Delays in Diagnosis, Treatment, and Surgery: Root Causes, Actions Taken, and Recommendations for Healthcare Improvement.

OBJECTIVES: Although patient safety continues to be a priority in the U.S. healthcare system, delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery still led to adverse events for patients. The purpose of this study was to review root cause analysis (RCA) reports in the Veterans Health Administration to identify the root causes and contributing factors of delays in diagnosis, treatment, or surgery in an effort to prevent avoidable delays in future care. METHODS: The RCA reports from Veterans Health Administration hospitals from October 2016 through September 2019 were reviewed and the root causes and contributory factors were identified. These elements were coded by consensus and analyzed using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: During the 3-year study period, 206 RCAs were identified and 163 were analyzed that were specific to delays in diagnosis, treatment, and surgery. The reports identified 24 delays in diagnosis, 117 delays in treatment, and 22 delays in surgery. Delays occurred most often in outpatient settings. CONCLUSIONS: Results supported the need for standardization of care processes and procedures, improved communication between and within department personnel, and improved policies and procedures that will be followed as intended. By reviewing adverse events, root causes, and contributing factors identified by local RCA teams, strategies can be developed to reduce delays in diagnosis and treatment of patients and lead to safer care.

Power Failures During Surgery: A 2000-2019 Review of Reported Events in the Veterans Health Administration.

OBJECTIVES: The frequency and impact of power failure on surgical care over time in a large integrated healthcare system such as the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is unknown. Reducing the likelihood of harm related to these rare but potential catastrophic events is imperative to ensuring patient safety and high-quality surgical care. This study provides analysis and description of reported power failures during surgery (January 2000-March 2019), in the VHA and their impact. METHODS: This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events related to power failure in the operating room reported by 63 VHA medical centers from the approximately 137 VHAs with a surgical program. Power failure events during surgery reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety are analyzed. RESULTS: The authors identify 20 root cause analyses and 135 safety reports. Most events 36.1% (n = 56) resulted from generator delay, equipment reboot delay 21.9% (n = 34), and equipment backup power failure 13.5% (n = 21). Root causes include issues with backup batteries or equipment, engineering and clinical staff communication, standardized procedures for testing power, backup power delay, electrical circuit issues, documentation, and training. Patient harm occurred in 18% (n = 28) and 3.9% (n = 6) as major or catastrophic. CONCLUSIONS: Power failure during surgery is associated with major or catastrophic patient harm, though rare. Staff preoccupation with failure, disaster preparedness, and focus on communication has the potential to minimize or avoid patient harm.

The Impact of Surgical Count Technology on Retained Surgical Items Rates in the Veterans Health Administration.

OBJECTIVES: The aim of the study was to compare retained surgical item (RSI) rates for 137 Veterans Health Administration Surgery Programs with and without surgical count technology and the root cause analysis (RCA) for soft good RSI events between October 1, 2009 and December 31, 2016. A 2017 survey identified 46 programs to have independently acquired surgical count technology. METHODS: Retained surgical item rates were calculated by the sum of events (sharp, soft good, instrument) divided by the total procedures performed. The RCAs for RSI events were analyzed using codebooks for procedure type/location and root cause characterization. RESULTS: One hundred twenty-four RSI events occurred in 2,964,472 procedures for an overall RSI rate of 1/23,908 procedures. The RSI rates for 46 programs with surgical count technology were significantly higher in comparison with 91 programs without a surgical count technology system (1/18,221 versus 1/30,593, P = 0.0026). The RSI rates before and after acquiring the surgical count technology were not significantly different (1/17,508 versus 1/18,673, P = 0.8015). Root cause analyses for 42 soft good RSI events identified multiple associated disciplines (general surgery 26, urology 5, cardiac 4, neurosurgery 3, vascular 2, thoracic 1, gynecology 1) and locations (abdomen 26, thorax 7, retroperitoneal 4, paraspinal 2, extremity 1, pelvis 1, and head/neck 1). Human factors (n = 24), failure of policy/procedure (n = 21), and communication (n = 19) accounted for 64 (65%) of the 98 root causes identified. CONCLUSIONS: Acquisition of surgical count technology did not significantly improve RSI rates. Soft good RSI events are associated with multiple disciplines and locations and the following dominant root causes: human factors, failure to follow policy/procedure, and communication.

Root Cause Analyses of Reported Adverse Events Occurring During Gastrointestinal Scope and Tube Placement Procedures in the Veterans Health Association.

OBJECTIVE: This study describes reported adverse events related to gastrointestinal (GI) scope and tube placement procedures (between January 2010 and June 2012), in the Veterans Health Administration. Adverse events, including those related to GI procedures resulting in preventable harm, continue to occur. METHODS: This is a descriptive review of root cause analysis reports of GI scope and tube placement procedures from the National Center for Patient Safety database. Adverse event type, procedure, location, severity, and frequency were extracted. Spearman ρ was used to determine associations between types of adverse events and harm levels. RESULTS: We reviewed 27 cases of reported adverse events related to GI invasive procedures. Of the adverse events for which we could determine location (n = 25), 10 (40%) were in the operating room and 15 (60%) occurred in a nonoperating room. Endoscopies were associated with the least amount of harm. The most frequently reported adverse event types were human factors (22.22%, n = 6) and retained items (18.52%, n = 5). Retained item events were associated with the most harm. The most common root causes were lack of standardization in the process of care and suboptimal communication. CONCLUSIONS: Retained items after invasive procedures and human factors errors were the most common and harmful type of adverse event in this study. Efforts to reduce adverse events during GI invasive procedures include improving situational awareness of the risk of retained items, standardization of care, communication between providers, and inspection of instruments for intactness before and after procedures.

Wrong Site Spine Surgery in the Veterans Administration.

STUDY DESIGN: Basic descriptive analysis was performed for the incident characteristics of wrong level spinal surgery in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). OBJECTIVE: To determine the frequency of reported occurrence of incorrect spine level surgery in the VHA, causal factors for the events, and propose solutions to the issue. SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND DATA: Wrong site surgery is one of the most common events reported to The Joint Commission. It has been reported that 50% of spine surgeons experience at least 1 wrong site surgery in their career, with events leading to signficant harm to patients. MATERIALS AND METHODS: We examined incorrect level spine surgery adverse events reported to the VHA National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) from 2000 to 2017. A rate of wrong site spine surgery was determined by dividing the number of wrong site cases by the total number of spine surgeries during the study period. Similarly, a rate of wrong site surgery by orthopedist and neurosurgeons was calculated. RESULTS: There were 32 reported cases of wrong site spine surgery between 2000 and 2017. Fourteen cases involved the cervical region, 13 the lumbar region, and 5 the thoracic region. The majority of the root causes (69% or 48 of 69 root causes) fell into 2 broad categories: problems with the radiograph or problems with the intraoperative marker. These were not mutually exclusive and several root cause analyses involved >1 of these issues. CONCLUSIONS: Wrong level surgery of the spine is a significant safety issue facing the field that continues to occur despite surgical teams following guidelines. As poor radiograph quality and interpretability were the most common root causes of these events, interventions aimed at optimizing image quality and accurate interpretation would be a logical first action.

Root Cause Analysis of Oncology Adverse Events in the Veterans Health Administration.

PURPOSE: Oncology providers are leaders in patient safety. Despite their efforts, oncology-related medical errors still occur, sometimes resulting in patient injury or death. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center of Patient Safety used data obtained from root cause analysis (RCA) to determine how and why these adverse events occurred in the VHA, and how to prevent future reoccurrence. This study details the types of oncology adverse events reported in VHA hospitals and their root causes and suggests actions for prevention and improvement. METHODS: We searched the National Center for Patient Safety adverse event reporting database for RCA related to oncology care from October 1, 2013, to September 8, 2017, to identify event types, root causes, severity of outcomes, care processes, and suggested actions. Two independent reviewers coded these variables, and inter-rater agreement was calculated by κ statistic. Variables were evaluated using descriptive statistics. RESULTS: We identified 48 RCA reports that specifically involved an oncology provider. Event types included care delays (39.5% [n = 19]), issues with chemotherapy (25% [n = 12]) and radiation (12.5% [n = 6]), other (12.5% [n = 6]), and suicide (10.5% [n = 5]). Of the 48 events, 27.1% (n = 13) resulted in death, 4.2% (n = 2) in severe harm, 18.8% (n = 9) in temporary harm, 20.8% (n = 10) in minimal harm, and 2.1% (n = 1) in no harm. The majority of root causes identified a need to improve care processes and policies, interdisciplinary communication, and care coordination. CONCLUSION: This analysis highlights an opportunity to implement system-wide changes to prevent similar events from reoccurring. These actions include comprehensive cancer clinics, usability testing of medical equipment, and standardization of processes and policies. Additional studies are necessary to assess oncologic adverse events across specialties.

Examining Wrong Eye Implant Adverse Events in the Veterans Health Administration With a Focus on Prevention: A Preliminary Report.

OBJECTIVE: The study goals were to examine wrong intraocular lens (IOL) implant adverse events in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA), identify root causes and contributing factors, and describe system changes that have been implemented to address this challenge. DESIGN: This study represents collaboration between the VHA's National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) and the National Surgery Office (NSO). PARTICIPANTS: This report includes 45 wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events reported to established VHA NCPS and NSO databases between July 1, 2006, and June 31, 2014. There are approximately 50,000 eye implant procedures performed each year in the VHA. METHODS: Wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events are reported by VHA facilities to the NCPS and the NSO. Two authors (A.C. and J.N.) coded the reports for event type (wrong lens or expired lens) and identified the primary contributing factor (coefficient κ = 0.837). A descriptive analysis was conducted, which included the reported yearly event rate. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: The main outcome measure was the reported wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events. RESULTS: There were 45 reported wrong IOL implant surgery adverse events. Between 2011 and June 30, 2014, there was a significant downward trend (P = 0.02, R = 99.7%) at a pace of -0.08 (per 10,000 cases) every year. The most frequently coded primary contributing factor was incomplete preprocedure time-out (n = 12) followed by failure to perform double check of preprocedural calculations based upon original data and implant read-back at the time the surgical eye implant was performed (n = 10). CONCLUSIONS: Preventing wrong IOL implant adverse events requires diligence beyond performance of the preprocedural time-out. In 2013, the VHA has modified policy to ensure double check of preprocedural calculations and implant read-back with positive impact. Continued analysis of contributing human factors and improved surgical team communication are warranted.

Assessment of Incorrect Surgical Procedures Within and Outside the Operating Room: A Follow-up Study From US Veterans Health Administration Medical Centers.

Importance: Reducing wrong-site surgery is fundamental to safe, high-quality care. This is a follow-up study examining 8 years of reported surgical adverse events and root causes in the nation's largest integrated health care system. Objectives: To provide a follow-up description of incorrect surgical procedures reported from 2010 to 2017 from US Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical centers, compared with the previous studies of 2001 to 2006 and 2006 to 2009, and to recommend actions for future prevention of such events. Design, Setting, and Participants: This quality improvement study describes patient safety adverse events and close calls reported from 86 VHA medical centers from the approximately 130 VHA facilities with a surgical program. The surgical procedures and programs vary in size and complexity from small rural centers to large, complex urban facilities. Procedures occurring between January 1, 2010, and December 31, 2017, were included. Data analysis took place in 2018. Main Outcomes and Measures: The categories of incorrect procedure types were wrong patient, side, site (including wrong-level spine), procedure, or implant. Events included those in or out of the operating room, adverse events or close calls, surgical specialty, and harm. These results were compared with the previous studies of VHA-reported wrong-site surgery (2001-2006 and 2006-2009). Results: Our review produced 483 reports (277 adverse events and 206 close calls). The rate of in-operating room (in-OR) reported adverse events with harm has continued to trend downward from 1.74 to 0.47 reported adverse events with harm per 100 000 procedures between 2000 and 2017 based on 6 591 986 in-OR procedures. When in-OR events were examined by discipline as a rate, dentistry had 1.54, neurosurgery had 1.53, and ophthalmology had 1.06 reported in-OR adverse events per 10 000 cases. The overall VHA in-OR rate for adverse events during 2010 to 2017 was 0.53 per 10 000 procedures based on 3 234 514 in-OR procedures. The most common root cause for adverse events was related to issues in performing a comprehensive time-out (28.4%). In these cases, the time-out either was conducted incorrectly or was incomplete in some way. Conclusions and Relevance: Over the period studied, the VHA identified a decrease in the rate of reported adverse events in the OR associated with harm and continued reporting of adverse event close calls. Organizational efforts continue to examine root cause analysis reports, promulgate lessons learned, and enhance policy to promote a culture and behavior that minimizes events and is transparent in reporting occurrences.

Explanation and elaboration of the SQUIRE (Standards for Quality Improvement Reporting Excellence) Guidelines, V.2.0: examples of SQUIRE elements in the healthcare improvement literature.

Since its publication in 2008, SQUIRE (Standards for Quality Improvement Reporting Excellence) has contributed to the completeness and transparency of reporting of quality improvement work, providing guidance to authors and reviewers of reports on healthcare improvement work. In the interim, enormous growth has occurred in understanding factors that influence the success, and failure, of healthcare improvement efforts. Progress has been particularly strong in three areas: the understanding of the theoretical basis for improvement work; the impact of contextual factors on outcomes; and the development of methodologies for studying improvement work. Consequently, there is now a need to revise the original publication guidelines. To reflect the breadth of knowledge and experience in the field, we solicited input from a wide variety of authors, editors and improvement professionals during the guideline revision process. This Explanation and Elaboration document (E&E) is a companion to the revised SQUIRE guidelines, SQUIRE 2.0. The product of collaboration by an international and interprofessional group of authors, this document provides examples from the published literature, and an explanation of how each reflects the intent of a specific item in SQUIRE. The purpose of the guidelines is to assist authors in writing clearly, precisely and completely about systematic efforts to improve the quality, safety and value of healthcare services. Authors can explore the SQUIRE statement, this E&E and related documents in detail at http://www.squire-statement.org.

Errors upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol associated with wrong surgery events in the Veterans Health Administration.

BACKGROUND: The Universal Protocol has been associated with the prevention of wrong surgery procedures; however, such events still occur. This article explores wrong surgery events, defined as those incorrect procedures (wrong site, wrong side, wrong procedure, wrong patient, wrong level, wrong implant) that would have occurred despite the Universal Protocol including the performance of a time-out by the surgical team. Understanding why some of these events are not caught by the steps of the Universal Protocol, culminating in the time-out, can help the field to add upstream and downstream safeguards to help prevent these never events. METHODS: The Veterans Health Administration database of root cause analyses was queried for all cases involving an incorrect surgical procedure between 2004 and 2013 to determine the relative frequency and characteristics of wrong surgery events because of errors upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol. This subgroup of wrong surgery events was selected from among all the wrong surgery events by 2 clinicians with expertise in patient safety (Kappa = .91). RESULTS: Forty-eight cases of wrong surgery events because of upstream/downstream errors were analyzed, representing 16% of the 308 root cause analyses for wrong surgery events reported during this period. Upstream errors included mislabeling of specimens, while downstream errors were associated with ineffective intraoperative process. Surgical procedures that were particularly vulnerable included wrong level spine operations, wrong patient prostatectomies, wrong implant cataract procedures, and wrong site skin lesion excisions. CONCLUSIONS: Wrong surgery events can and do occur despite adherence to Universal Protocol including a time-out. The prevention of incorrect procedures requires complementary safety behaviors and technologies to address errors that occur upstream and downstream to the Universal Protocol and the time-out.

Root cause analysis of serious adverse events among older patients in the Veterans Health Administration.

BACKGROUND: Preventable adverse events are more likely to occur among older patients because of the clinical complexity of their care. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) National Center for Patient Safety (NCPS) stores data about serious adverse events when a root cause analysis (RCA) has been performed. A primary objective of this study was to describe the types of adverse events occurring among older patients (age > or = 65 years) in Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. Secondary objectives were to determine the underlying reasons for the occurrence of these events and report on effective action plans that have been implemented in VA hospitals. METHODS: In a retrospective, cross-sectional review, RCA reports were reviewed and outcomes reported using descriptive statistics for all VA hospitals that conducted an RCA for a serious geriatric adverse event from January 2010 to January 2011 that resulted in sustained injury or death. RESULTS: The search produced 325 RCA reports on VA patients (age > or = 65 years). Falls (34.8%), delays in diagnosis and/or treatment (11.7%), unexpected death (9.9%), and medication errors (9.0%) were the most commonly reported adverse events among older VA patients. Communication was the most common underlying reason for these events, representing 43.9% of reported root causes. Approximately 40% of implemented action plans were judged by local staff to be effective. CONCLUSION: The RCA process identified falls and communication as important themes in serious adverse events. Concrete actions, such as process standardization and changes to communication, were reported by teams to yield some improvement. However, fewer than half of the action plans were reported to be effective. Further research is needed to guide development and implementation of effective action plans.

Wrong-side thoracentesis: lessons learned from root cause analysis.

IMPORTANCE: Despite the recognized value of the Joint Commission's Universal Protocol and the implementation of time-outs, incorrect surgical procedures are still among the most common types of sentinel events and can have fatal consequences. OBJECTIVES: To examine a root cause analysis database for reported wrong-side thoracenteses and to determine the contributing factors associated with their occurrence. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: We searched the National Center for Patient Safety database for wrong-side thoracenteses performed in ambulatory clinics and hospital units other than the operating room reported from January 1, 2004, through December 31, 2011. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Data extracted included patient factors, clinical features, team structure and function, adherence to bottom-line patient safety measures, complications, and outcomes. RESULTS: Fourteen cases of wrong-side thoracenteses are identified. Contributing factors included failure to perform a time-out (n=12), missing indication of laterality on the patient's consent form (n=10), absence of a site mark on the patient's skin within the sterile field (n=12), and absent verification of medical images (n=7). Complications included pneumothoraces (n=4), hemorrhage (n=3), and death directly attributable to the wrong-side thoracentesis (n=2). Teamwork and communication failure, unawareness of existing policy, and a deficit in training and education were the most common root causes of wrong-side thoracentesis. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Prevention of wrong-site procedures and accompanying patient harm outside the operating room requires adherence to the Universal Protocol and time-outs, effective teamwork, training and education, mentoring, and patient assessment for early detection of complications. The time-outs provide protected time and place for error detection and recovery.

Sharing lessons learned to prevent incorrect surgery.

The purpose of this report is to discuss surgical adverse event lessons learned and to recommend action. Examples of incorrect surgical adverse events managed in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) patient safety system and results of a survey regarding the impact of the surgery lessons learned process are provided. The VHA implemented a process for sharing deidentified stories of surgical lessons learned. The cases are in-operating room selected examples from lessons learned from October 1, 2009, to June 30, 2011. Examples selected illustrate helpful human factors principles. To learn more about the awareness and impact of the lessons learned, we conducted a survey with Chiefs of Surgery in the VHA. The types of examples of adverse events include wrong eye implants, incorrect nerve blocks, and wrong site excisions of lesions. These are accompanied by human factors recommendations and change concepts such as designing the system to prevent mistakes, using differentiation, minimizing handoffs, and standardizing how information is communicated. The survey response rate was 76 per cent (88 of 132). Of those who had seen the surgical lessons learned (76% [67 of 88]), the majority (87%) reported they were valuable and 85% that they changed or reinforced patient safety behaviors in their facility as a result of surgical lessons learned. Simply having a policy will not ensure patient safety. When reviewing adverse events, human factors must be considered as a cause for error and for the failure to follow policy without assigning blame. VHA surgeons reported that the surgery lessons learned were valuable and impacted practice.

Association between implementation of a medical team training program and surgical morbidity.

OBJECTIVE: To determine whether there is an association between the Veterans Health Administration Medical Team Training (MTT) program and surgical morbidity. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: A retrospective health services study was conducted with a contemporaneous control group. Outcome data were obtained from the Veterans Health Administration Surgical Quality Improvement Program. The analysis included aggregated measures representing 119,383 sampled procedures from 74 Veterans Health Administration facilities that provide care to veterans. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The primary outcome measure was the rate of change in annual surgical morbidity rate 1 year after facilities enrolled in the MTT program as compared with 1 year before and compared with the non-MTT program sites. RESULTS: Facilities in the MTT program (n = 42) had a significant decrease of 17% in observed annual surgical morbidity rate (rate ratio, 0.83; 95% CI, 0.79-0.88; P = .01). Facilities not trained (n = 32) had an insignificant decrease of 6% in observed morbidity (rate ratio, 0.94; 95% CI, 0.86-1.05; P = .11). After adjusting for surgical risk, we found a decrease of 15% in morbidity rate for facilities in the MTT program and a decrease of 10% for those not yet in the program. The risk-adjusted annual surgical morbidity rate declined in both groups, and the decline was 20% steeper in the MTT program group (P = .001) after propensity-score matching. The steeper decline in annual surgical morbidity rates was also observed in specific morbidity outcomes, such as surgical infection. CONCLUSION: The Veterans Health Administration MTT program is associated with decreased surgical morbidity.

Incorrect surgical procedures within and outside of the operating room: a follow-up report.

OBJECTIVE: To describe incorrect surgical procedures reported from mid-2006 to 2009 from Veterans Health Administration medical centers and build on previously reported events from 2001 to mid-2006. DESIGN: Retrospective database review. SETTING: Veterans Health Administration medical centers. INTERVENTIONS: The Veterans Health Administration implemented Medical Team Training and continues to support their directive for ensuring correct surgery to improve surgical patient safety. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: The categories were incorrect procedure types (wrong patient, side, site, procedure, or implant), major or minor surgery, in or out of the operating room (OR), adverse event or close call, specialty, and harm. RESULTS: Our review produced 237 reports (101 adverse events, 136 close calls) and found decreased harm compared with the previous report. The rate of reported adverse events decreased from 3.21 to 2.4 per month (P = .02). Reported close calls increased from 1.97 to 3.24 per month (P ≤ .001). Adverse events were evenly split between OR (50) and non-OR (51). When in-OR events were examined as a rate, Neurosurgery had 1.56 and Ophthalmology had 1.06 reported adverse events per 10 000 cases. The most common root cause for adverse events was a lack of standardization of clinical processes (18%). CONCLUSIONS: The rate of reported adverse events and harm decreased, while reported close calls increased. Despite improvements, we aim to achieve further gains. Current plans and actions include sharing lessons learned from root cause analyses, policy changes based on root cause analysis review, and additional focused Medical Team Training as needed.

Changing perceptions of safety climate in the operating room with the Veterans Health Administration medical team training program.

Perceptions of organizational commitment to safety differ between the operating rooms in high- and medium-complexity facilities of the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). The purpose of this study was to see whether medical team training (MTT) reduced this difference. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was administered before and at the completion of a MTT program. The study population consisted of respondents working in the operating room. Responses to the 7 safety climate items were analyzed using nonparametric tests. Before MTT, respondents working at medium-complexity facilities had more favorable perceptions of knowledge of proper channels and encouragement by colleagues to report safety concerns than respondents who work at high-complexity facilities. At completion, there was no difference in perceptions between respondents working at high- and medium-complexity facilities for these items. The VHA MTT program improved perceptions at both high- and medium-complexity facilities and eliminated differences present at baseline.

Briefing guide study: preoperative briefing and postoperative debriefing checklists in the Veterans Health Administration medical team training program.

BACKGROUND: The purpose of this study was to examine the outcomes of checklist-driven preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings during the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) medical team training program. METHODS: A briefing score (1, never started; 2, started then discontinued; 3, maintained on original targeted cases; 4, expanded to other services; 5, briefing all cases, all services) was established at 10.1 ± .3 months after introduction of the checklist. Outcomes included antibiotic and deep venous thrombosis prophylaxis compliance rates before and after use of the checklist. RESULTS: Antibiotic (97.0% ± .1% vs 92.1% ± 1.5%; P = .01) and deep venous thrombosis (95.7% ± .8% vs 85.1% ± 4.6%; P = .05) prophylaxis compliance rates were higher after initiation of a surgical checklist. CONCLUSIONS: Checklist-driven preoperative briefings and postoperative debriefings are associated with improvements in patient safety for surgical patients.

Association between implementation of a medical team training program and surgical mortality.

CONTEXT: There is insufficient information about the effectiveness of medical team training on surgical outcomes. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) implemented a formalized medical team training program for operating room personnel on a national level. OBJECTIVE: To determine whether an association existed between the VHA Medical Team Training program and surgical outcomes. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: A retrospective health services study with a contemporaneous control group was conducted. Outcome data were obtained from the VHA Surgical Quality Improvement Program (VASQIP) and from structured interviews in fiscal years 2006 to 2008. The analysis included 182,409 sampled procedures from 108 VHA facilities that provided care to veterans. The VHA's nationwide training program required briefings and debriefings in the operating room and included checklists as an integral part of this process. The training included 2 months of preparation, a 1-day conference, and 1 year of quarterly coaching interviews MAIN OUTCOME MEASURE: The rate of change in the mortality rate 1 year after facilities enrolled in the training program compared with the year before and with nontraining sites. RESULTS: The 74 facilities in the training program experienced an 18% reduction in annual mortality (rate ratio [RR], 0.82; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.76-0.91; P = .01) compared with a 7% decrease among the 34 facilities that had not yet undergone training (RR, 0.93; 95% CI, 0.80-1.06; P = .59). The risk-adjusted mortality rates at baseline were 17 per 1000 procedures per year for the trained facilities and 15 per 1000 procedures per year for the nontrained facilities. At the end of the study, the rates were 14 per 1000 procedures per year for both groups. Propensity matching of the trained and nontrained groups demonstrated that the decline in the risk-adjusted surgical mortality rate was about 50% greater in the training group (RR,1.49; 95% CI, 1.10-2.07; P = .01) than in the nontraining group. A dose-response relationship for additional quarters of the training program was also demonstrated: for every quarter of the training program, a reduction of 0.5 deaths per 1000 procedures occurred (95% CI, 0.2-1.0; P = .001). CONCLUSION: Participation in the VHA Medical Team Training program was associated with lower surgical mortality.

The effect of facility complexity on perceptions of safety climate in the operating room: size matters.

This study explores the effect of facility complexity on operating room (OR) caregiver perceptions of safety climate in the Veterans Health Administration (VHA). Facility complexity is a standardized score based on volume, risk, teaching, research, and intensive care unit capability. The Safety Attitudes Questionnaire was administered at 34 VHA hospitals. The authors performed analysis of variance on safety climate item scores by facility complexity and Bonferroni post hoc probes. Caregivers at high-complexity facilities were significantly less likely to agree that "Medical errors are handled appropriately in this hospital" than caregivers at medium-complexity facilities. Caregivers at high-complexity facilities were significantly more likely to agree that "I know the proper channels to direct questions regarding patient safety in the ORs here" than caregivers at medium-complexity facilities. Differences in caregiver perceptions of safety climate by facility complexity are present. Awareness of these differences can help when facilities implement surgical safety procedures.