Chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy: a rare cause of falls.

This case of chronic inflammatory demyelinating polyneuropathy (CIDP) shows that a patient's condition can evolve from the point of admission, gradually manifesting its underlying cause. Our patient's initial presentation of backpain and lower limb weakness prompted investigations which ruled out compressive myelopathy and neuropathy. As upper limb weakness developed later, along with a more proximal and symmetrical pattern of lower limb weakness, the clinical picture suggested polyneuropathy. The diagnosis of CIDP became apparent only after numerous negative tests and nerve conduction studies which identified demyelination. Diagnosing CIDP enabled the commencement of definitive treatment which led to a good recovery.

Hormone replacement therapy: informed consent without assessment?

Florence Ashley has argued that requiring patients with gender dysphoria to undergo an assessment and referral from a mental health professional before undergoing hormone replacement therapy (HRT) is unethical and may represent an unconscious hostility towards transgender people. We respond, first, by showing that Ashley has conflated the self-reporting of symptoms with self-diagnosis, and that this is not consistent with the standard model of informed consent to medical treatment. Second, we note that the model of informed consent involved in cosmetic surgery resembles the model Ashley defends, and that psychological assessment and referral is recognised as an important aspect of such a model. Third, we suggest that the increased prevalence of psychiatric morbidity in the transgender population arguably supports the requirement of assessment and referral from a mental health professional prior to undergoing HRT.

Mistakes and missed opportunities regarding cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection.

In her paper 'Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection', Minerva rightly identifies cosmetic surgery as an interesting test case for the question of conscientious objection in medicine. Her treatment of this important subject, however, seems problematic. It is argued that Minerva's suggestion that a doctor has a prima facie duty to satisfy patient preferences even against his better clinical judgment, which we call Patient Preference Absolutism, must be regarded with scepticism. This is because (1) it overlooks an important distinction regarding autonomy's meaning and place in clinical practice, and (2) it makes obsolete the important concepts of expert clinical judgment and beneficence. Finally, we discuss two ideas which emerge from consideration of cosmetic surgery in relation to conscientious objection. These are the possible analogy between clinical judgment and conscientious objection, and the possible role the goals of medicine can play in defining the scope of conscientious objection.