Optimally generate policy-based evidence before scaling.

Social scientists have increasingly turned to the experimental method to understand human behaviour. One critical issue that makes solving social problems difficult is scaling up the idea from a small group to a larger group in more diverse situations. The urgency of scaling policies impacts us every day, whether it is protecting the health and safety of a community or enhancing the opportunities of future generations. Yet, a common result is that, when we scale up ideas, most experience a 'voltage drop'-that is, on scaling, the cost-benefit profile depreciates considerably. Here I argue that, to reduce voltage drops, we must optimally generate policy-based evidence. Optimality requires answering two crucial questions: what information should be generated and in what sequence. The economics underlying the science of scaling provides insights into these questions, which are in some cases at odds with conventional approaches. For example, there are important situations in which I advocate flipping the traditional social science research model to an approach that, from the beginning, produces the type of policy-based evidence that the science of scaling demands. To do so, I propose augmenting efficacy trials by including relevant tests of scale in the original discovery process, which forces the scientist to naturally start with a recognition of the big picture: what information do I need to have scaling confidence?

The missing risks of climate change.

The risks of climate change are enormous, threatening the lives and livelihoods of millions to billions of people. The economic consequences of many of the complex risks associated with climate change cannot, however, currently be quantified. Here we argue that these unquantified, poorly understood and often deeply uncertain risks can and should be included in economic evaluations and decision-making processes. We present an overview of these unquantified risks and an ontology of them founded on the reasons behind their lack of robust evaluation. These consist of risks missing owing to delays in sharing knowledge and expertise across disciplines, spatial and temporal variations of climate impacts, feedbacks and interactions between risks, deep uncertainty in our knowledge, and currently unidentified risks. We highlight collaboration needs within and between the natural and social science communities to address these gaps. We also provide an approach for integrating assessments or speculations of these risks in a way that accounts for interdependencies, avoids double counting and makes assumptions clear. Multiple paths exist for engaging with these missing risks, with both model-based quantification and non-model-based qualitative assessments playing crucial roles. A wide range of climate impacts are understudied or challenging to quantify, and are missing from current evaluations of the climate risks to lives and livelihoods. Strong interdisciplinary collaboration and deeper engagement with uncertainty is needed to properly inform policymakers and the public about climate risks.

Meaningful measures of human society in the twenty-first century.

Science rarely proceeds beyond what scientists can observe and measure, and sometimes what can be observed proceeds far ahead of scientific understanding. The twenty-first century offers such a moment in the study of human societies. A vastly larger share of behaviours is observed today than would have been imaginable at the close of the twentieth century. Our interpersonal communication, our movements and many of our everyday actions, are all potentially accessible for scientific research; sometimes through purposive instrumentation for scientific objectives (for example, satellite imagery), but far more often these objectives are, literally, an afterthought (for example, Twitter data streams). Here we evaluate the potential of this massive instrumentation-the creation of techniques for the structured representation and quantification-of human behaviour through the lens of scientific measurement and its principles. In particular, we focus on the question of how we extract scientific meaning from data that often were not created for such purposes. These data present conceptual, computational and ethical challenges that require a rejuvenation of our scientific theories to keep up with the rapidly changing social realities and our capacities to capture them. We require, in other words, new approaches to manage, use and analyse data.

Human social sensing is an untapped resource for computational social science.

The ability to 'sense' the social environment and thereby to understand the thoughts and actions of others allows humans to fit into their social worlds, communicate and cooperate, and learn from others' experiences. Here we argue that, through the lens of computational social science, this ability can be used to advance research into human sociality. When strategically selected to represent a specific population of interest, human social sensors can help to describe and predict societal trends. In addition, their reports of how they experience their social worlds can help to build models of social dynamics that are constrained by the empirical reality of human social systems.

Integrating explanation and prediction in computational social science.

Computational social science is more than just large repositories of digital data and the computational methods needed to construct and analyse them. It also represents a convergence of different fields with different ways of thinking about and doing science. The goal of this Perspective is to provide some clarity around how these approaches differ from one another and to propose how they might be productively integrated. Towards this end we make two contributions. The first is a schema for thinking about research activities along two dimensions-the extent to which work is explanatory, focusing on identifying and estimating causal effects, and the degree of consideration given to testing predictions of outcomes-and how these two priorities can complement, rather than compete with, one another. Our second contribution is to advocate that computational social scientists devote more attention to combining prediction and explanation, which we call integrative modelling, and to outline some practical suggestions for realizing this goal.

Measuring algorithmically infused societies.

It has been the historic responsibility of the social sciences to investigate human societies. Fulfilling this responsibility requires social theories, measurement models and social data. Most existing theories and measurement models in the social sciences were not developed with the deep societal reach of algorithms in mind. The emergence of 'algorithmically infused societies'-societies whose very fabric is co-shaped by algorithmic and human behaviour-raises three key challenges: the insufficient quality of measurements, the complex consequences of (mis)measurements, and the limits of existing social theories. Here we argue that tackling these challenges requires new social theories that account for the impact of algorithmic systems on social realities. To develop such theories, we need new methodologies for integrating data and measurements into theory construction. Given the scale at which measurements can be applied, we believe measurement models should be trustworthy, auditable and just. To achieve this, the development of measurements should be transparent and participatory, and include mechanisms to ensure measurement quality and identify possible harms. We argue that computational social scientists should rethink what aspects of algorithmically infused societies should be measured, how they should be measured, and the consequences of doing so.

Estimating a social cost of carbon for global energy consumption.

Estimates of global economic damage caused by carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions can inform climate policy1-3. The social cost of carbon (SCC) quantifies these damages by characterizing how additional CO2 emissions today impact future economic outcomes through altering the climate4-6. Previous estimates have suggested that large, warming-driven increases in energy expenditures could dominate the SCC7,8, but they rely on models9-11 that are spatially coarse and not tightly linked to data2,3,6,7,12,13. Here we show that the release of one ton of CO2 today is projected to reduce total future energy expenditures, with most estimates valued between -US$3 and -US$1, depending on discount rates. Our results are based on an architecture that integrates global data, econometrics and climate science to estimate local damages worldwide. Notably, we project that emerging economies in the tropics will dramatically increase electricity consumption owing to warming, which requires critical infrastructure planning. However, heating reductions in colder countries offset this increase globally. We estimate that 2099 annual global electricity consumption increases by about 4.5 exajoules (7 per cent of current global consumption) per one-degree-Celsius increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), whereas direct consumption of other fuels declines by about 11.3 exajoules (7 per cent of current global consumption) per one-degree-Celsius increase in GMST. Our finding of net savings contradicts previous research7,8, because global data indicate that many populations will remain too poor for most of the twenty-first century to substantially increase energy consumption in response to warming. Importantly, damage estimates would differ if poorer populations were given greater weight14.

Exposing omitted moderators: Explaining why effect sizes differ in the social sciences.

Policymakers increasingly rely on behavioral science in response to global challenges, such as climate change or global health crises. But applications of behavioral science face an important problem: Interventions often exert substantially different effects across contexts and individuals. We examine this heterogeneity for different paradigms that underlie many behavioral interventions. We study the paradigms in a series of five preregistered studies across one in-person and 10 online panels, with over 11,000 respondents in total. We find substantial heterogeneity across settings and paradigms, apply techniques for modeling the heterogeneity, and introduce a framework that measures typically omitted moderators. The framework's factors (Fluid Intelligence, Attentiveness, Crystallized Intelligence, and Experience) affect the effectiveness of many text-based interventions, producing different observed effect sizes and explaining variations across samples. Moderators are associated with effect sizes through two paths, with the intensity of the manipulation and with the effect of the manipulation directly. Our results motivate observing these moderators and provide a theoretical and empirical framework for understanding and predicting varying effect sizes in the social sciences.

Can Generative AI improve social science?

Generative AI that can produce realistic text, images, and other human-like outputs is currently transforming many different industries. Yet it is not yet known how such tools might influence social science research. I argue Generative AI has the potential to improve survey research, online experiments, automated content analyses, agent-based models, and other techniques commonly used to study human behavior. In the second section of this article, I discuss the many limitations of Generative. I examine how bias in the data used to train these tools can negatively impact social science research-as well as a range of other challenges related to ethics, replication, environmental impact, and the proliferation of low-quality research. I conclude by arguing that social scientists can address many of these limitations by creating open-source infrastructure for research on human behavior. Such infrastructure is not only necessary to ensure broad access to high-quality research tools, I argue, but also because the progress of AI will require deeper understanding of the social forces that guide human behavior.

Social mobility in the Tang Dynasty as the Imperial Examination rose and aristocratic family pedigree declined, 618-907 CE.

Data from the distant past are fertile ground for testing social science theories of education and social mobility. In this study, we construct a dataset from 3,640 tomb epitaphs of males in China's Tang Dynasty (618-907 CE), which contain granular and extensive information about the ancestral origins, family background, and career histories of the deceased elites. Our statistical analysis of the complete profiles yields evidence of the transition away from an aristocratic society in three key trends: 1) family pedigree (i.e., aristocracy) mattered less for career achievement over time, 2) passing the Imperial Examination (Keju) became an increasingly important predictor of one's career achievement, and 3) father's position always mattered throughout the Tang, especially for men who did not pass the Keju. The twilight of medieval Chinese aristocracy, according to the data, began in as early as the mid-seventh century CE.

The long-term expansion and recession of human populations.

Over the last 12,000 y, human populations have expanded and transformed critical earth systems. Yet, a key unresolved question in the environmental and social sciences remains: Why did human populations grow and, sometimes, decline in the first place? Our research builds on 20 y of archaeological research studying the deep time dynamics of human populations to propose an explanation for the long-term growth and stability of human populations. Innovations in the productive capacity of populations fuels exponential-like growth over thousands of years; however, innovations saturate over time and, often, may leave populations vulnerable to large recessions in their well-being and population density. Empirically, we find a trade-off between changes in land use that increase the production and consumption of carbohydrates, driving repeated waves of population growth over thousands of years, and the susceptibility of populations to large recessions due to a lag in the impact of humans on resources. These results shed light on the long-term drivers of human population growth and decline.

A discipline-wide investigation of the replicability of Psychology papers over the past two decades.

Conjecture about the weak replicability in social sciences has made scholars eager to quantify the scale and scope of replication failure for a discipline. Yet small-scale manual replication methods alone are ill-suited to deal with this big data problem. Here, we conduct a discipline-wide replication census in science. Our sample (N = 14,126 papers) covers nearly all papers published in the six top-tier Psychology journals over the past 20 y. Using a validated machine learning model that estimates a paper's likelihood of replication, we found evidence that both supports and refutes speculations drawn from a relatively small sample of manual replications. First, we find that a single overall replication rate of Psychology poorly captures the varying degree of replicability among subfields. Second, we find that replication rates are strongly correlated with research methods in all subfields. Experiments replicate at a significantly lower rate than do non-experimental studies. Third, we find that authors' cumulative publication number and citation impact are positively related to the likelihood of replication, while other proxies of research quality and rigor, such as an author's university prestige and a paper's citations, are unrelated to replicability. Finally, contrary to the ideal that media attention should cover replicable research, we find that media attention is positively related to the likelihood of replication failure. Our assessments of the scale and scope of replicability are important next steps toward broadly resolving issues of replicability.

The search for ocean solutions.

The search for ways to protect and restore ocean health is rapidly accelerating and expanding. A new collection of articles draws on biological and social sciences to suggest changes in how ocean science and conservation are conducted to achieve a sustainable, healthy and inclusive future.

Complex societies precede moralizing gods throughout world history.

The origins of religion and of complex societies represent evolutionary puzzles1-8. The 'moralizing gods' hypothesis offers a solution to both puzzles by proposing that belief in morally concerned supernatural agents culturally evolved to facilitate cooperation among strangers in large-scale societies9-13. Although previous research has suggested an association between the presence of moralizing gods and social complexity3,6,7,9-18, the relationship between the two is disputed9-13,19-24, and attempts to establish causality have been hampered by limitations in the availability of detailed global longitudinal data. To overcome these limitations, here we systematically coded records from 414 societies that span the past 10,000 years from 30 regions around the world, using 51 measures of social complexity and 4 measures of supernatural enforcement of morality. Our analyses not only confirm the association between moralizing gods and social complexity, but also reveal that moralizing gods follow-rather than precede-large increases in social complexity. Contrary to previous predictions9,12,16,18, powerful moralizing 'big gods' and prosocial supernatural punishment tend to appear only after the emergence of 'megasocieties' with populations of more than around one million people. Moralizing gods are not a prerequisite for the evolution of social complexity, but they may help to sustain and expand complex multi-ethnic empires after they have become established. By contrast, rituals that facilitate the standardization of religious traditions across large populations25,26 generally precede the appearance of moralizing gods. This suggests that ritual practices were more important than the particular content of religious belief to the initial rise of social complexity.