Completeness of serious adverse drug event reports received by the US Food and Drug Administration in 2014.

PURPOSE: Adverse drug event reports to the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) remain the primary tool for identifying serious drug adverse effects without adequate existing warnings. We assessed the completeness of reports the FDA received in 2014. METHODS: Serious adverse drug event reports were evaluated for whether they included age, gender, event date, and at least one medical term describing the event in computer excerpts. Report sources were direct reports to the FDA, manufacturer expedited reports about events without adequate warnings, and manufacturer periodic reports about events with existing warnings. RESULTS: In 2014, the FDA received 528,192 new case reports indicating a serious or fatal outcome, 25,038 (4.7%) directly from health professionals and consumers, and 503,154 (95.3%) from drug manufacturers. Overall, 21,595 (86.2%) of serious reports submitted directly to the FDA provided data for all four completeness variables, compared with 271,022 (40.4%) of manufacturer expedited reports and 24,988 (51.3%) of periodic reports. Among manufacturer serious reports, 37.9% lacked age and 46.9% had no event date. Performance by 25 manufacturers submitting 5000 or more reports varied from 24.4% complete on all variables to 67% complete. Patient death cases had the lowest completeness scores in all categories. CONCLUSIONS: By these measures, report completeness from drug manufacturers was poor compared with direct submissions to the agency. The FDA needs to update reporting requirements and compliance policies to help industry capture better adverse event information from new forms of manufacturer interactions with health professionals and consumers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Apolipoprotein B improves risk assessment of future coronary heart disease in the Framingham Heart Study beyond LDL-C and non-HDL-C.

AIMS: Analyses using conventional statistical methodologies have yielded conflicting results as to whether low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (LDL-C) or non-high-density lipoprotein cholesterol (non-HDL-C) or apolipoprotein B (apoB) is the best marker of the apoB-associated risk of coronary heart disease. The aim of this study was to determine the additional value of apoB beyond LDL-C or non-HDL-C as a predictor of coronary heart disease. METHODS AND RESULTS: For each patient from the Framingham Offspring Cohort aged 40-75 years (n = 2966), we calculated the extent to which the observed apoB differed from the expected apoB based on their LDL-C or non-HDL-C. We added this difference to a Cox model predicting new onset coronary heart disease over a maximum of 20 years adjusting for standard risk factors plus LDL-C or non-HDL. The difference between observed and expected apoB over LDL-C or non-HDL-C was highly prognostic of future coronary heart disease events: adjusted hazard ratios 1.26 (95% confidence interval: 1.15, 1.37) and 1.20 (1.11, 1.29), respectively, for each standard deviation increase beyond expected apoB levels. When this difference between observed and expected apoB was added to standard coronary heart disease prediction models including LDL-C or non-HDL-C, prediction improved significantly (likelihood ratio test p-values <0.0001) and discrimination c-statistics increased from 0.72 to 0.73. The corresponding relative integrated discrimination improvements were 11% and 8%, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: apoB improves risk assessment of future coronary heart disease events over and beyond LDL-C or non-HDL-C, which is consistent with coronary risk being more closely related to the number of atherogenic apoB particles than to the mass of cholesterol within them.

Comparison of coronary calcium screening versus broad statin therapy for patients at intermediate cardiovascular risk.

Net reclassification has become widely accepted as a method to demonstrate whether new diagnostic technologies add significantly to the discrimination of risk. However, more accurate categorization of risk does not necessarily result in a better clinical outcome. This study examined whether coronary artery calcium, a technology that improves net reclassification in patients at intermediate risk for cardiovascular events, is superior to a strategy that calls for broader intervention with statin therapy in these patients. To do so, the clinical impact and costs of 2 intervention regimens on outcome in the Multi-Ethnic Study of Atherosclerosis (MESA) were calculated based on the known efficacy of statins. Intervention 1 involved treatment of all subjects at conventional intermediate risk with moderate-dose stain, whereas intervention 2 involved moderate- and high-dose statin therapy, respectively, of those remaining at intermediate risk and those reassigned to high risk after reclassification by coronary artery calcium. The 2 strategies would decrease clinical events by 23% and would produce net savings. However, these would be greater with the broad statin prevention strategy than with the coronary calcium reclassification strategy ($732,152 vs $288,336, respectively). In conclusion, even in the short term, the broad statin prevention strategy would be at least as effective in decreasing clinical events but with greater net savings than a prevention strategy using coronary calcium screening.

Cost-effectiveness of chlorthalidone, amlodipine, and lisinopril as first-step treatment for patients with hypertension: an analysis of the Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT).

OBJECTIVE: To evaluate the cost-effectiveness of first-line treatments for hypertension. BACKGROUND: The Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT) found that first-line treatment with lisinopril or amlodipine was not significantly superior to chlorthalidone in terms of the primary endpoint, so differences in costs may be critical for optimizing decision-making. METHODS: Cost-effectiveness analysis was performed using bootstrap resampling to evaluate uncertainty. RESULTS: Over a patient's lifetime, chlorthalidone was always least expensive (mean $4,802 less than amlodipine, $3,700 less than lisinopril). Amlodipine provided more life-years (LYs) than chlorthalidone in 84% of bootstrap samples (mean 37 days) at an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio of $48,400 per LY gained. Lisinopril provided fewer LYs than chlorthalidone in 55% of bootstrap samples (mean 7-day loss) despite a higher cost. At a threshold of $50,000 per LY gained, amlodipine was preferred in 50%, chlorthalidone in 40%, and lisinopril in 10% of bootstrap samples, but these findings were highly sensitive to the cost of amlodipine and the cost-effectiveness threshold chosen. Incorporating quality of life did not appreciably alter the results. Overall, no reasonable combination of assumptions led to 1 treatment being preferred in over 90% of bootstrap samples. CONCLUSIONS: Initial treatment with chlorthalidone is less expensive than lisinopril or amlodipine, but amlodipine provided a nonsignificantly greater survival benefit and may be a cost-effective alternative. A randomized trial with power to exclude "clinically important" differences in survival will often have inadequate power to determine the most cost-effective treatment.

Controlling prescription drug expenditures: a report of success.

OBJECTIVE: To determine whether a multi-interventional program can limit increases in prescription drug expenditures while maintaining utilization of needed medications. STUDY DESIGN: Quasi-experimental, pre-post design. METHODS: The program included formulary changes, quantity limits, and mandatory pill splitting for select drugs implemented in phases. We assessed the short-term effects of each intervention by comparing class-specific drug spending and generic medication use before and after benefit changes. Long-term effects were determined by comparing overall spending with projected spending estimates, and by examining changes in the planwide use of generic medications over time. Effects on medication utilization were assessed by examining members' use of selected classes of chronic medications before and after the policy changes. RESULTS: Over 3 years, the plan and members saved $6.6 million attributed to the interventions. Most of the savings were due to the reclassification of select brand-name drugs to nonpreferred status (estimated annual savings, $941,000), followed by the removal of nonsedating antihistamines from the formulary (annual savings, $565,000), and the introduction of pill splitting (annual savings, $342,000). Limiting quantities of select medications had the smallest impact (annual savings, $135,000). Members' use of generic medications steadily increased from 40% to 57%. Although 17.5% of members stopped using at least 1 class of selected medications, members' total use of chronic medications remained constant. CONCLUSIONS: A combination of interventions can successfully manage prescription drug spending while preserving utilization of chronic medications. Additional studies are needed to determine the effect of these cost-control interventions on other health outcomes.

The FDA and drug safety: a proposal for sweeping changes.

The current Food and Drug Administration (FDA) system of regulating drug safety has serious limitations and is in need of changes. The major problems include the following: the design of initial preapproval studies lets uncommon, serious adverse events go undetected; massive underreporting of adverse events to the FDA postmarketing surveillance system reduces the ability to quantify risk accurately; manufacturers do not fulfill the majority of their postmarketing safety study commitments; the FDA lacks authority to pursue sponsors who violate regulations and ignore postmarketing safety study commitments; the public increasingly perceives the FDA as having become too close to the regulated pharmaceutical industry; the FDA's safety oversight structure is suboptimal; and the FDA's expertise and resources in drug safety and public health are limited. To address these problems, we urge Congress, which is ultimately responsible for the FDA's performance, to implement the following 5 recommendations: (1) give the FDA more direct legal authority to pursue violations, (2) authorize the adoption of a conditional drug approval policy, at least for selected drugs, (3) provide additional financial resources to support the safety operations, (4) mandate a reorganization of the agency with emphasis on strengthening the evaluation and proactive monitoring of drug safety, and (5) require broader representation of safety experts on the FDA's advisory committees.

Long-term and short-term changes in antihypertensive prescribing by office-based physicians in the United States.

Medication choices for the treatment of elevated blood pressure have a large potential impact on both patient outcomes and health care costs. Historic trends of prescribing for hypertension will advance the understanding of physician practice of evidence-based medicine. This study describes both long- and short-term trends in US antihypertensive prescribing from 1990 through 2004. Data were extracted from the National Disease and Therapeutic Index, a continuing survey of a national sample of US office-based physicians. Cox and Stuart and z tests were performed. Diuretics ranked among the top 3 antihypertensive drug classes throughout the entire study time span. Angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors and calcium channel blockers (CCBs) were preferred over diuretics beginning in 1993, with diuretics surpassing CCBs in 2000. Beta-blockers were consistently the fourth most common class until 2002, when exceeded by angiotensin II receptor antagonists (ARBs). Most recent trends indicated an immediate but short-lived increase in the prescription of thiazide diuretics after the new clinical evidence released in December 2002 demonstrating clinical equivalence of thiazides to ACE inhibitors and CCBs. In contrast, prescription of ACE inhibitors declined, accompanied by continuation of a pre-existing increase in the prescription of ARBs, whereas prescription of CCBs remained essentially stable after the new evidence was released. The recorded long- and short-term trends indicate that evidence-based clinical recommendations had an impact on antihypertensive prescribing practices, but the magnitude of impact may be smaller and of more limited duration than desired.

Potential for conflict of interest in the evaluation of suspected adverse drug reactions: use of cerivastatin and risk of rhabdomyolysis.

CONTEXT: In recent years, US patients have increasingly been the first to receive new medications, some of which are subsequently discovered to have suspected adverse drug reactions (SADRs). As a result, the challenge of early detection has largely shifted to the US postmarketing systems. OBJECTIVE: To review the association between the use of cerivastatin sodium and the risk of rhabdomyolysis in an effort to illustrate the operation and limitations of the current US postmarketing safety-surveillance system. DATA SOURCES AND SELECTION: For the published literature, we used previous reviews and MEDLINE searches from all years through 2003. For the unpublished literature, we used internal company documents that have become part of the public record during a trial in Nueces County, Texas. DATA SYNTHESIS: In the published literature, cerivastatin was associated with much larger risks of rhabdomyolysis than other statins. Although only a small percentage of cerivastatin users also took gemfibrozil, approximately half of the case reports of rhabdomyolysis occurred in users of this combination therapy, and a cerivastatin-gemfibrozil interaction was supported by the results of a 3-day pharmacokinetic study. In internal company documents, multiple case reports suggested a drug-drug interaction within approximately 100 days of the launch in 1998; however, the company did not add a contraindication about the concomitant use of cerivastatin and gemfibrozil to the package insert for more than 18 months. Unpublished data available in July 1999 also suggested an increased risk of rhabdomyolysis associated with high doses of cerivastatin monotherapy. In late 1999 and early 2000, company scientists conducted high-quality analyses of the US Food and Drug Administration adverse event reporting system data. These analyses suggested that compared with atorvastatin calcium, cerivastatin monotherapy substantially increased the risk of rhabdomyolysis. To our knowledge, these findings were not disseminated or published. The company continued to conduct safety studies, some of them inadequately designed to assess the risk of rhabdomyolysis, until cerivastatin was removed from the market in August 2001. CONCLUSIONS: Despite limitations of the available data, the asymmetry between the information available to the company and the information available to patients and physicians seems striking. A subjective element is present in the effort to infer whether or not the occurrence of untoward outcomes in users of a particular drug was actually the consequence of the use of that drug, and, under the current system, a pharmaceutical company's appraisal of SADRs may be influenced by economic considerations. Such an appraisal would best be made by an independent group. The US Congress should mandate and provide adequate support for independent reviews and analysis of postmarketing data.

Impact of clinical trial results on national trends in alpha-blocker prescribing, 1996-2002.

CONTEXT: Research on factors that influence prescribing patterns and the extent of change produced by clinical trial findings is limited. OBJECTIVE: To examine the changes in prescribing of alpha-blockers for hypertension treatment before and after the April 2000 publication of the unfavorable Antihypertensive and Lipid-Lowering Treatment to Prevent Heart Attack Trial (ALLHAT) early termination involving the study's doxazosin mesylate arm. Changes in prescribing were considered in the context of other potential concurrent influences on medication use between 1996 and 2002, including changes in alpha-blocker drug prices, generic conversion, drug promotion, and competition. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PATIENTS: Using 2 national pharmaceutical market research reports published by IMS HEALTH, alpha-blocker prescription orders reported in the National Prescription Audit-a random computerized sample of about 20 000 of 29 000 retail, independent, and mail order pharmacies and mass merchandise and discount houses--and office-based physician alpha-blocker prescribing patterns reported in the National Disease and Therapeutic Index--a random stratified sample of about 3500 physician offices--were tracked. OUTCOME MEASURES: Trends in physician-reported use of alpha-blockers and alpha-blocker prescribing and dispensing by US pharmacies. RESULTS: There were steady increases in alpha-blocker new prescriptions, dispensed prescriptions, and physician drug use from 1996 through 1999. There was a moderate reversal in these trends following ALLHAT early termination and subsequent publications in early 2000. Between 1999 and 2002, new annual alpha-blocker prescription orders declined by 26% (from 5.15 million to 3.79 million), dispensed prescriptions by 22% (from 17.2 million to 13.4 million), and physician-reported drug use by 54% (from 2.26 million to 1.03 million). Other potential influences did not appear to have contributed significantly to this decline although cessation of alpha-blocker marketing may have hastened the decline. CONCLUSIONS: Modest yet statistically significant declines in the use of doxazosin and other alpha-blockers coincided with the early termination of the ALLHAT doxazosin arm. Although physicians responded to this new evidence, strategies to augment the impact of clinical trials on clinical practice are warranted.