Meaningful Use: Does Physician Participation Move the Needle on Quality Metrics?

INTRODUCTION: To determine the association between pattern of participation in the Meaningful Use (MU) initiative and self-reported clinical quality metrics. METHODS: We used state-level Medicaid electronic health record (EHR) incentive program data to categorize physicians based on receipt of MU payments (single year vs. multiple years) and self-reported quality metrics from 2011 to 2016. RESULTS: Among 4,198 participating physicians, only 36% received more than one EHR incentive payment. Physicians participating for a single year had better cancer-screening metrics. By comparison, physicians who participated for multiple years reported better medication-related metrics and chronic disease management metrics. CONCLUSIONS: Nature of participation may have varying degrees of influence on types of clinical quality metrics. Sustained participation may support management of chronic conditions. Administrative claims data will help to elucidate our findings.

Variability in Case Durations for Common Surgical Procedures.

BACKGROUND: Under the Merit-based Incentive Payment System, physician payment will be adjusted using a composite performance score that has 4 components, one of which is resource use. The objective of this exploratory study is to quantify the facility-level variation in surgical case duration for common surgeries to examine the feasibility of using surgical case duration as a performance metric. METHODS: We used data from the National Anesthesia Clinical Outcomes Registry on 404,987 adult patients undergoing one of 6 general surgical or orthopedic procedures: laparoscopic appendectomy, laparoscopic cholecystectomy, laparoscopic cholecystectomy with intraoperative cholangiogram, knee arthroscopy, laminectomy, and total hip replacement. We constructed separate mixed-effects multivariable time-to-event models (survival analysis) for each of the 6 procedures to model surgical case duration. RESULTS: We identified performance outliers, based on surgical case duration, using 2013 data and then quantified the gap between high- and low-performance outliers using 2014 data. After adjusting for patient risk, patients undergoing surgery at high-performance facilities were between 54% and 79% more likely to exit the operating room (OR) per unit time compared to average-performing facilities, depending on the procedure. For example, patients undergoing a laparoscopic appendectomy at high-performance facilities were 68% more likely to exit the OR per unit time (hazard ratio, 1.68; 95% CI, 1.40-2.02; P < .001) compared to average-performing facilities. Patients undergoing a laparoscopic appendectomy at low-performance facilities were 41% less likely to exit the OR per unit time (hazard ratio, 0.59; 95% CI, 0.47-0.74; P < .001) compared to average-performing facilities. The adjusted median surgical case duration for patients undergoing laparoscopic appendectomy was 69 minutes at high-performance centers and 92 minutes at low-performance centers. Similar results were obtained for the other procedures. CONCLUSIONS: There was wide variation in surgery case duration for patients undergoing common general surgical and orthopedic surgeries. This variability in care delivery may represent an important opportunity to promote more efficient use of health care resources.

Factors that Predict Failure to Meet Merit-Based Incentive Payment System Quality Measures for Asymptomatic Carotid Endarterectomy.

BACKGROUND: The Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) created by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services financially penalizes providers who fail to meet expected quality of care measures. The purpose of this study is to evaluate the factors that predict failure to meet PQRS measures for carotid endarterectomy (CEA). METHODS: PQRS measure 260 (discharge by postoperative day 2 following CEA in asymptomatic patients) and 346 (rate of postoperative stroke or death following CEA in asymptomatic patients) were evaluated using hospital records from the state of Florida from 2008 to 2012. The impact of demographics, comorbidities, hospital factors, admission variables, and individual practitioner data upon timely discharge, and postoperative stroke and death. Odds ratios, 95% confidence intervals, and significance (P < 0.05) were determined through the development of a logistic regression model. Surgeons were identified by national provider identifier number, and practitioner data obtained from the American Medical Association Physician Masterfile. RESULTS: A total of 34,235 patient records and 701 providers were identified over the 5-year period. Significant negative predictors for PQRS measure 260 included weekend admission (odds ratio [OR], 2.9), Medicaid (OR, 2.4), surgeon historical postoperative stroke rate >2.0% (OR, 1.7), African-American race (OR, 2.0), and female gender (OR, 1.3). The presence of any of these factors was associated with a 13.5% rate of failure. The most significant negative predictor for PQRS measure 346 was surgeon postoperative stroke rate >2.0% (OR, 6.2 for stroke and OR, 29.0 for death). Surgeons in this underperforming group had worse outcomes compared to their peers despite having patients with fewer risk factors for poor outcomes. Surgeon specialty, board certification, and case volume do not impact either PQRS measures. CONCLUSIONS: Selected groups of patients and surgeons with a disproportionately high rate of postoperative stroke are at risk of failing to meet PQRS pay for performance quality measures. Awareness of these risk factors may help mitigate and minimize the risk of adversely impacting the value stream. Further evaluation of the causative factors that lead to surgeon underperformance could help to improve the quality of care.

A Longitudinal Study of Medical Practices' Treatment of Patients Who Use Tobacco.

INTRODUCTION: Many patients who use tobacco have never been encouraged by their healthcare providers to quit. In recent years, incentives have been provided for medical practices to incorporate tobacco-cessation processes into routine care. This study examined growth in use of these processes as well as organizational and policy factors associated with their implementation. METHODS: Data from three National Study of Physician Organizations surveys fielded in 2006-2013 were analyzed in 2014. The analyses estimated multivariate longitudinal and cross-sectional linear regression models to assess the relationship between implementation of cessation processes and change in practices' characteristics and external incentives, including state mandates for tobacco-cessation coverage. RESULTS: Systematic identification of patients who use tobacco increased in large (26% to 91%, p<0.0001) and small-medium practices (69% to 83%, p<0.0001). Neither routine advice to quit nor referral to counseling and guideline-based point-of-care reminders increased. Practice feedback to physicians on their use of cessation interventions increased (18% to 29%, p<0.0001) for small-medium practices. State-mandated coverage was associated with the use of cessation processes in small-medium practices (p<0.0001), as was pay for performance participation (p<0.0001); public reporting (p<0.0001); Medicaid revenue (p=0.02); and practice size (p<0.0001). Among large practices, predictors were practice size (p<0.0001); hospital ownership (p=0.004); public reporting (p=0.03); and primary care practice (p=0.04). CONCLUSIONS: The findings suggest that state-mandated coverage for tobacco-cessation treatment and increased use of external incentives such as pay for performance and public reporting programs may improve care for patients who use tobacco.

Effect of financial incentives on improvement in medical quality indicators for primary care.

PURPOSE: The efficacy of rewarding physicians financially for preventive services is unproven. The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of a physician pay-for-performance program similar to the Medicare Physician Quality Reporting Initiative program on quality of preventive care in a network of community health centers. METHODS: A retrospective review of administrative data was done to evaluate a natural quasi-experiment in a network of publicly funded primary care clinics. Physicians in 6 of 11 clinics were given a financial incentive twice the size of the current Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services' incentive for achieving group targets in preventive care that included cervical cancer screening, mammography, and pediatric immunization. They also received productivity incentives. Six years of performance indicators were compared between incentivized and nonincentivized clinics. We also surveyed the incentivized clinicians about their perception of the incentive program. RESULTS: Although some performance indicators improved for all measures and all clinics, there were no clinically significant differences between clinics that had incentives and those that did not. A linear trend test approached conventional significance levels for Papanicolaou smears (P = .08) but was of very modest magnitude compared with observed nonlinear variations; there was no suggestion of a linear trend for mammography or pediatric immunizations. The survey revealed that most physicians felt the incentives were not very effective in improving quality of care. CONCLUSION: We found no evidence for a clinically significant effect of financial incentives on performance of preventive care in these community health centers. Based on our findings and others, we believe there is great need for more research with strong research designs to determine the effects, both positive and negative, of financial incentives on clinical quality indicators in primary care.

Financial incentives for quality in breast cancer care.

OBJECTIVES: To examine the use of financial incentives related to performance on quality measures reported by oncologists and surgeons associated with a population-based cohort of patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County, California, and to explore the physician and practice characteristics associated with the use of these incentives among breast cancer care providers. STUDY DESIGN: Cross-sectional observational study. METHODS: Physician self-reported financial arrangements from a survey of 348 medical oncologists, radiation oncologists, and surgeons caring for patients with breast cancer in Los Angeles County (response rate, 76%). Physicians were asked whether they were subject to financial incentives for quality (ie, patient satisfaction surveys and adherence to practice guidelines). We examined the prevalence and correlates of incentives and performed multivariate logistic regression analyses to assess predictors of incentives, controlling for other covariates. RESULTS: Twenty percent of respondents reported incentives based on patient satisfaction, and 15% reported incentives based on guideline adherence. The use of incentives for quality in this cohort of oncologists and surgeons was modest and was primarily associated with staff- or group-model health maintenance organization (HMO) settings. In other settings, important predictors were partial physician ownership interest, large practice size, and capitation. CONCLUSIONS: Most cancer care providers in Los Angeles County outside of staff- or group-model HMOs are not subject to explicit financial incentives based on quality-of-care measures. Those who are, seem more likely to be associated with large practice settings. New approaches are needed to direct financial incentives for quality toward specialists outside of staff- or group-model HMOs if pay-for-performance programs are to succeed in influencing care.

Should we have confidence if a physician is accredited? A study of the relative impacts of accreditation and insurance payments on quality of care in the Philippines.

It is unclear whether health provider accreditation ensures or promotes quality of care. Using baseline data from the Quality Improvement Demonstration Study (QIDS) in the Philippines we measured the quality of pediatric care provided by private and public doctors working at the district hospital level in the country's central region. We found that national level accreditation by a national insurance program influences quality of care. However, our data also show that insurance payments have a similar, strong impact on quality of care. These results suggest that accreditation alone may not be sufficient to promote high quality of care. Further improvements may be achieved with properly monitored and well-designed payment or incentive schemes.