RESUMO
BACKGROUND: On 20 September 2022, the Ugandan Ministry of Health declared an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by Sudan ebolavirus. METHODS: From 6 October 2022 to 10 January 2023, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) staff conducted public health assessments at five US ports of entry for travellers identified as having been in Uganda in the past 21 days. CDC also recommended that state, local and territorial health departments ('health departments') conduct post-arrival monitoring of these travellers. CDC provided traveller contact information, daily to 58 health departments, and collected health department data regarding monitoring outcomes. RESULTS: Among 11 583 travellers screened, 132 (1%) required additional assessment due to potential exposures or symptoms of concern. Fifty-three (91%) health departments reported receiving traveller data from CDC for 10 114 (87%) travellers, of whom 8499 (84%) were contacted for monitoring, 1547 (15%) could not be contacted and 68 (1%) had no reported outcomes. No travellers with high-risk exposures or Ebola disease were identified. CONCLUSION: Entry risk assessment and post-arrival monitoring of travellers are resource-intensive activities that had low demonstrated yield during this and previous outbreaks. The efficiency of future responses could be improved by incorporating an assessment of risk of importation of disease, accounting for individual travellers' potential for exposure, and expanded use of methods that reduce burden to federal agencies, health departments, and travellers.
Assuntos
Surtos de Doenças , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola , Viagem , Humanos , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/epidemiologia , Doença pelo Vírus Ebola/prevenção & controle , Uganda/epidemiologia , Surtos de Doenças/prevenção & controle , Medição de Risco/métodos , Estados Unidos/epidemiologia , Masculino , Feminino , Adulto , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Saúde Pública/métodos , Pessoa de Meia-Idade , Ebolavirus , Adolescente , Adulto JovemRESUMO
In January 2020, with support from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CDC instituted an enhanced entry risk assessment and management (screening) program for air passengers arriving from certain countries with widespread, sustained transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The objectives of the screening program were to reduce the importation of COVID-19 cases into the United States and slow subsequent spread within states. Screening aimed to identify travelers with COVID-19-like illness or who had a known exposure to a person with COVID-19 and separate them from others. Screening also aimed to inform all screened travelers about self-monitoring and other recommendations to prevent disease spread and obtain their contact information to share with public health authorities in destination states. CDC delegated postarrival management of crew members to airline occupational health programs by issuing joint guidance with the Federal Aviation Administration.* During January 17-September 13, 2020, a total of 766,044 travelers were screened, 298 (0.04%) of whom met criteria for public health assessment; 35 (0.005%) were tested for SARS-CoV-2, and nine (0.001%) had a positive test result. CDC shared contact information with states for approximately 68% of screened travelers because of data collection challenges and some states' opting out of receiving data. The low case detection rate of this resource-intensive program highlighted the need for fundamental change in the U.S. border health strategy. Because SARS-CoV-2 infection and transmission can occur in the absence of symptoms and because the symptoms of COVID-19 are nonspecific, symptom-based screening programs are ineffective for case detection. Since the screening program ended on September 14, 2020, efforts to reduce COVID-19 importation have focused on enhancing communications with travelers to promote recommended preventive measures, reinforcing mechanisms to refer overtly ill travelers to CDC, and enhancing public health response capacity at ports of entry. More efficient collection of contact information for international air passengers before arrival and real-time transfer of data to U.S. health departments would facilitate timely postarrival public health management, including contact tracing, when indicated. Incorporating health attestations, predeparture and postarrival testing, and a period of limited movement after higher-risk travel, might reduce risk for transmission during travel and translocation of SARS-CoV-2 between geographic areas and help guide more individualized postarrival recommendations.
Assuntos
Aeroportos , Doenças Transmissíveis Importadas/prevenção & controle , Infecções por Coronavirus/prevenção & controle , Programas de Rastreamento , Pandemias/prevenção & controle , Pneumonia Viral/prevenção & controle , COVID-19 , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Doenças Transmissíveis Importadas/epidemiologia , Infecções por Coronavirus/epidemiologia , Humanos , Pneumonia Viral/epidemiologia , Medição de Risco , Viagem , Estados Unidos/epidemiologiaRESUMO
The 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) outbreak in the Republic of Korea (ROK) is an example of an infectious disease outbreak initiated by international travelers to a high-income country. This study was conducted to determine the economic impact of the MERS outbreak on the tourism and travel-related service sectors, including accommodation, food and beverage, and transportation, in the ROK. We projected monthly numbers of noncitizen arrivals and indices of services for 3 travel-related service sectors during and after the MERS outbreak (June 2015 to June 2016) using seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average models. Tourism losses were estimated by multiplying the monthly differences between projected and actual numbers of noncitizen arrivals by average tourism expenditure per capita. Estimated tourism losses were allocated to travel-related service sectors to understand the distribution of losses across service sectors. The MERS outbreak was correlated with a reduction of 2.1 million noncitizen visitors corresponding with US$2.6 billion in tourism loss for the ROK. Estimated losses in the accommodation, food and beverage service, and transportation sectors associated with the decrease of noncitizen visitors were US$542 million, US$359 million, and US$106 million, respectively. The losses were demonstrated by lower than expected indices of services for the accommodation and food and beverage service sectors in June and July 2015 and for the transportation sector in June 2015. The results support previous findings that public health emergencies due to traveler-associated outbreaks of infectious diseases can cause significant losses to the broader economies of affected countries.