Biosafety risk assessment for production of candidate vaccine viruses to protect humans from zoonotic highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses.

A major lesson learned from the public health response to the 2009 H1N1 pandemic was the need to shorten the vaccine delivery timeline to achieve the best pandemic mitigation results. A gap analysis of previous pre-pandemic vaccine development activities identified possible changes in the Select Agent exclusion process that would maintain safety and shorten the timeline to develop candidate vaccine viruses (CVVs) for use in pandemic vaccine manufacture. Here, we review the biosafety characteristics of CVVs developed in the past 15 years to support a shortened preparedness timeline for A(H5) and A(H7) subtype highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) CVVs. Extensive biosafety experimental evidence supported recent changes in the implementation of Select Agent regulations that eliminated the mandatory chicken pathotype testing requirements and expedited distribution of CVVs to shorten pre-pandemic and pandemic vaccine manufacturing by up to 3 weeks.

Improving pandemic influenza risk assessment.

Assessing the pandemic risk posed by specific non-human influenza A viruses is an important goal in public health research. As influenza virus genome sequencing becomes cheaper, faster, and more readily available, the ability to predict pandemic potential from sequence data could transform pandemic influenza risk assessment capabilities. However, the complexities of the relationships between virus genotype and phenotype make such predictions extremely difficult. The integration of experimental work, computational tool development, and analysis of evolutionary pathways, together with refinements to influenza surveillance, has the potential to transform our ability to assess the risks posed to humans by non-human influenza viruses and lead to improved pandemic preparedness and response.

LABEL: fast and accurate lineage assignment with assessment of H5N1 and H9N2 influenza A hemagglutinins.

The evolutionary classification of influenza genes into lineages is a first step in understanding their molecular epidemiology and can inform the subsequent implementation of control measures. We introduce a novel approach called Lineage Assignment By Extended Learning (LABEL) to rapidly determine cladistic information for any number of genes without the need for time-consuming sequence alignment, phylogenetic tree construction, or manual annotation. Instead, LABEL relies on hidden Markov model profiles and support vector machine training to hierarchically classify gene sequences by their similarity to pre-defined lineages. We assessed LABEL by analyzing the annotated hemagglutinin genes of highly pathogenic (H5N1) and low pathogenicity (H9N2) avian influenza A viruses. Using the WHO/FAO/OIE H5N1 evolution working group nomenclature, the LABEL pipeline quickly and accurately identified the H5 lineages of uncharacterized sequences. Moreover, we developed an updated clade nomenclature for the H9 hemagglutinin gene and show a similarly fast and reliable phylogenetic assessment with LABEL. While this study was focused on hemagglutinin sequences, LABEL could be applied to the analysis of any gene and shows great potential to guide molecular epidemiology activities, accelerate database annotation, and provide a data sorting tool for other large-scale bioinformatic studies.

Assessment of route of administration and dose escalation for an adenovirus-based influenza A Virus (H5N1) vaccine in chickens.

Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) virus causes one of the most economically devastating poultry diseases. An HPAI vaccine to prevent the disease in commercial and backyard birds must be effective, safe, and inexpensive. Recently, we demonstrated the efficacy of an adenovirus-based H5N1 HPAI vaccine (Ad5.HA) in chickens. To further evaluate the potential of the Ad5.HA vaccine and its cost-effectiveness, studies to determine the minimal effective dose and optimal route of administration in chickens were performed. A dose as low as 10(7) viral particles (vp) of adenovirus-based H5N1 vaccine per chicken was sufficient to generate a robust humoral immune response, which correlated with the previously reported level of protection. Several routes of administration, including intratracheal, conjunctival, subcutaneous, and in ovo routes, were evaluated for optimal vaccine administration. However, only the subcutaneous route of immunization induced a satisfactory level of influenza virus-specific antibodies. Importantly, these studies established that the vaccine-induced immunity was cross-reactive against an H5N1 strain from a different clade, emphasizing the potential of cross-protection. Our results suggest that the Ad5.HA HPAI vaccine is safe and effective, with the potential of cross-clade protection. The ease of manufacturing and cost-effectiveness make Ad5.HA an excellent avian influenza vaccine candidate with the ability to protect poultry from HPAI virus infection. Considering the limitations of the influenza vaccine technology currently used for poultry applications, any effort aimed at overcoming those limitations is highly significant.

Reassortment between avian H5N1 and human H3N2 influenza viruses in ferrets: a public health risk assessment.

This study investigated whether transmissible H5 subtype human-avian reassortant viruses could be generated in vivo. To this end, ferrets were coinfected with recent avian H5N1 (A/Thailand/16/04) and human H3N2 (A/Wyoming/3/03) viruses. Genotype analyses of plaque-purified viruses from nasal secretions of coinfected ferrets revealed that approximately 9% of recovered viruses contained genes from both progenitor viruses. H5 and H3 subtype viruses, including reassortants, were found in airways extending toward and in the upper respiratory tract of ferrets. However, only parental H5N1 genotype viruses were found in lung tissue. Approximately 34% of the recovered reassortant viruses possessed the H5 hemagglutinin (HA) gene, with five unique H5 subtypes recovered. These H5 reassortants were selected for further studies to examine their growth and transmissibility characteristics. Five H5 viruses with representative reassortant genotypes showed reduced titers in nasal secretions of infected ferrets compared to the parental H5N1 virus. No transmission by direct contact between infected and naïve ferrets was observed. These studies indicate that reassortment between H5N1 avian influenza and H3N2 human viruses occurred readily in vivo and furthermore that reassortment between these two viral subtypes is likely to occur in ferret upper airways. Given the relatively high incidence of reassortant viruses from tissues of the ferret upper airway, it is reasonable to conclude that continued exposure of humans and animals to H5N1 alongside seasonal influenza viruses increases the risk of generating H5 subtype reassortant viruses that may be shed from upper airway secretions.