Time is money: general practitioners' reflections on the fee-for-service system.

BACKGROUND: Fee-for-service is a common payment model for remunerating general practitioners (GPs) in OECD countries. In Norway, GPs earn two-thirds of their income through fee-for-service, which is determined by the number of consultations and procedures they register as fees. In general, fee-for-service incentivises many and short consultations and is associated with high service provision. GPs act as gatekeepers for various treatments and interventions, such as addictive drugs, antibiotics, referrals, and sickness certification. This study aims to explore GPs' reflections on and perceptions of the fee-for-service system, with a specific focus on its potential impact on gatekeeping decisions. METHODS: We conducted six focus group interviews with 33 GPs in 2022 in Norway. We analysed the data using thematic analysis. RESULTS: We identified three main themes related to GPs' reflections and perceptions of the fee-for-service system. First, the participants were aware of the profitability of different fees and described potential strategies to increase their income, such as having shorter consultations or performing routine procedures on all patients. Second, the participants acknowledged that the fees might influence GP behaviour. Two perspectives on the fees were present in the discussions: fees as incentives and fees as compensation. The participants reported that financial incentives were not directly decisive in gatekeeping decisions, but that rejecting requests required substantially more time compared to granting them. Consequently, time constraints may contribute to GPs' decisions to grant patient requests even when the requests are deemed unreasonable. Last, the participants reported challenges with remembering and interpreting fees, especially complex fees. CONCLUSIONS: GPs are aware of the profitability within the fee-for-service system, believe that fee-for-service may influence their decision-making, and face challenges with remembering and interpreting certain fees. Furthermore, the fee-for-service system can potentially affect GPs' gatekeeping decisions by incentivising shorter consultations, which may result in increased consultations with inadequate time to reject unnecessary treatments.

The cost of saying no: general practitioners' gatekeeping role in sickness absence certification.

BACKGROUND: General practitioners (GPs) have an important gatekeeping role in the Norwegian sickness insurance system. This role includes limiting access to paid sick leave when this is not justified according to sick leave criteria. 85% of GPs in Norway operate within a fee-for-service system that incentivises short consultations and high service provision. In this qualitative study, we explore how GPs practise the gatekeeping role in sickness absence certification. METHODS: Qualitative data was collected through six focus group interviews with 33 GPs, working in practices with a minimum of four practising GPs, in different geographical regions across Norway, including both urban and rural areas. Data was analysed using Braune and Clarke's thematic analysis approach. RESULTS: Our results indicate that GPs' sick-listing decisions are largely driven by patient demand and preferences for sick leave. GPs reported that they rarely overrule patient requests for sickness absence, including in cases where such requests conflict with the GPs' opinion of whether sick leave is justified or benefits the patient. The degree of effort made to limit unjustified or non-beneficial sick leave seems to depend on the GPs' available time and perceived risk of conflict with the patient. GPs generally expressed dissatisfaction with their role as certifiers of sickness absence. CONCLUSION: Our study suggests that GPs' decisions about sickness certification is largely driven by patient preferences. The GPs' gatekeeping function is limited to negotiations about grade and duration of absence spells.

Health problems account for a small part of the association between socioeconomic status and disability pension award. Results from the Hordaland Health Study.

BACKGROUND: Low socioeconomic status is a known risk factor for disability pension, and is also associated with health problems. To what degree health problems can explain the increased risk of disability pension award associated with low socioeconomic status is not known. METHODS: Information on 15,067 participants in the Hordaland Health Study was linked to a comprehensive national registry on disability pension awards. Level of education was used as a proxy for socioeconomic status. Logistic regression analyses were employed to examine the association between socioeconomic status and rates of disability pension award, before and after adjusting for a wide range of somatic and mental health factors. The proportion of the difference in disability pension between socioeconomic groups explained by health was then calculated. RESULTS: Unadjusted odds ratios for disability pension was 4.60 (95% CI: 3.34-6.33) for the group with elementary school only (9 years of education) and 2.03 (95% CI 1.49-2.77) for the group with high school (12 years of education) when compared to the group with higher education (more than 12 years). When adjusting for somatic and mental health, odds ratios were reduced to 3.87 (2.73-5.47) and 1.81 (1.31-2.52). This corresponds to health explaining only a marginal proportion of the increased level of disability pension in the groups with lower socioeconomic status. CONCLUSION: There is a socioeconomic gradient in disability pension similar to the well known socioeconomic gradient in health. However, health accounts for little of the socioeconomic gradient in disability pension. Future studies of socioeconomic gradients in disability pension should focus on explanatory factors beyond health.