Dopamine and serotonin in human substantia nigra track social context and value signals during economic exchange.

Dopamine and serotonin are hypothesized to guide social behaviours. In humans, however, we have not yet been able to study neuromodulator dynamics as social interaction unfolds. Here, we obtained subsecond estimates of dopamine and serotonin from human substantia nigra pars reticulata during the ultimatum game. Participants, who were patients with Parkinson's disease undergoing awake brain surgery, had to accept or reject monetary offers of varying fairness from human and computer players. They rejected more offers in the human than the computer condition, an effect of social context associated with higher overall levels of dopamine but not serotonin. Regardless of the social context, relative changes in dopamine tracked trial-by-trial changes in offer value-akin to reward prediction errors-whereas serotonin tracked the current offer value. These results show that dopamine and serotonin fluctuations in one of the basal ganglia's main output structures reflect distinct social context and value signals.

Equality bias impairs collective decision-making across cultures.

We tend to think that everyone deserves an equal say in a debate. This seemingly innocuous assumption can be damaging when we make decisions together as part of a group. To make optimal decisions, group members should weight their differing opinions according to how competent they are relative to one another; whenever they differ in competence, an equal weighting is suboptimal. Here, we asked how people deal with individual differences in competence in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task. We developed a metric for estimating how participants weight their partner's opinion relative to their own and compared this weighting to an optimal benchmark. Replicated across three countries (Denmark, Iran, and China), we show that participants assigned nearly equal weights to each other's opinions regardless of true differences in their competence-even when informed by explicit feedback about their competence gap or under monetary incentives to maximize collective accuracy. This equality bias, whereby people behave as if they are as good or as bad as their partner, is particularly costly for a group when a competence gap separates its members.