Ecological study of the association between socioeconomic inequality and food deserts and swamps around schools in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

BACKGROUND: Previous research suggests that unhealthy community food environments around schools contribute to unhealthy eating habits and negative health outcomes among the youth. However, little is known about how socioeconomic inequalities in those community food environments are associated with food deserts and food swamps across schools' neighborhoods. METHODS: An ecological study was carried out in all 3,159 public and private schools in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Three measures of socioeconomic inequality were evaluated: per capita income, segregation index and deprivation index. The community school food environment was analyzed by metrics of food swamps and food deserts. RESULTS: Food deserts and food swamps were simultaneously more prevalent in neighborhoods of the lowest income, high deprivation, and high segregation. Spatial socioeconomic disparities at the neighborhoods of schools were associated with food deserts and food swamps in Rio de Janeiro. CONCLUSIONS: Our results point to a spatial socioeconomic inequality of establishments that sell food around schools in a Brazilian metropolis, indicating that the areas of greatest deprivation of food services are also the areas with the worst socioeconomic characteristics.

Transparência interna: cumprimento e punição no processo orçamentário municipal brasileiro / Transparencia interna: cumplimiento y sanción en el proceso presupuestario municipal brasileño / Internal transparency: compliance and punishment in the Brazilian municipal budget process

Resumo Muito tem sido escrito a respeito da transparência externa no setor público. No entanto, a transparência interna - a divulgação inter- e intra-governamental de informações - é comumente negligenciada como objeto de estudo. Subestimar a transparência interna é surpreendente, pois ela é um fator determinante para a coordenação de políticas públicas e para uma governança democrática de qualidade. O presente artigo analisa os custos de curto e longo prazos do não cumprimento de requisitos de transparência interna vinculados aos orçamentos municipais em geral e aos gastos com educação em particular. Neste estudo, utilizamos métodos mistos, analisando quantitativamente os incentivos de curto prazo para cumprir os requisitos de transparência do financiamento da educação e, qualitativamente, as consequências futuras decorrentes do seu descumprimento. Os resultados revelam que municípios que recebem maior volume de transferências voluntárias têm maior probabilidade de atender aos requisitos de transparência interna; contudo, os custos de não cumprir tais requisitos são baixos e facilmente reversíveis a curto prazo. No longo prazo, os prefeitos que não cumprirem a regulação orçamentária, incluindo a legislação para a transparência interna, podem enfrentar consequências mais severas, como a possibilidade de serem futuramente impedidos de exercer seus cargos. No entanto, nossos resultados mostram relativamente poucos casos de punição e que, em média, essas punições só são aplicadas após dez anos de processos judiciais. De modo geral, demonstramos que os Tribunais de Contas - principais agentes para a accountability orçamentária dos 5.570 municípios brasileiros - são tão importantes quanto ineficazes para a transparência interna.

Resumen Mucho se ha escrito sobre la transparencia externa en el sector público. Sin embargo, la transparencia interna -divulgación intra e intergubernamental de información- se suele pasar por alto como objeto de estudio. Subestimar la transparencia interna es sorprendente, ya que es un factor determinante para la coordinación de las políticas públicas y para una gobernabilidad democrática de calidad. Este artículo analiza los costos a corto y largo plazo del incumplimiento de los requisitos de transparencia interna, vinculados a los presupuestos municipales en general y al gasto educativo en particular. En este estudio, utilizamos métodos mixtos, analizando cuantitativamente los incentivos a corto plazo para cumplir con los requisitos de transparencia del financiamiento de la educación y, cualitativamente, las consecuencias futuras del incumplimiento. Los resultados muestran que los municipios que reciben mayores transferencias voluntarias tienen más probabilidades de cumplir con los requisitos de transparencia interna; sin embargo, los costos de incumplir dichos requisitos son bajos y fácilmente reversibles a corto plazo. A largo plazo, los alcaldes que no cumplan con la regulación presupuestaria, incluyendo la legislación de transparencia interna, podrían enfrentar consecuencias más severas, como la posibilidad de verse impedidos de ejercer sus cargos en el futuro. Sin embargo, nuestros resultados muestran relativamente pocos casos de sanción y, en promedio, estas penalidades solo se aplican después de diez años de procesos judiciales. En general, demostramos que los tribunales de cuentas, principales agentes del accountability presupuestario de los 5.570 municipios brasileños, son tan importantes como ineficaces para la transparencia interna.

Abstract Much has been written about external transparency in the public sector. However, internal transparency - the inter and intragovernmental disclosure of information - is commonly overlooked as an object of study. Underestimating the importance of internal transparency is surprising, as it is a determining factor for the coordination of public policies and the quality of democratic governance. This paper analyzes the short-and-long-term costs of failing to comply with internal transparency requirements linked to municipal budgets in general and education spending in particular. In this study, we employ mixed methods, quantitatively analyzing the short-term incentives to comply with transparency requirements for education finance and, qualitatively, the future consequences of noncompliance. The results show that municipalities receiving the most voluntary transfers are more likely to meet internal transparency requirements. However, the costs of not fulfilling such requirements are low and easily reversible in the short-term. In the long-term, municipal officials who fail to comply with budget regulation, including internal transparency statutes, can face more severe consequences, such as the possibility of being barred from office. However, our results show relatively few instances of punishment, and, on average, punishments are only levied after ten years of legal processes. Overall, our results show how, as the lynchpin agents of budgetary accountability and enforcement for Brazil's 5570 municipalities, the courts of audit (Tribunais de Contas) are important but ineffective.

How changes in menu quality associate with subsequent expenditure on (un)healthy foods and beverages in school cafeterias: A three-year longitudinal study.

Evidence of the association between the school food environment and children's and adolescents' diet is mostly cross-sectional, usually based on self-reported behavior, and often conducted in high-income countries. Also, relatively little is known about how variations in menu quality associate with the subsequent expenditure on food and beverages of the same- (vs. cross-) nutritional value. Based on a three-year longitudinal dataset comprised of 4,268,457 purchases made by 20,333 children and adolescents from 54 private schools in Brazil, we unobtrusively assess how changes in (un)healthy product availability associate with students' subsequent purchase behavior. Our results reveal that, on average, only 11.6% of the products offered in the school cafeterias were of high nutritional value (HNV). Critically, expenditure on HNV products increased following both the addition of one HNV product (ß = 0.18; 95% CI = 0.128, 0.240) and, to a lesser extent, the subtraction of one low nutritional value (LNV) product from the menu (ß = -0.03; 95% CI = -0.042, -0.016). Cross-nutritional value effects were stronger for beverages. The inclusion of one HNV beverage was associated not only with a subsequent increase in expenditure on HNV beverages (ß = 0.19; 95% CI = 0.115, 0.264), but also with a decrease in expenditure on LNV beverages (ß = -0.18; 95% CI = -0.352, -0.010).Although only a small percentage of foods and beverages consumed in private school cafeterias in Brazil are of high nutritional value, improvements to menu quality have the potential to increase the consumption of healthier products and decrease the consumption of unhealthy ones.