Can financial incentives improve access to care? Evidence from a French experiment on specialist physicians.

ABSTRACT

In France, addressing balance billing is essential for equitable healthcare access and reducing physician income disparities. The National Health Insurance (NHI) introduced financial incentive programs, namely the "Contract for Access to Care" (CAS) in 2014 and the "Option for Controlled Pricing" (OPTAM) in 2017, to encourage physicians to reduce extra fees and adhere to regulated prices. This study analyzed the impact of these programs on self-employed physicians using a comprehensive administrative dataset covering specialist physicians from 2005 to 2017. The dataset comprised 9891 surgical specialists (30,972 observations) and 6926 medical specialists (21,650 observations) between 2005 and 2017. Applying a difference-in-differences design with a two-way fixed effect model and matching through the "Coarsened Exact Matching" method, the study examined CAS and/or OPTAM membership effects on physicians' activity and fees. The results indicate that both the CAS and OPTAM successfully enhance access to care. Physicians treat more patients, particularly those with lower incomes who might have previously avoided care because of the extra fees. However, an increased patient load translates to a higher workload for physicians. Despite a fee increase, it was observed to be smaller than the surge in activity. Furthermore, if all physicians are appropriately rewarded for their efforts, this improvement in access comes at a cost to NHI. This study's findings provide crucial insights into the nuanced effects of these financial incentive programs on physicians' behavior, highlighting the tradeoff between improved access and increased NHI costs. Ultimately, these findings underscore the complexity of balancing financial incentives, physician workload, and healthcare accessibility in pursuit of a more equitable healthcare system.