Health and equity implications of individual adaptation to air pollution in a changing climate.

Future climate change can cause more days with poor air quality. This could trigger more alerts telling people to stay inside to protect themselves, with potential consequences for health and health equity. Here, we study the change in US air quality alerts over this century due to fine particulate matter (PM2.5), who they may affect, and how they may respond. We find air quality alerts increase by over 1 mo per year in the eastern United States by 2100 and quadruple on average. They predominantly affect areas with high Black populations and leakier homes, exacerbating existing inequalities and impacting those less able to adapt. Reducing emissions can offer significant annual health benefits ($5,400 per person) by mitigating the effect of climate change on air pollution and its associated risks of early death. Relying on people to adapt, instead, would require them to stay inside, with doors and windows closed, for an extra 142 d per year, at an average cost of $11,000 per person. It appears likelier, however, that people will achieve minimal protection without policy to increase adaptation rates. Boosting adaptation can offer net benefits, even alongside deep emission cuts. New adaptation policies could, for example: reduce adaptation costs; reduce infiltration and improve indoor air quality; increase awareness of alerts and adaptation; and provide measures for those working or living outdoors. Reducing emissions, conversely, lowers everyone's need to adapt, and protects those who cannot adapt. Equitably protecting human health from air pollution under climate change requires both mitigation and adaptation.

Best response dynamics improve sustainability and equity outcomes in common-pool resources problems, compared to imitation dynamics.

Shared resource extraction among profit-seeking individuals involves a tension between individual benefit and the collective well-being represented by the persistence of the resource. Many game theoretic models explore this scenario, but these models tend to assume either best response dynamics (where individuals instantly switch to better paying strategies) or imitation dynamics (where individuals copy successful strategies from neighbours), and do not systematically compare predictions under the two assumptions. Here we propose an iterated game on a social network with payoff functions that depend on the state of the resource. Agents harvest the resource, and the strategy composition of the population evolves until an equilibrium is reached. The system is then repeatedly perturbed and allowed to re-equilibrate. We compare model predictions under best response and imitation dynamics. Compared to imitation dynamics, best response dynamics increase sustainability of the system, the persistence of cooperation while decreasing inequality and debt corresponding to the Gini index in the agents' cumulative payoffs. Additionally, for best response dynamics, the number of strategy switches before equilibrium fits a power-law distribution under a subset of the parameter space, suggesting the system is in a state of self-organized criticality. We find little variation in most mean results over different network topologies; however, there is significant variation in the distributions of the raw data, equality of payoff, clustering of like strategies and power-law fit. We suggest the primary mechanisms driving the difference in sustainability between the two strategy update rules to be the clustering of like strategies as well as the time delay imposed by an imitation processes. Given the strikingly different outcomes for best response versus imitation dynamics for common-pool resource systems, our results suggest that modellers should choose strategy update rules that best represent decision-making in their study systems.