The Golden Hour of Casualty Care: Rapid Handoff to Surgical Team is Associated With Improved Survival in War-injured US Service Members.

OBJECTIVE: To examine time from injury to initiation of surgical care and association with survival in US military casualties. BACKGROUND: Although the advantage of trauma care within the "golden hour" after an injury is generally accepted, evidence is scarce. METHODS: This retrospective, population-based cohort study included US military casualties injured in Afghanistan and Iraq, January 2007 to December 2015, alive at initial request for evacuation with maximum abbreviated injury scale scores ≥2 and documented 30-day survival status after injury. Interventions: (1) handoff alive to the surgical team, and (2) initiation of first surgery were analyzed as time-dependent covariates (elapsed time from injury) using sequential Cox proportional hazards regression to assess how intervention timing might affect mortality. Covariates included age, injury year, and injury severity. RESULTS: Among 5269 patients (median age, 24 years; 97% males; and 68% battle-injured), 728 died within 30 days of injury, 68% within 1 hour, and 90% within 4 hours. Only handoffs within 1 hour of injury and the resultant timely initiation of emergency surgery (adjusted also for prior advanced resuscitative interventions) were significantly associated with reduced 24-hour mortality compared with more delayed surgical care (adjusted hazard ratios: 0.34; 95% CI: 0.14-0.82; P = 0.02; and 0.40; 95% CI: 0.20-0.81; P = 0.01, respectively). In-hospital waits for surgery (mean: 1.1 hours; 95% CI; 1.0-1.2) scarcely contributed ( P = 0.67). CONCLUSIONS: Rapid handoff to the surgical team within 1 hour of injury may reduce mortality by 66% in US military casualties. In the subgroup of casualties with indications for emergency surgery, rapid handoff with timely surgical intervention may reduce mortality by 60%. To inform future research and trauma system planning, findings are pivotal.

Living with metastatic breast cancer (LIMBER): experiences, quality of life, gaps in information, care and support of patients in the UK.

PURPOSE: To determine the experiences, information, support needs and quality of life of women in the UK living with metastatic breast cancer (MBC) to provide content for educational materials. METHODS: An online survey, hosted for 3 months on a UK MBC charity website, comprised sections covering issues such as communication about MBC treatment and management, helpful and less helpful things that healthcare professionals, family and friends did or said and completion of the Patient Roles and Responsibilities Scale (PRRS). RESULTS: A total of 143 patients participated; 48/143(33%) presented de novo; 54/143(38%) had been living with MBC > 2 years. PRRS analysis revealed that MBC imposed a serious impact upon most respondents' own caring abilities and social lives. A majority 98/139 (71%) wished they had known more about MBC before their diagnosis; 63/134(47%) indicated that they still did not fully understand their illness; merely 78/139(56%) had access to a specialist nurse and only 69/135(51%) had been offered any additional support. Respondents reported little consideration given to their lifestyle/culture during consultations and inconsistent information, support services, continuity of care or access to clinical trials. They commented upon things health care professionals/friends and family did or said that were useful and cited other behaviours that were especially unhelpful. CONCLUSIONS: MBC exerted a deleterious impact upon patients' activities of daily living which were exacerbated in part by significant gaps in support, communication and information. IMPLICATIONS FOR CANCER SURVIVORS: LIMBER results are informing the content of educational materials currently being developed for patients' formal and informal carers.

Committee on Surgical Combat Casualty Care position statement: Neurosurgical capability for the optimal management of traumatic brain injury during deployed operations.

BACKGROUND: Experiences over the last three decades of war have demonstrated a high incidence of traumatic brain injury (TBI) resulting in a persistent need for a neurosurgical capability within the deployed theater of operations. Despite this, no doctrinal requirement for a deployed neurosurgical capability exists. Through an iterative process, the Joint Trauma System Committee on Surgical Combat Casualty Care (CoSCCC) developed a position statement to inform medical and nonmedical military leaders about the risks of the lack of a specialized neurosurgical capability. METHODS: The need for deployed neurosurgical capability position statement was identified during the spring 2021 CoSCCC meeting. A triservice working group of experienced forward-deployed caregivers developed a preliminary statement. An extensive iterative review process was then conducted to ensure that the intended messaging was clear to senior medical leaders and operational commanders. To provide additional context and a civilian perspective, statement commentaries were solicited from civilian clinical experts including a recently retired military trauma surgeon boarded in neurocritical care, a trauma surgeon instrumental in developing the Brain Injury Guidelines, a practicing neurosurgeon with world-renowned expertise in TBI, and the chair of the Committee on Trauma. RESULTS: After multiple revisions, the position statement was finalized, and approved by the CoSCCC membership in February 2023. Challenges identified include (1) military neurosurgeon attrition, (2) the lack of a doctrinal neurosurgical capabilities requirement during deployed combat operations, and (3) the need for neurosurgical telemedicine capability and in-theater computed tomography scans to triage TBI casualties requiring neurosurgical care. CONCLUSION: Challenges identified regarding neurosurgical capabilities within the deployed trauma system include military neurosurgeon attrition and the lack of a doctrinal requirement for neurosurgical capability during deployed combat operations. To mitigate risk to the force in a future peer-peer conflict, several evidence-based recommendations are made. The solicited civilian commentaries strengthen these recommendations by putting them into the context of civilian TBI management. This neurosurgical capabilities position statement is intended to be a forcing function and a communication tool to inform operational commanders and military medical leaders on the use of these teams on current and future battlefields. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Prognostic and Epidemiological; Level V.

The Battalion Aid Station-The Forgotten Frontier of the Army Health System During the Global War on Terrorism.

BACKGROUND: The battalion aid station (BAS) has historically served as the first stop during which combat casualties would receive care beyond a combat medic. Since the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, many combat casualties have bypassed the BAS for treatment facilities capable of surgery. We describe the care provided at these treatment facilities during 2007-2020. METHODS: This is a secondary analysis of previously described data from the Department of Defense Trauma Registry. We included encounters with the documentation of an assessment or intervention at a BAS or forward operating base from January 1, 2007 to March 17, 2020. We utilized descriptive statistics to characterize these encounters. RESULTS: There were 28,950 encounters in our original dataset, of which 3.1% (884) had the documentation of a prehospital visit to a BAS. The BAS cohort was older (25 vs. 24, P < .001) The non-BAS cohort saw a larger portion of pediatric (<18 years) patients (10.7% vs. 5.7%, P < .001). A higher proportion of BAS patients had nonbattle injuries (40% vs. 20.7%, P < .001). The mean injury severity score was higher in the non-BAS cohort (9 vs. 5, P < .001). A higher proportion of the non-BAS cohort had more serious extremity injuries (25.1% vs. 18.4%, P < .001), although the non-BAS cohort had a trend toward serious injuries to the abdomen (P = .051) and thorax (P = .069). There was no difference in survival. CONCLUSIONS: The BAS was once a critical point in casualty evacuation and treatment. Within our dataset, the overall number of encounters that involved a stop at a BAS facility was low. For both the asymmetric battlefield and multidomain operations/large-scale combat operations, the current model would benefit from a more robust capability to include storage of blood, ventilators, and monitoring and hold patients for an undetermined amount of time.

Evidence-based principles of time, triage and treatment: Refining the initial medical response to massive casualty incidents.

BACKGROUND: The overall approach to massive casualty triage has changed little in the past 200 years. As the military and civilian organizations prepare for the possibility of future large-scale combat operations, terrorist attacks and natural disasters, potentially involving hundreds or even thousands of casualties, a modified approach is needed to conduct effective triage, initiate treatment, and save as many lives as possible. METHODS: Military experience and review of analyses from the Department of Defense Trauma Registry are combined to introduce new concepts in triage and initial casualty management. RESULTS: The classification of the scale of massive casualty (MASCAL) incidents, timeline of life-saving interventions, immediate first pass actions prior to formal triage decisions during the first hour after injury, simplification of triage decisions, and the understanding that ultra-MASCAL will primarily require casualty movement and survival needs with few prehospital life-saving medical interventions are discussed. CONCLUSION: Self aid, bystander, and first responder interventions are paramount and should be trained and planned extensively. Military and disaster planning should not only train these concepts, but should seek innovations to extend the timelines of effectiveness and to deliver novel capabilities within the timelines to the greatest extent possible.

United States military fatalities during Operation New Dawn.

BACKGROUND: Military operations vary by scope, purpose, and intensity, each having unique forces and actions to execute a mission. Evaluation of military operation fatalities guides current and future casualty care. METHODS: A retrospective study was conducted of all US military fatalities from Operation New Dawn in Iraq, 2010 to 2011. Data were obtained from autopsies and other records. Population characteristics, manner of death, cause of death, and location of death were analyzed. All fatalities were evaluated for concomitant evidence of underlying atherosclerosis. Nonsuicide trauma fatalities were also reviewed for injury severity, mechanism of death, injury survivability, death preventability, and opportunities for improvement. RESULTS: Of 74 US military Operation New Dawn fatalities (median age, 26 years; male, 98.6%; conventional forces, 100%; prehospital, 82.4%) the leading cause of death was injury (86.5%). The manner of death was primarily homicide (55.4%), followed by suicide (17.6%), natural (13.5%), and accident (9.5%). Fatalities were divided near evenly between combatants (52.7%) and support personnel (47.3%), and between battle injury (51.4%) and disease and nonbattle injury (48.6%). Natural and suicide death was higher (p < 0.01, 0.02) among support personnel who were older (p = 0.05) with more reserve/national guard personnel (p = 0.01). Total population prevalence of underlying atherosclerosis was 18.9%, with more among support personnel (64.3%). Of 46 nonsuicide trauma fatalities, most died of blast injury (67.4%) followed by gunshot wound (26.1%) and multiple/blunt force injury (6.5%). The leading mechanism of death was catastrophic tissue destruction (82.6%). Most had nonsurvivable injuries (82.6%) and nonpreventable deaths (93.5%). CONCLUSION: Operation New Dawn fatalities were exclusively conventional forces divided between combatants and support personnel, the former succumbing more to battle injury and the latter to disease and nonbattle injury including self-inflicted injury. For nonsuicide trauma fatalities, none died from a survivable injury, and 17.4% died from potentially survivable injuries. Opportunities for improvement included providing earlier blood products and surgery. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Therapeutic, level V and epidemiological, level IV.

Case-control analysis of prehospital death and prolonged field care survival during recent US military combat operations.

BACKGROUND: Quantification of medical interventions administered during prolonged field care (PFC) is necessary to inform training and planning. MATERIALS AND METHODS: Retrospective cohort study of Department of Defense Trauma Registry casualties with maximum Abbreviated Injury Scale (MAIS) score of 2 or greater and prehospital records during combat operations 2007 to 2015; US military nonsurvivors were linked to Armed Forces Medical Examiner System data. Medical interventions administered to survivors of 4 hours to 72 hours of PFC and nonsurvivors who died prehospital were compared by frequency-matching on mechanism (explosive, firearm, other), injury type (penetrating, blunt) and injured body regions with MAIS score of 3 or greater. Covariates for adjustment included age, sex, military Service, shock, Glasgow Coma Scale, transport team, MAIS and Injury Severity Score (ISS). Sensitivity analysis focused on US military subgroup with AIS/ISS assigned to nonsurvivors after autopsy. RESULTS: The total inception cohort included 16,202 casualties (5,269 US military, 10,809 non-US military), 64% Afghanistan, 36% Iraq. Of US military, 734 deaths occurred within 30 days, nearly 90% occurred within 4 hours of injury. There were 3,222 casualties (1,111 US military, 2,111 non-US military) documented for prehospital care and died prehospital (691) or survived 4 hours to 72 hours of PFC (2,531). Twenty-five percent (815/3,222) received advanced airway, 18% (583) ventilatory support, 9% (281) tourniquet. Twenty-three percent (725) received blood transfusions within 24 hours. Of the matched cohort (1,233 survivors, 490 nonsurvivors), differences were observed in care (survivors received more warming, intravenous fluids, sedation, mechanical ventilation, narcotics, antibiotics; nonsurvivors received more intubations, tourniquets, intraosseous fluids, cardiopulmonary resuscitation). Sensitivity analysis focused on US military (732 survivors, 379 nonsurvivors) showed no significant differences in prehospital interventions. Without autopsy information, the ISS of nonsurvivors significantly underestimated injury severity. CONCLUSION: Tourniquets, blood transfusion, airway, and ventilatory support are frequently required interventions for the seriously injured. Prolonged field care should direct resources, technology, and training to field technology for sustained resuscitation, airway, and breathing support in the austere environment. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Prognostic, Level III.

Establishing an enduring Military Trauma Mortality Review: Misconceptions and lessons learned.

Under direction from the Defense Health Agency, subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Joint Trauma System, Armed Forces Medical Examiner System, and civilian sector established the Military Trauma Mortality Review process. To establish the most empirically robust process, these SMEs used both qualitative and quantitative methods published in a series of peer-reviewed articles over the last 3 years. Most recently, the Military Mortality Review process was implemented for the first time on all battle-injured service members attached to the United States Special Operations Command from 2001 to 2018. The current Military Mortality Review process builds on the strengths and limitations of important previous work from both the military and civilian sector. To prospectively improve the trauma care system and drive preventable death to the lowest level possible, we present the main misconceptions and lessons learned from our 3-year effort to establish a reliable and sustainable Military Trauma Mortality Review process. These lessons include the following: (1) requirement to use standardized and appropriate lexicon, definitions, and criteria; (2) requirement to use a combination of objective injury scoring systems, forensic information, and thorough SME case review to make injury survivability and death preventability determinations; (3) requirement to use nonmedical information to make reliable death preventability determinations and a comprehensive list of opportunities for improvement to reduce preventable deaths within the trauma care system; and (4) acknowledgment that the military health system still has gaps in current infrastructure that must be addressed to globally and continuously implement the process outlined in the Military Trauma Mortality Review process in the future. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level III.

United States Special Operations Command fatality study of subcommands, units, and trends.

BACKGROUND: Death from injury occurs predominantly in prehospital settings. Injury prevention and prehospital care of military forces is the responsibility of combatant commanders. Medical examiner and trauma systems should routinely study fatalities and inform commanders of mortality trends. METHODS: Data reported on US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fatalities who died while performing duties from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018, were reevaluated to compare subcommands, units, and trends. Injury was assessed by mechanism, severity, operational posture, and survivability. Death was assessed by manner, cause, classification, mechanism, and preventability. RESULTS: Of 614 USSOCOM fatalities (median age, 30 years; male, 98.5%), 67.6% occurred in the Army command, of which 49.2% occurred in the Special Forces command. Battle injury accounted for 60.1% of USSOCOM fatalities. Most battle-injured fatalities in each subcommand had nonsurvivable injuries and nonpreventable deaths. For each subcommand except Marine Corps, fatalities with nonsurvivable injuries sustained injuries primarily while mounted. By subcommand, the primary cause of death for fatalities with nonsurvivable injuries was blast for Army (57.6%), multiple/blunt force for Navy (60.0%), gunshot wound for Air Force (55.6%), and split between blast (50.0%) and gunshot wound (50.0%) for Marine Corps. For each subcommand except Air Force, fatalities with potentially survivable-survivable injuries sustained injuries primarily while dismounted, and the mechanism of death was primarily hemorrhage plus other mechanism or hemorrhage alone. Hemorrhage only mechanism of death was surpassed over time by complex multimechanism death. Potential for injury survivability and death preventability was greatest during early and later years of conflict. CONCLUSION: Organizational differences in mortality characteristics and trends were identified from which commanders can refine efforts to prevent and treat injury and improve survival. Fatality analyses inform operational risk matrices and advance casualty prevention and response efforts. Prevention, assessment, and treatment strategies must evolve to reduce death from hemorrhage plus coexisting mechanisms. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Performance Improvement and Epidemiological, level IV.

Mortality review of US Special Operations Command battle-injured fatalities.

BACKGROUND: Comprehensive analyses of battle-injured fatalities, incorporating a multidisciplinary process with a standardized lexicon, is necessary to elucidate opportunities for improvement (OFIs) to increase survivability. METHODS: A mortality review was conducted on United States Special Operations Command battle-injured fatalities who died from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018. Fatalities were analyzed by demographics, operational posture, mechanism of injury, cause of death, mechanism of death (MOD), classification of death, and injury severity. Injury survivability was determined by a subject matter expert panel and compared with injury patterns among Department of Defense Trauma Registry survivors. Death preventability and OFI were determined for fatalities with potentially survivable or survivable (PS-S) injuries using tactical data and documented medical interventions. RESULTS: Of 369 United States Special Operations Command battle-injured fatalities (median age, 29 years; male, 98.6%), most were killed in action (89.4%) and more than half died from injuries sustained during mounted operations (52.3%). The cause of death was blast injury (45.0%), gunshot wound (39.8%), and multiple/blunt force injury (15.2%). The leading MOD was catastrophic tissue destruction (73.7%). Most fatalities sustained nonsurvivable injuries (74.3%). For fatalities with PS-S injuries, most had hemorrhage as a component of MOD (88.4%); however, the MOD was multifactorial in the majority of these fatalities (58.9%). Only 5.4% of all fatalities and 21.1% of fatalities with PS-S injuries had comparable injury patterns among survivors. Accounting for tactical situation, a minority of deaths were potentially preventable (5.7%) and a few preventable (1.1%). Time to surgery (93.7%) and prehospital blood transfusion (89.5%) were the leading OFI for PS-S fatalities. Most fatalities with PS-S injuries requiring blood (83.5%) also had an additional prehospital OFI. CONCLUSION: Comprehensive mortality reviews of battlefield fatalities can identify OFI in combat casualty care and prevention. Standardized lexicon is essential for translation to civilian trauma systems. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Epidemiological, level IV.

A descriptive study of US Special Operations Command fatalities, 2001 to 2018.

BACKGROUND: Studies of fatalities from injury and disease guide prevention and treatment efforts for populations at risk. Findings can inform leadership and direct clinical practice guidelines, research, and personnel, training, and equipment requirements. METHODS: A retrospective review and descriptive analysis was conducted of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) fatalities who died while performing duties from September 11, 2001, to September 10, 2018. Characteristics analyzed included subcommand, military activity, operational posture, and manner of death. RESULTS: Of 614 USSOCOM fatalities (median age, 30 years; male, 98.5%) the leading cause of death was injury (97.7%); specifically, multiple/blunt force injury (34.5%), blast injury (30.7%), gunshot wound (GSW; 30.3%), and other (4.5%). Most died outside the United States (87.1%), during combat operations (85.3%), in the prehospital environment (91.5%), and the same day of insult (90.4%). Most fatalities were with the US Army Special Operations Command (67.6%), followed by the Naval Special Warfare Command (16.0%), Air Force Special Operations Command (9.3%), and Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (7.2%). Of 54.6% who died of injuries incurred during mounted operations, most were on ground vehicles (53.7%), followed by rotary-wing (37.3%) and fixed-wing (9.0%) aircrafts. The manner of death was primarily homicide (66.0%) and accident (30.5%), followed by natural (2.1%), suicide (0.8%), and undetermined (0.7%). Specific homicide causes of death were GSW (43.7%), blast injury (42.2%), multiple/blunt force injury (13.8%), and other (0.2%). Specific accident causes of death were multiple/blunt force injury (80.7%), blast injury (6.4%), GSW (0.5%), and other (12.3%). Of accident fatalities with multiple/blunt force injury, the mechanism was mostly aircraft mishaps (62.9%), particularly rotary wing (68.4%). CONCLUSION: Most USSOCOM fatalities died abroad from injury in the prehospital setting. To improve survival from military activities worldwide, leaders must continue to optimize prehospital capability and develop strategies that rapidly connect patients to advanced resuscitative and surgical care. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Epidemiological, level IV; Therapeutic level IV.

Use of Combat Casualty Care Data to Assess the US Military Trauma System During the Afghanistan and Iraq Conflicts, 2001-2017.

Importance: Although the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts have the lowest US case-fatality rates in history, no comprehensive assessment of combat casualty care statistics, major interventions, or risk factors has been reported to date after 16 years of conflict. Objectives: To analyze trends in overall combat casualty statistics, to assess aggregate measures of injury and interventions, and to simulate how mortality rates would have changed had the interventions not occurred. Design, Setting, and Participants: Retrospective analysis of all available aggregate and weighted individual administrative data compiled from Department of Defense databases on all 56 763 US military casualties injured in battle in Afghanistan and Iraq from October 1, 2001, through December 31, 2017. Casualty outcomes were compared with period-specific ratios of the use of tourniquets, blood transfusions, and transport to a surgical facility within 60 minutes. Main Outcomes and Measures: Main outcomes were casualty status (alive, killed in action [KIA], or died of wounds [DOW]) and the case-fatality rate (CFR). Regression, simulation, and decomposition analyses were used to assess associations between covariates, interventions, and individual casualty status; estimate casualty transitions (KIA to DOW, KIA to alive, and DOW to alive); and estimate the contribution of interventions to changes in CFR. Results: In aggregate data for 56 763 casualties, CFR decreased in Afghanistan (20.0% to 8.6%) and Iraq (20.4% to 10.1%) from early stages to later stages of the conflicts. Survival for critically injured casualties (Injury Severity Score, 25-75 [critical]) increased from 2.2% to 39.9% in Afghanistan and from 8.9% to 32.9% in Iraq. Simulations using data from 23 699 individual casualties showed that without interventions assessed, CFR would likely have been higher in Afghanistan (15.6% estimated vs 8.6% observed) and Iraq (16.3% estimated vs 10.1% observed), equating to 3672 additional deaths (95% CI, 3209-4244 deaths), of which 1623 (44.2%) were associated with the interventions studied: 474 deaths (12.9%) (95% CI, 439-510) associated with the use of tourniquets, 873 (23.8%) (95% CI, 840-910) with blood transfusion, and 275 (7.5%) (95% CI, 259-292) with prehospital transport times. Conclusions and Relevance: Our analysis suggests that increased use of tourniquets, blood transfusions, and more rapid prehospital transport were associated with 44.2% of total mortality reduction. More critically injured casualties reached surgical care, with increased survival, implying improvements in prehospital and hospital care.

Implementation and evaluation of nationwide scale-up of the Surgical Safety Checklist.

BACKGROUND: The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist improves surgical outcomes, but evidence and theoretical frameworks for successful implementation in low-income countries remain lacking. Based on previous research in Madagascar, a nationwide checklist implementation in Benin was designed and evaluated longitudinally. METHODS: This study had a longitudinal embedded mixed-methods design. The well validated Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR) was used to structure the approach and evaluate the implementation. Thirty-six hospitals received 3-day multidisciplinary training and 4-month follow-up. Seventeen hospitals were sampled purposively for evaluation at 12-18 months. The primary outcome was sustainability of checklist use at 12-18 months measured by questionnaire. Secondary outcomes were CFIR-derived implementation outcomes, measured using the WHO Behaviourally Anchored Rating Scale (WHOBARS), safety questionnaires and focus groups. RESULTS: At 12-18 months, 86·0 per cent of participants (86 of 100) reported checklist use compared with 31·1 per cent (169 of 543) before training and 88·8 per cent (158 of 178) at 4 months. There was high-fidelity use (median WHOBARS score 5·0 of 7; use of basic safety processes ranged from 85·0 to 99·0 per cent), and high penetration shown by a significant improvement in hospital safety culture (adapted Human Factors Attitude Questionnaire scores of 76·7, 81·1 and 82·2 per cent before, and at 4 and 12-18 months after training respectively; P < 0·001). Acceptability, adoption, appropriateness and feasibility scored 9·6-9·8 of 10. This approach incorporated 31 of 36 CFIR implementation constructs successfully. CONCLUSION: This study shows successfully sustained nationwide checklist implementation using a validated implementation framework.

A US military Role 2 forward surgical team database study of combat mortality in Afghanistan.

BACKGROUND: Timely and optimal care can reduce mortality among critically injured combat casualties. US military Role 2 surgical teams were deployed to forward positions in Afghanistan on behalf of the battlefield trauma system. They received prehospital casualties, provided early damage control resuscitation and surgery, and rapidly transferred casualties to Role 3 hospitals for definitive care. A database was developed to capture Role 2 data. METHODS: A retrospective review and descriptive analysis were conducted of battle-injured casualties transported to US Role 2 surgical facilities in Afghanistan from February 2008 to September 2014. Casualties were analyzed by mortality status and location of death (pretransport, intratransport, or posttransport), military affiliation, transport time, injury type and mechanism, combat mortality index-prehospital (CMI-PH), and documented prehospital treatment. RESULTS: Of 9,557 casualties (median age, 25.0 years; male, 97.4%), most (95.1%) survived to transfer from Role 2 facility care. Military affiliation included US coalition forces (37.4%), Afghanistan National Security Forces (23.8%), civilian/other forces (21.3%), Afghanistan National Police (13.5%), and non-US coalition forces (4.0%). Mortality differed by military affiliation (p < 0.001). Among fatalities, most were Afghanistan National Security Forces (30.5%) civilian/other forces (26.0%), or US coalition forces (25.2%). Of those categorized by CMI-PH, 40.0% of critical, 11.2% of severe, 0.8% of moderate, and less than 0.1% of mild casualties died. Most fatalities with CMI-PH were categorized as critical (66.3%) or severe (25.9%), whereas most who lived were mild (56.9%) or moderate (25.4%). Of all fatalities, 14.0% died prehospital (pretransport, 5.8%; intratransport, 8.2%), and 86.0% died at a Role 2 facility (posttransport). Of fatalities with documented transport times (median, 53.0 minutes), most (61.7%) were evacuated within 60 minutes. CONCLUSIONS: Role 2 surgical team care has been an important early component of the battlefield trauma system in Afghanistan. Combat casualty care must be documented, collected, and analyzed for outcomes and trends to improve performance. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Therapeutic/Care Management, level IV.

A Review of Casualties Transported to Role 2 Medical Treatment Facilities in Afghanistan.

Critically injured trauma patients benefit from timely transport and care. Accordingly, the provision of rapid transport and effective treatment capabilities in appropriately close proximity to the point of injury will optimize time and survival. Pre-transport tactical combat casualty care, rapid transport with en route casualty care, and advanced damage control resuscitation and surgery delivered early by small, mobile, forward-positioned Role 2 medical treatment facilities have potential to reduce morbidity and mortality from trauma. This retrospective review and descriptive analysis of trauma patients transported from Role 1 entities to Role 2 facilities in Afghanistan from 2008 to 2014 found casualties to be diverse in affiliation and delivered by various types and modes of transport. Air medical evacuation provided transport for most patients, while the shortest transport time was seen with air casualty evacuation. Although relatively little data were collected for air casualty evacuation, this rapid mode of transport remains an operationally important method of transport on the battlefield. For prehospital care provided before and during transport, continued leadership and training emphasis should be placed on the administration and documentation of tactical combat casualty care as delivered by both medical and non-medical first responders.

Comparison of Military and Civilian Methods for Determining Potentially Preventable Deaths: A Systematic Review.

Importance: Military and civilian trauma experts initiated a collaborative effort to develop an integrated learning trauma system to reduce preventable morbidity and mortality. Because the Department of Defense does not currently have recommended guidelines and standard operating procedures to perform military preventable death reviews in a consistent manner, these performance improvement processes must be developed. Objectives: To compare military and civilian preventable death determination methods to understand the existing best practices for evaluating preventable death. Evidence Review: This systematic review followed the PRISMA reporting guidelines. English-language articles were searched from inception to February 15, 2017, using the following databases: MEDLINE (Ovid), Evidence-Based Medicine Reviews (Ovid), PubMed, CINAHL, and Google Scholar. Articles were initially screened for eligibility and excluded based on predetermined criteria. Articles reviewing only prehospital deaths, only inhospital deaths, or both were eligible for inclusion. Information on study characteristics was independently abstracted by 2 investigators. Reported are methodological factors affecting the reliability of preventable death studies and the preventable death rate, defined as the number of potentially preventable deaths divided by the total number of deaths within a specific patient population. Findings: Fifty studies (8 military and 42 civilian) met the inclusion criteria. In total, 1598 of 6500 military deaths reviewed and 3346 of 19 108 civilian deaths reviewed were classified as potentially preventable. Among military studies, the preventable death rate ranged from 3.1% to 51.4%. Among civilian studies, the preventable death rate ranged from 2.5% to 85.3%. The high level of methodological heterogeneity regarding factors, such as preventable death definitions, review process, and determination criteria, hinders a meaningful quantitative comparison of preventable death rates. Conclusions and Relevance: The reliability of military and civilian preventable death studies is hindered by inconsistent definitions, incompatible criteria, and the overall heterogeneity in study methods. The complexity, inconsistency, and unpredictability of combat require unique considerations to perform a methodologically sound combat-related preventable death review. As the Department of Defense begins the process of developing recommended guidelines and standard operating procedures for performing military preventable death reviews, consideration must be given to the factors known to increase the risk of bias and poor reliability.

The effect of prehospital transport time, injury severity, and blood transfusion on survival of US military casualties in Iraq.

BACKGROUND: Reducing time from injury to care can optimize trauma patient outcomes. A previous study of prehospital transport of US military casualties during the Afghanistan conflict demonstrated the importance of time and treatment capability for combat casualty survival. METHODS: A retrospective descriptive analysis was conducted to analyze battlefield data collected on US military combat casualties during the Iraq conflict from March 19, 2003, to August 31, 2010. All casualties were analyzed by mortality outcome (killed in action, died of wounds, case fatality rate) and compared with Afghanistan conflict. Detailed data for those who underwent prehospital transport were analyzed for effects of transport time, injury severity, and blood transfusion on survival. RESULTS: For the total population, percent killed in action (16.6% vs. 11.1%), percent died of wounds (5.9% vs. 4.3%), and case fatality rate (10.0 vs. 8.6) were higher for Iraq versus Afghanistan (p < 0.001). Among 1,692 casualties (mean New Injury Severity Score, 22.5; mortality, 17.6%) with detailed data, the injury mechanism included 77.7% from explosions and 22.1% from gunshot wounds. For prehospital transport, 67.6% of casualties were transported within 60 minutes, and 32.4% of casualties were transported in greater than 60 minutes. Although 97.0% of deaths occurred in critical casualties (New Injury Severity Score, 25-75), 52.7% of critical casualties survived. Critical casualties were transported more rapidly (p < 0.01) and more frequently within 60 minutes (p < 0.01) than other casualties. Critical casualties had lower mortality when blood was received (p < 0.01). Among critical casualties, blood transfusion was associated with survival irrespective of transport time within or greater than 60 minutes (p < 0.01). CONCLUSION: Although data were limited, early blood transfusion was associated with battlefield survival in Iraq as it was in Afghanistan. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Performance improvement and epidemiological, level IV.

Reexamination of a Battlefield Trauma Golden Hour Policy.

BACKGROUND: Most combat casualties who die, do so in the prehospital setting. Efforts directed toward alleviating prehospital combat trauma death, known as killed in action (KIA) mortality, have the greatest opportunity for eliminating preventable death. METHODS: Four thousand five hundred forty-two military casualties injured in Afghanistan from September 11, 2001, to March 31, 2014, were included in this retrospective analysis to evaluate proposed explanations for observed KIA reduction after a mandate by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates that transport of injured service members occur within 60 minutes. Using inverse probability weighting to account for selection bias, data were analyzed using multivariable logistic regression and simulation analysis to estimate the effects of (1) gradual improvement, (2) damage control resuscitation, (3) harm from inadequate resources, (4) change in wound pattern, and (5) transport time on KIA mortality. RESULTS: The effect of gradual improvement measured as a time trend was not significant (adjusted odds ratio [AOR], 0.99; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.94-1.03; p = 0.58). For casualties with military Injury Severity Score of 25 or higher, the odds of KIA mortality were 83% lower for casualties who needed and received prehospital blood transfusion (AOR, 0.17; 95% CI, 0.06-0.51; p = 0.002); 33% lower for casualties receiving initial treatment by forward surgical teams (AOR, 0.67; 95% CI, 0.58-0.78; p < 0.001); 70%, 74%, and 87% lower for casualties with dominant injuries to head (AOR, 0.30; 95% CI, 0.23-0.38; p < 0.001), abdomen (AOR, 0.26, 95% CI, 0.19-0.36; p < 0.001) and extremities (AOR, 0.13; 95% CI, 0.09-0.17; p < 0.001); 35% lower for casualties categorized with blunt injuries (AOR, 0.65; 95% CI, 0.46-0.92; p = 0.01); and 39% lower for casualties transported within one hour (AOR, 0.61; 95% CI, 0.51-0.74; p < 0.001). Results of simulations in which transport times had not changed after the mandate indicate that KIA mortality would have been 1.4% higher than observed, equating to 135 more KIA deaths (95% CI, 105-164). CONCLUSION: Reduction in KIA mortality is associated with early treatment capabilities, blunt mechanism, select body locations of injury, and rapid transport. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Therapy, level III.

Leadership and a casualty response system for eliminating preventable death.

Combat casualties who die from their injuries do so primarily in the prehospital setting. Although most of these deaths result from injuries that are nonsurvivable, some are potentially survivable. Of injuries that are potentially survivable, most are from hemorrhage. Thus, military organizations should direct efforts toward prehospital care, particularly through early hemorrhage control and remote damage control resuscitation, to eliminate preventable death on the battlefield. A systems-based approach and priority of effort for institutionalizing such care was developed and maintained by medical personnel and command-directed by nonmedical combatant leaders within the 75th Ranger Regiment, U.S. Army Special Operations Command. The objective of this article is to describe the key components of this prehospital casualty response system, emphasize the importance of leadership, underscore the synergy achieved through collaboration between medical and nonmedical leaders, and provide an example to other organizations and communities striving to achieve success in trauma as measured through improved casualty survival.