Investigation of a food-borne outbreak of gastroenteritis in a school canteen revealed a variant of sapovirus genogroup V not detected by standard PCR, Sollentuna, Sweden, 2016.

A food-borne outbreak of gastroenteritis with more than 650 suspected cases occurred in April 2016 in Sollentuna, Sweden. It originated in a school kitchen serving a total of 2,700 meals daily. Initial microbiological testing (for Campylobacter, Salmonella, Shigella, Yersinia, Giardia, Cryptosporidium, Entamoeba histolytica, adeno-, astro-, noro-, rota- and sapovirus) of stool samples from 15 symptomatic cases was negative, despite a clinical presentation suggestive of calicivirus. Analyses of the findings from both the Sollentuna municipality environmental team and a web-based questionnaire suggested that the source of the outbreak was the salad buffet served on 20 April, although no specific food item could be identified. Subsequent electron microscopic examination of stool samples followed by whole genome sequencing revealed a variant of sapovirus genogroup V. The virus was not detected using standard PCR screening. This paper describes the epidemiological outbreak investigation and findings leading to the discovery.

Six-week follow-up after HIV-1 exposure: a position statement from the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Swedish Reference Group for Antiviral Therapy.

In 2014 the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the Swedish Reference Group for Antiviral Therapy (RAV) conducted a review and analysis of the state of knowledge on the duration of follow-up after exposure to human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). Up until then a follow-up of 12 weeks after exposure had been recommended, but improved tests and new information on early diagnosis motivated a re-evaluation of the national recommendations by experts representing infectious diseases and microbiology, county medical officers, the RAV, the Public Health Agency, and other national authorities. Based on the current state of knowledge the Public Health Agency of Sweden and the RAV recommend, starting in April 2015, a follow-up period of 6 weeks after possible HIV-1 exposure, if HIV testing is performed using laboratory-based combination tests detecting both HIV antibody and antigen. If point-of-care rapid HIV tests are used, a follow-up period of 8 weeks is recommended, because currently available rapid tests have insufficient sensitivity for detection of HIV-1 antigen. A follow-up period of 12 weeks is recommended after a possible exposure for HIV-2, since presently used assays do not include HIV-2 antigens and only limited information is available on the development of HIV antibodies during early HIV-2 infection. If pre- or post-exposure prophylaxis is administered, the follow-up period is recommended to begin after completion of prophylaxis. Even if infection cannot be reliably excluded before the end of the recommended follow-up period, HIV testing should be performed at first contact for persons who seek such testing.

Infection control in the management of highly pathogenic infectious diseases: consensus of the European Network of Infectious Disease.

The European Network for Infectious Diseases (EUNID) is a network of clinicians, public health epidemiologists, microbiologists, infection control, and critical-care doctors from the European member states, who are experienced in the management of patients with highly infectious diseases. We aim to develop a consensus recommendation for infection control during clinical management and invasive procedures in such patients. After an extensive literature review, draft recommendations were amended jointly by 27 partners from 15 European countries. Recommendations include repetitive training of staff to ascertain infection control, systematic use of cough and respiratory etiquette at admission to the emergency department, fluid sampling in the isolation room, and analyses in biosafety level 3/4 laboratories, and preference for point-of-care bedside laboratory tests. Children should be cared for by paediatricians and intensive-care patients should be cared for by critical-care doctors in high-level isolation units (HLIU). Invasive procedures should be avoided if unnecessary or done in the HLIU, as should chest radiography, ultrasonography, and renal dialysis. Procedures that require transport of patients out of the HLIU should be done during designated sessions or hours in secure transport. Picture archiving and communication systems should be used. Post-mortem examination should be avoided; biopsy or blood collection is preferred.