A nexus between green digital finance and green innovation under asymmetric effects on renewable energy markets: a study on Chinese green cities.

This article examines the innovation in the green sector frequently facing a financial conundrum. Production of renewable energy is the eighth sustainable development, based on the data from the 30 Chinese provinces (2000-2017). This study presents an analysis of the effects of green digital finance on green innovation on protection of environment using influence mechanism analysis. Digital finance, which has become a major driver of green innovations in China, may first increase the number and quality of green technical innovation. The results show that the promotion effect of digital finance on the efficiency of renewable energy markets is greater than the inhibitory effect, making the total effect less obviously favorable. In other results, the elasticity of lnGFDI is significant at the 5% level and is 0.1545% and 0.1880% in the present and 1-year delayed periods, respectively. Further, the average total effect of FDI on the effectiveness of green innovation is 0.008, with an average encouraging effect of 0.0051 and an average inhibiting effect of 0.0039. We conclude that diverse behavior for that policy support increases the impact of green digital finance, promote green innovation, and generate emission free environment for sustainable energy markets.

The impact of cross-shareholding under different power structures considering green investment and green marketing.

Cross-shareholding has played an important role in strengthening strategic synergy among enterprises, but its impact on the green development of enterprises is unclear. In this paper, we construct an analytical framework that includes a manufacturer and a retailer to explore the impact of cross-shareholdings under different leaderships on green supply chain operational decisions and profits, in which the manufacturer invests in green technologies and the retailer conducts green marketing. By constructing and solving the game model of manufacturer-led and retailer-led before and after cross-shareholding, it is found that after cross-shareholding, the product's green level and the retailers' marketing level are improved. For supply chain leaders, cross-shareholdings always increase their profits. Only when the follower holds the leader's shares no more than a certain value, cross-shareholding will increase the total profit of the supply chain. In addition, we obtain the optimal decisions and profits of the supply chain in the integrated situation and design two-part pricing contracts to achieve cross-shareholding supply chain coordination. The results of this paper can provide theoretical guidance and decision support for enterprises interested in using cross-shareholding to improve supply chain performance.