of a contaminated 46-ton batch of beef distributed via a Dutch deboning plant as the likely source of infection. In total, 24/29 respondents (83%) could be linked to the incriminated batch of beef products (predominantly filet américain and minced beef). DISCUSSION: Repeated identification of raw meat products as a source of infection emphasizes the importance of awareness of the risk of infection when handling or consuming these products. Improved measures and procedures on product labelling, pre-treatment or product testing should be considered.

How safe is the meat inspection based on artificial digestion of pooled samples for Trichinella in pork? A scenario from wildlife to a human patient in a non-endemic region of Europe.

The occurrence of trichinellosis in a resident of the Netherlands prompted us to examine the likelihood of this originating from infected rats in spite of prevailing biosecurity and testing procedures. In so doing, we sought to calculate the possible risks for trichinellosis in countries deemed non-endemic. The infection risk was determined by simulating a scenario from a reservoir of minimally contaminated wildlife to pigs to humans. Results indicate that humans might become infected even in the event that artificial digestion had been performed on individually tested pig carcasses. Our conclusions justify reconsidering Trichinella control strategies based on the current testing protocol, and emphasize the importance of proper cooking as further insurance against human infection.