People mistake the internet's knowledge for their own.

People frequently search the internet for information. Eight experiments (n = 1,917) provide evidence that when people "Google" for online information, they fail to accurately distinguish between knowledge stored internally-in their own memories-and knowledge stored externally-on the internet. Relative to those using only their own knowledge, people who use Google to answer general knowledge questions are not only more confident in their ability to access external information; they are also more confident in their own ability to think and remember. Moreover, those who use Google predict that they will know more in the future without the help of the internet, an erroneous belief that both indicates misattribution of prior knowledge and highlights a practically important consequence of this misattribution: overconfidence when the internet is no longer available. Although humans have long relied on external knowledge, the misattribution of online knowledge to the self may be facilitated by the swift and seamless interface between internal thought and external information that characterizes online search. Online search is often faster than internal memory search, preventing people from fully recognizing the limitations of their own knowledge. The internet delivers information seamlessly, dovetailing with internal cognitive processes and offering minimal physical cues that might draw attention to its contributions. As a result, people may lose sight of where their own knowledge ends and where the internet's knowledge begins. Thinking with Google may cause people to mistake the internet's knowledge for their own.

The harm-made mind: observing victimization augments attribution of minds to vegetative patients, robots, and the dead.

People often think that something must have a mind to be part of a moral interaction. However, the present research suggests that minds do not create morality but that morality creates minds. In four experiments, we found that observing intentional harm to an unconscious entity--a vegetative patient, a robot, or a corpse--leads to augmented attribution of mind to that entity. A fifth experiment reconciled these results with extant research on dehumanization by showing that observing the victimization of conscious entities leads to reduced attribution of mind to those entities. Taken together, these experiments suggest that the effects of victimization vary according to victims' preexisting mental status and that people often make an intuitive cognitive error when unconscious entities are placed in harm's way. People assume that if apparent moral harm occurs, then there must be someone there to experience that harm-a harm-made mind. These findings have implications for political policies concerning right-to-life issues.

Conservatism predicts aversion to consequential Artificial Intelligence.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to revolutionize society by automating tasks as diverse as driving cars, diagnosing diseases, and providing legal advice. The degree to which AI can improve outcomes in these and other domains depends on how comfortable people are trusting AI for these tasks, which in turn depends on lay perceptions of AI. The present research examines how these critical lay perceptions may vary as a function of conservatism. Using five survey experiments, we find that political conservatism is associated with low comfort with and trust in AI-i.e., with AI aversion. This relationship between conservatism and AI aversion is explained by the link between conservatism and risk perception; more conservative individuals perceive AI as being riskier and are therefore more averse to its adoption. Finally, we test whether a moral reframing intervention can reduce AI aversion among conservatives.

Time for Change? The Why, What and How of Promoting Innovation to Tackle Rare Diseases - Is It Time to Update the EU's Orphan Regulation? And if so, What Should be Changed?

Since developments are global in the healthcare arena, more should be done to align EU and other big markets' regulatory practices for rare disease patients. Notwithstanding efforts and cooperation between the US and EU aimed to harmonize their strategic plans in the field of orphan drugs, regulatory criteria and procedures to gain the designation, terms and classifications should be still harmonised. Aligning the criteria of prevalence and support to orphan medicines in the various jurisdictions internationally, would facilitate patient recruitment eventually at global level, so as to gain the data and the biological insights required to identify biomarkers and appropriate endpoints needed for progressing clinical development. A conducive regulatory environment can further support the development of medicines to treat rare diseases. Overall there is a need for joined-up regulatory process coordination. Better integration of regulatory pathways and better integration of regulatory systems, such as scientific tools and methods to generate evidence, would be helpful. There is a need to revise and agree the current frameworks to be improved which will take into account the considerations and challenges to diagnose and treat different rare diseases and improve quality of life. Deliberative processes with multi-stakeholders' involvement for reimbursement should be considered. This paper explores the successes and limitation of both the regulation and its implementation mechanisms in the current regulatory context, and suggests some improvements that could maximise its benefits and boost rare disease research even further.

The myth of harmless wrongs in moral cognition: Automatic dyadic completion from sin to suffering.

When something is wrong, someone is harmed. This hypothesis derives from the theory of dyadic morality, which suggests a moral cognitive template of wrongdoing agent and suffering patient (i.e., victim). This dyadic template means that victimless wrongs (e.g., masturbation) are psychologically incomplete, compelling the mind to perceive victims even when they are objectively absent. Five studies reveal that dyadic completion occurs automatically and implicitly: Ostensibly harmless wrongs are perceived to have victims (Study 1), activate concepts of harm (Studies 2 and 3), and increase perceptions of suffering (Studies 4 and 5). These results suggest that perceiving harm in immorality is intuitive and does not require effortful rationalization. This interpretation argues against both standard interpretations of moral dumbfounding and domain-specific theories of morality that assume the psychological existence of harmless wrongs. Dyadic completion also suggests that moral dilemmas in which wrongness (deontology) and harm (utilitarianism) conflict are unrepresentative of typical moral cognition.

Paying it forward: generalized reciprocity and the limits of generosity.

When people are the victims of greed or recipients of generosity, their first impulse is often to pay back that behavior in kind. What happens when people cannot reciprocate, but instead have the chance to be cruel or kind to someone entirely different--to pay it forward? In 5 experiments, participants received greedy, equal, or generous divisions of money or labor from an anonymous person and then divided additional resources with a new anonymous person. While equal treatment was paid forward in kind, greed was paid forward more than generosity. This asymmetry was driven by negative affect, such that a positive affect intervention disrupted the tendency to pay greed forward. Implications for models of generalized reciprocity are discussed.

Give what you get: capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 4-year-old children pay forward positive and negative outcomes to conspecifics.

The breadth of human generosity is unparalleled in the natural world, and much research has explored the mechanisms underlying and motivating human prosocial behavior. Recent work has focused on the spread of prosocial behavior within groups through paying-it-forward, a case of human prosociality in which a recipient of generosity pays a good deed forward to a third individual, rather than back to the original source of generosity. While research shows that human adults do indeed pay forward generosity, little is known about the origins of this behavior. Here, we show that both capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and 4-year-old children pay forward positive and negative outcomes in an identical testing paradigm. These results suggest that a cognitively simple mechanism present early in phylogeny and ontogeny leads to paying forward positive, as well as negative, outcomes.

Mind-blanking: when the mind goes away.

People often feel like their minds and their bodies are in different places. Far from an exotic experience, this phenomenon seems to be a ubiquitous facet of human life (e.g., Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010). Many times, people's minds seem to go "somewhere else"-attention becomes disconnected from perception, and people's minds wander to times and places removed from the current environment (e.g., Schooler et al., 2004). At other times, however, people's minds may seem to go nowhere at all-they simply disappear. This mental state-mind-blanking-may represent an extreme decoupling of perception and attention, one in which attention fails to bring any stimuli into conscious awareness. In the present research, we outline the properties of mind-blanking, differentiating this mental state from other mental states in terms of phenomenological experience, behavioral outcomes, and underlying cognitive processes. Seven experiments suggest that when the mind seems to disappear, there are times when we have simply failed to monitor its whereabouts-and there are times when it is actually gone.

Inversión uterina aguda / Acute inversion of the uterus

Se revisan 13 expedientes de pacientes que presentaron inversión uterina aguda. No se hallan factores predisponentes y/o precipitantes que por sí sólo explicaran este accidente del tercer estadío de la labor de parto. La hemorragia y el shock fueron los hallazgo clínicos más frecuentes. El diagnóstico inmediato de la inversión uterina facilita el tratamiento manual corrector del útero invertido, el cual se puede realizar sin necesidad de anestesia en la mayoría de los casos. La pronta reposición manual del útero invertido con el tratamiento simultáneo para el shock y hemorragia disminuyen los síntomas y complicaciones maternas.