The regulation of competition and procurement in the National Health Service 2015-2018: enduring hierarchical control and the limits of juridification.

Since 1990, market mechanisms have occurred in the predominantly hierarchical National Health Service (NHS). The Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to concerns that market principles had been irrevocably embedded in the NHS and that the regulators would acquire unwarranted power compared with politicians (known as 'juridification'). To assess this concern, we analysed regulatory activity in the period from 2015 to 2018. We explored how economic regulation of the NHS had changed in light of the policy turn back to hierarchy in 2014 and the changes in the legislative framework under Public Contracts Regulations 2015. We found the continuing dominance of hierarchical modes of control was reflected in the relative dominance and behaviour of the sector economic regulator. But there had also been a limited degree of juridification involving the courts. Generally, the regulatory decisions were consistent with the 2014 policy shift away from market principles and with the enduring role of hierarchy in the NHS, but the existing legislative regime did allow the incursion of pro market regulatory decision making, and instances of such decisions were identified.

Exploring the impacts of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act reforms to commissioning on clinical activity in the English NHS: a mixed methods study of cervical screening.

OBJECTIVES: Explore the impact of changes to commissioning introduced in England by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA) on cervical screening activity in areas identified empirically as particularly affected organisationally by the reforms. METHODS: Qualitative followed by quantitative methods. Qualitative: semi-structured interviews (with NHS commissioners, managers, clinicians, senior administrative staff from Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), local authorities, service providers), observations of commissioning meetings in two metropolitan areas of England. Quantitative: triple-difference analysis of national administrative data. Variability in the expected effects of HSCA on commissioning was measured by comparing CCGs working with one local authority with CCGs working with multiple local authorities. To control for unmeasured confounders, differential changes over time in cervical screening rates (among women, 25-64 years) between CCGs more and less likely to have been affected by HSCA commissioning organisational change were compared with another outcome-unassisted birth rates-largely unaffected by HSCA changes. RESULTS: Interviewees identified that cervical screening commissioning and provision was more complex and 'fragmented', with responsibilities less certain, following the HSCA. Interviewees predicted this would reduce cervical screening rates in some areas more than others. Quantitative findings supported these predictions. Areas where CCGs dealt with multiple local authorities experienced a larger decline in cervical screening rates (1.4%) than those dealing with one local authority (1.0%). Over the same period, unassisted deliveries decreased by 1.6% and 2.0%, respectively, in the two groups. CONCLUSIONS: Arrangements for commissioning and delivering cervical screening were disrupted and made more complex by the HSCA. Areas most affected saw a greater decline in screening rates than others. The fact that this was identified qualitatively and then confirmed quantitatively strengthens this finding. The study suggests large-scale health system reforms may have unintended consequences, and that complex commissioning arrangements may be problematic.

Co-operation and conflict under hard and soft contracting regimes: case studies from England and Wales.

BACKGROUND: This paper examines NHS secondary care contracting in England and Wales in a period which saw increasing policy divergence between the two systems. At face value, England was making greater use of market levers and utilising harder-edged service contracts incorporating financial penalties and incentives, while Wales was retreating from the 1990 s internal market and emphasising cooperation and flexibility in the contracting process. But there were also cross-border spill-overs involving common contracting technologies and management cultures that meant that differences in on-the-ground contracting practices might be smaller than headline policy differences suggested. METHODS: The nature of real-world contracting behaviour was investigated by undertaking two qualitative case studies in England and two in Wales, each based on a local purchaser/provider network. The case studies involved ethnographic observations and interviews with staff in primary care trusts (PCTs) or local health boards (LHBs), NHS or Foundation trusts, and the overseeing Strategic Health Authority or NHS Wales regional office, as well as scrutiny of relevant documents. RESULTS: Wider policy differences between the two NHS systems were reflected in differing contracting frameworks, involving regional commissioning in Wales and commissioning by either a PCT, or co-operating pair of PCTs in our English case studies, and also in different oversight arrangements by higher tiers of the service. However, long-term relationships and trust between purchasers and providers had an important role in both systems when the financial viability of organisations was at risk. In England, the study found examples where both PCTs and trusts relaxed contractual requirements to assist partners faced with deficits. In Wales, news of plans to end the purchaser/provider split meant a return to less precisely-specified block contracts and a renewed concern to build cooperation between LHB and trust staff. CONCLUSIONS: The interdependency of local purchasers and providers fostered long-term relationships and co-operation that shaped contracting behaviour, just as much as the design of contracts and the presence or absence of contractual penalties and incentives. Although conflict and tensions between contracting partners sometimes surfaced in both the English and Welsh case studies, cooperative behaviour became crucial in times of trouble.

An economic analysis of the limits of market based reforms in the English NHS.

BACKGROUND: Over the past three decades, a limited range of market like mechanisms have been introduced into the hierarchically structured English National Health Service ('NHS'), which is a nationally tax funded, budget limited healthcare system, with access to care for all, producing structures known as a quasi market. Recently, the Health and Social Care Act 2012 ('HSCA') has been enacted, introducing further market elements. The paper examines the theory and effects of these market mechanisms. METHODS: Using neo-classical economics as a primary theoretical framework, as well as new institutional economics and socio-legal theory, the paper first examines the fundamental elements of markets, comparing these with the operation of authority and resource allocation employed in hierarchical structures. Second, the paper examines the application of market concepts to the delivery of healthcare, drawing out the problems which economic and socio-legal theories predict are likely to be encountered. Third, the paper discusses the research evidence concerning the operation of the quasi market in the English NHS. This evidence is provided by research conducted in the UK which uses economic and socio-legal logic to investigate the operation of the economic aspects of the NHS quasi market. Fourth, the paper provides an analysis of the salient elements of the quasi market regime amended by the HSCA 2012. RESULTS: It is not possible to construct a market conforming to classical economic principles in respect of healthcare. Moreover, it is not desirable to do so, as goals which markets cannot deliver (such as fairness of access) are crucial in England. Most of the evidence shows that the quasi market mechanisms used in the English NHS do not appear to be effective either. This finding should be seen in the light of the fact that the operation of these mechanisms has been significantly affected by the national political (i.e. continuingly hierarchical) and budgetary context in which they are operating. CONCLUSION: The organisational structures of a hierarchy are more appropriate for the delivery of healthcare in the English NHS.

Innovation and the English National Health Service: a qualitative study of the independent sector treatment centre programme.

Over the past two decades, an international trend of exposing public health services to different forms of economic organisation has emerged. In the English National Health Service (NHS), care is currently provided through a quasi-market including 'diverse' providers from the private and third sector. The predominant scheme through which private sector companies have been awarded NHS contracts is the Independent Sector Treatment Centre (ISTC) programme. ISTCs were designed to produce innovative models of service delivery for elective care and stimulate innovation among incumbent NHS providers. This paper investigates these claims using qualitative data on the impact of an ISTC upon a local health economy (LHE) composed of NHS organisations in England. Using the case of elective orthopaedic surgery, we conducted semi-structured interviews with senior managers from incumbent NHS providers and an ISTC in 2009. We show that ISTCs exhibit a different relationship with frontline clinicians because they counteract the power of professional communities associated with the NHS. This has positive and negative consequences for innovation. ISTCs have introduced new routines unencumbered by the extant norms of professional communities, but they appear to represent weaker learning environments and do not reproduce cooperation across organisational boundaries to the same extent as incumbent NHS providers.

From health technology assessment to research on the organisation and delivery of health services: addressing the balance.

This paper argues that the focus of research to improve health services has, until recently, been on health technology assessment. The authors make the case for a greater emphasis on research on how health services are managed, organised and delivered, and refer to initiatives in a number of countries which are seeking to address this balance. The way two such initiatives in England and Canada have set priorities for this type of research, involving a wide range of stakeholders is described. The authors argue that a wide range of disciplines needs to be applied to research on the organisation and delivery of health services. Important theoretical differences between and within disciplines, and their implications for research methods, are discussed. An example of an issue in the delivery of organisation of health services (how best to deliver orthopaedic care) is used to illustrate how a number of different disciplines can be applied. The challenge for researchers from these disciplines is to see how far they can work together to carry out research in this important field. The challenge for this research is that the findings are valued and used by health service professionals, managers and users.