Ethical issues in neuroprosthetics.

OBJECTIVE: Neuroprosthetics are artificial devices or systems designed to generate, restore or modulate a range of neurally mediated functions. These include sensorimotor, visual, auditory, cognitive affective and volitional functions that have been impaired or lost from congenital anomalies, traumatic brain injury, infection, amputation or neurodevelopmental and neurodegenerative disorders. Cochlear implants, visual prosthetics, deep brain stimulation, brain-computer interfaces, brain-to-brain interfaces and hippocampal prosthetics can bypass, replace or compensate for dysfunctional neural circuits, brain injury and limb loss. They can enable people with these conditions to gain or regain varying degrees of control of thought and behavior. These direct and indirect interventions in the brain raise general ethical questions about weighing the potential benefit of altering neural circuits against the potential harm from neurophysiological and psychological sequelae. Other ethical questions are more specific to the therapeutic goals of particular neuroprosthetics and the conditions for which they are indicated. These include informed consent, agency, autonomy (free will) and identity. APPROACH: This review is an analysis and discussion of these questions. It also includes consideration of social justice issues such as how to establish and implement fair selection criteria in providing access to neuroprosthetic research and balancing technological innovation with patients' best interests. MAIN RESULTS: Neuroprosthetics can restore or improve motor and mental functions in bypassing areas of injury or modulating dysregulation in neural circuits. As enabling devices that integrate with these circuits, neuroprosthetics can restore varying degrees of autonomous agency for people affected by neurological and psychiatric disorders. They can also re-establish the connectedness and continuity of the psychological properties they had before injury or disease onset and thereby re-establish their identity. Neuroprosthetics can maximize benefit and minimize harm for people affected by damaged or dysfunctional brains and improve the quality of their lives. SIGNIFICANCE: Provided that adequate protections are in place for research subjects and patients, the probable benefit of research into and therapeutic applications of neuroprosthetics outweighs the risk and therefore can be ethically justified. Depending on their neurogenerative potential, there may be an ethical obligation to conduct this research. Advances in neuroscience will generate new ethical and philosophical questions about people and their brains. These questions should shape the evolution and application of novel techniques to better understand and treat brain disorders.

A critical reflection on the technological development of deep brain stimulation (DBS).

Since the translational research findings of Benabid and colleagues which partly led to their seminal paper regarding the treatment of mainly tremor-dominant Parkinson patients through thalamic high-frequency-stimulation (HFS) in 1987, we still struggle with identifying a satisfactory mechanistic explanation of the underlying principles of deep brain stimulation (DBS). Furthermore, the technological advance of DBS devices (electrodes and implantable pulse generators, IPG's) has shown a distinct lack of dynamic progression. In light of this we argue that it is time to leave the paleolithic age and enter hellenistic times: the device-manufacturing industry and the medical community together should put more emphasis on advancing the technology rather than resting on their laurels.

Neuromodulation, agency and autonomy.

Neuromodulation consists in altering brain activity to restore mental and physical functions in individuals with neuropsychiatric disorders and brain and spinal cord injuries. This can be achieved by delivering electrical stimulation that excites or inhibits neural tissue, by using electrical signals in the brain to move computer cursors or robotic arms, or by displaying brain activity to subjects who regulate that activity by their own responses to it. As enabling prostheses, deep-brain stimulation and brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) are forms of extended embodiment that become integrated into the individual's conception of himself as an autonomous agent. In BCIs and neurofeedback, the success or failure of the techniques depends on the interaction between the learner and the trainer. The restoration of agency and autonomy through neuromodulation thus involves neurophysiological, psychological and social factors.

Burdens of ANH outweigh benefits in the minimally conscious state.

In the case of the minimally conscious patient M, the English Court of Protection ruled that it would be unlawful to withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration (ANH) from her. The Court reasoned that the sanctity of life was the determining factor and that it would not be in M's best interests for ANH to be withdrawn. This paper argues that the Court's reasoning is flawed and that continued ANH was not in this patient's best interests and thus should have been withdrawn.

Identity, prudential concern, and extended lives.

Recent advances in human genetics suggest that it may become possible to genetically manipulate telomerase and embryonic stem cells to alter the mechanisms of aging and extend the human life span. But a life span significantly longer than the present norm would be undesirable because it would severely weaken the connections between past- and future-oriented mental states and turn the psychological grounds for personal identity and prudential concern for our future selves. In addition, the collective effects of longer lives might lower the quality of life for all people. These two problems provide reasons against genetic manipulation of cells to alter the length of the human life span.

Genes, embryos, and future people.

Testing embryonic cells for genetic abnormalities gives us the capacity to predict whether and to what extent people will exist with disease and disability. Moreover, the freezing of embryos for long periods of time enables us to alter the length of a normal human lifespan. After highlighting the shortcomings of somatic-cell gene therapy and germ-line genetic alteration, I argue that the testing and selective termination of genetically defective embryos is the only medically and morally defensible way to prevent the existence of people with severe disability, pain and suffering that make their lives not worth living for them on the whole. In addition, I consider the possible harmful effects on children born from frozen embryos after the deaths of their biological parents, or when their parents are at an advanced age. I also explore whether embryos have moral status and whether the prospects for disease-preventing genetic alteration can justify long-term cryopreservation of embryos.