The impact of environmental regulation on enterprises' green innovation under the constraint of external financing: evidence from China's industrial firms.

In recent years, the value of green innovation in achieving high-quality development in China has been increasingly recognized. However, studies on different types of green innovation under various environmental regulations have not established a systematic framework; especially, those considering external financing constraints are lacking. This study subdivides both environmental regulation and green innovation. Specifically, environmental regulation is divided into command-and-control regulation, market-incentive regulation, and public-participation regulation. Green technology innovation is divided into cleaner production technology innovation and end-of-pipe technology innovation. Moreover, this study explores whether and how environmental regulation affects green technology innovation, and investigates the moderating effect of external financing constraints, by matching the data from China Environmental Yearbook and China Industrial Enterprise Database. The results show that both command-and-control regulation and market-incentive regulation have the U-shaped relationship with cleaner production technology innovation. Meanwhile, public-participation environmental regulation significantly and positively affects cleaner production technology innovation, whereas market-incentive regulation and public-participation regulation have the inverted U-shaped relationship with end-of-pipe technology innovation. In addition, the external financing constraints have a moderating effect on the relationship between environmental regulation and cleaner production technology innovation.

Can the Behavioural Spillover Effect Affect the Environmental Regulations Strategy Choice of Local Governments?

Combined with the characteristics of the Chinese environmental regulation supervision system and evolutionary game theory, the spillover effect of local governments' investment behaviour has been incorporated into their payment function to study the influence of spillover on the strategy choice of local governments and enterprises. The results show that (1) the spillover effect is one of the reasons for distortions in the implementation of environmental regulations. Whether the influence of the spillover effect on the probability of local governments choosing the strategy of strict supervision is positive or negative depends on the environmental benefit of the local government's environmental protection investment. (2) Increasing the reward for the enterprise's complete green technology innovation behaviour is conducive to improving the probability of the enterprises choosing the strategy of complete green technology innovation, while it reduces the probability of local governments choosing the strategy of strict supervision. Increasing punishment for enterprises' incomplete green technology innovation behaviour is conducive to improving the probability of enterprises choosing the strategy of complete green technology innovation, but its impact on the probability of local governments choosing the strategy of strict supervision is uncertain due to the limitations of many factors. (3) Enterprises' emission reduction capacity is positively related to the probability of the enterprises choosing the strategy of complete green technology innovation and is negatively related to the probability of local governments choosing the strategy of strict supervision. The research conclusions provide a new explanation for the distorted enforcement of environmental regulations from the perspective of the spillover of local governments' investment behaviour.

Financial performance evaluation of nuclear power-related enterprises from the perspective of sustainability.

A set of dynamic evaluation systems based on data envelopment analysis (DEA), Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) and Preference Ranking Organization Method for Enrichment Evaluation II has been constructed to determine the financial performance of Chinese nuclear power-related enterprises; the evaluation indicators reflect not only current development but also future development. (1) A comparison of the competitiveness of nine companies is conducted showing that Everbright Jiabao Co. Ltd. has the strongest competitiveness, the relative competitiveness of Dongfang Electric Corporation has declined year by year, and the competitiveness of Atlantic has increased year by year. (2) According to the analysis of the overall sustainable development capability indicated by financial performance, the financial performance of DUNAN Environment and Everbright Jiabao Co. Ltd. is relatively better than that of the other companies, and that of Atlantic is the worst. (3) According to the analysis of the sustainable development capability indicated by investment efficiency and development performance, during the 10-year development period, the investment efficiency and development performance of Dongfang Electric Corporation, DUNAN Environment, Wintime Energy Co. Ltd. and Everbright Jiabao Co. Ltd. increased, while those of Shanghai Electric and Hubei Energy Group Co. Ltd. declined. In the 10-year period, the other three companies, Boasteel Group, Atlantic, and HBIS Group Co. Ltd., developed unevenly. In addition, the investment efficiency and development performance of the nine companies are unbalanced in the two short-term development stages from 2007 to 2011 and from 2011 to 2016.

Implementation of a Multi-Agent Carbon Emission Reduction Strategy under the Chinese Dual Governance System: An Evolutionary Game Theoretical Approach.

A central-local dual governance system is the basic system of environmental governance in China. Co-governance between the central environmental protection department (CEPD) and local environmental protection departments (LEPDs) is an important means to effectively promote China's carbon emission reduction strategy. Accordingly, this paper discusses their interactive decision-making and investigates how to optimize the strategic relationships between the CEPD, LEPDs, and carbon emission enterprises (CEEs) under the dual governance system by constructing a trilateral evolutionary game model and analyzing evolutionary stability strategies, achieving a numerical experiment simulation of evolution processes and determining the impacts of various factors using MATLAB, leading to several countermeasures and suggestions. The results indicate that the CEPD should rationally use the incentive mechanism for LEPDs, improve the carbon tax system, and further penalize the nepotistic relationship of LEPDs and CEEs. Furthermore, it is essential to reform the current LEPD performance evaluation system and reduce the cost of LEPD positive regulation through subsidies and financial transfer payments. Additionally, the CEE strategy is affected by carbon reduction tax rates, penalties, subsides, and emission reduction costs and revenues. This study reveals the consequences of interactions between CEPD, LEPDs, and CEEs and presents options for the redesign of incentive and regulatory mechanisms to improve carbon emission reduction performance in China.

Effects of Rural Medical Insurance on Chronically Ill Patients' Choice of the Same Hospital Again in Rural Northern China.

The emergence of rural health insurance plays a crucial role in alleviating the pressure on rural medical expenditure. Under the current medical system in northern China, rural medical insurance may reduce the free referral of patients with chronic diseases among hospitals. This study was carried out based on the results of an investigation of rural chronically-ill patients in eight county hospitals in northern China, as well as through the comparison and analysis of patients with chronic diseases, considering whether they were with or without rural health insurance. The main results showed that both age (χ2 = 22.9, p < 0.000) and income level (χ2 = 18.5, p < 0.000) had considerable impact on the rural peoples' willingness to buy health insurance. Meanwhile, both the quality of the hospital's treatment (B = 0.555, p < 0.000), and service quality (B = 0.168, p < 0.000) had a significant positive correlation with the likelihood of a given patient choosing the same hospital on the next visit, but the medical costs had a significant negative correlation (B = -0.137, p < 0.000). Eventually, it was found that the provision of rural health insurance had weakened the three relationships upon which the aforementioned correlations were based.