Economic impact of vaccine safety incident in Ukraine: The economic case for safety system investment.

BACKGROUND: Vaccine confidence and coverage decreased following a death temporally but not causally related to measles vaccination in Ukraine in 2008. Large measles outbreaks including international exportations followed. Herein we characterize this experience including associated costs. METHODS: Mixed-methods were used to characterize this vaccine safety incident and quantify health and economic costs. Qualitative interviews illuminate the incident, social climate, and corruption that influenced vaccine confidence in Ukraine. A literature review explored attitudes toward vaccines in the USSR and post-independence Ukraine. Infectious disease incidence was examined before and after the vaccine safety incident. An economic analysis estimated associated healthcare costs, including prevention and outbreak control measures, additional vaccination activities due to failure of the 2008 campaign, treatment costs for new cases domestically and foreign exportation, and productivity loss from treatment time and mortality for new cases. FINDINGS: Vaccine hesitancy and distrust in government and public health programs due to corruption existed in Ukraine before the vaccine safety incident. The mishandling of the 2008 incident catalyzed the decline of vaccine confidence and prompted poor procurement decisions, leading to a drop in infant vaccination coverage, increased domestic measles cases, and exportation of measles. The estimated cost of this incident was approximately $140 million from 2008 to 2018. INTERPRETATION: Absent a rapid and credible vaccine safety response, a coincidental death following immunization resulted in major outbreaks of measles with substantial economic costs. Adequate investments in a post-licensure safety system may help avoid similar future incidents.

Planning for globally coordinated cessation of bivalent oral poliovirus vaccine: risks of non-synchronous cessation and unauthorized oral poliovirus vaccine use.

BACKGROUND: Oral polio vaccine (OPV) containing attenuated serotype 2 polioviruses was globally withdrawn in 2016, and bivalent OPV (bOPV) containing attenuated serotype 1 and 3 polioviruses needs to be withdrawn after the certification of eradication of all wild polioviruses to eliminate future risks from vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). To minimize risks from VDPVs, the planning and implementation of bOPV withdrawal should build on the experience with withdrawing OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses while taking into account similarities and differences between the three poliovirus serotypes. METHODS: We explored the risks from (i) a failure to synchronize OPV cessation and (ii) unauthorized post-cessation OPV use for serotypes 1 and 3 in the context of globally-coordinated future bOPV cessation and compared the results to similar analyses for serotype 2 OPV cessation. RESULTS: While the risks associated with a failure to synchronize cessation and unauthorized post-cessation OPV use appear to be substantially lower for serotype 3 polioviruses than for serotype 2 polioviruses, the risks for serotype 1 appear similar to those for serotype 2. Increasing population immunity to serotype 1 and 3 poliovirus transmission using pre-cessation bOPV supplemental immunization activities and inactivated poliovirus vaccine in routine immunization reduces the risks of circulating VDPVs associated with non-synchronized cessation or unauthorized OPV use. CONCLUSIONS: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative should synchronize global bOPV cessation during a similar window of time as occurred for the global cessation of OPV containing serotype 2 polioviruses and should rigorously verify the absence of bOPV in immunization systems after its cessation.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations.

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

Financial Support to Eligible Countries for the Switch From Trivalent to Bivalent Oral Polio Vaccine-Lessons Learned.

The global switch from trivalent oral polio vaccine (tOPV) to bivalent oral polio vaccine (bOPV) ("the switch") presented an unprecedented challenge to countries. In order to mitigate the risks associated with country-level delays in implementing the switch, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative provided catalytic financial support to specific countries for operational costs unique to the switch. Between November 2015 and February 2016, a total of approximately US$19.4 million in financial support was provided to 67 countries. On average, country budgets allocated 20% to human resources, 23% to trainings and meetings, 8% to communications and advocacy, 9% to logistics, 15% to monitoring, and 5% to waste management. All 67 funded countries successfully switched from tOPV to bOPV during April-May 2016. This funding provided target countries with the necessary catalytic support to facilitate the execution of the switch on an accelerated timeline, and the mechanism offers a model for similar support to future global health efforts, such as the eventual global withdrawal of bOPV.

Resource Needs for the Trivalent Oral Polio to Bivalent Oral Polio Vaccine Switch in Indonesia.

Background: We present an empirical economic cost analysis of the April 2016 switch from trivalent (tOPV) to bivalent (bOPV) oral polio vaccine at the national-level and 3 provinces (Bali, West Sumatera and Nusa Tenggara) for Indonesia's Expanded Program on Immunization. Methods: Data on the quantity and prices of resources used in the 4 World Health Organization guideline phases of the switch were collected at the national-level and in each of the sampled provinces, cities/districts, and health facilities. Costs were calculated as the sum of the value of resources reportedly used in each sampled unit by switch phase. Results: Estimated national-level costs were $46 791. Costs by health system level varied from $9062 to $34 256 at the province-level, from $4576 to $11 936 at the district-level , and from $3488 to $29 175 at the city-level. Estimated national costs ranged from $4 076 446 (Bali, minimum cost scenario) to $28 120 700 (West Sumatera, maximum cost scenario). Conclusions: Our findings suggest that the majority of tPOV to bOPV switch costs were borne at the subnational level. Considerable variation in reported costs among health system levels surveyed indicates a need for flexibility in budgeting for globally synchronized public health activities.

Adapting Nepal's polio eradication programme.

PROBLEM: Many countries have weak disease surveillance and immunization systems. The elimination of polio creates an opportunity to use staff and assets from the polio eradication programme to control other vaccine-preventable diseases and improve disease surveillance and immunization systems. APPROACH: In 2003, the active surveillance system of Nepal's polio eradication programme began to report on measles and neonatal tetanus cases. Japanese encephalitis and rubella cases were added to the surveillance system in 2004. Staff from the programme aided the development and implementation of government immunization policies, helped launch vaccination campaigns, and trained government staff in reporting practices and vaccine management. LOCAL SETTING: Nepal eliminated indigenous polio in 2000, and controlled outbreaks caused by polio importations between 2005 and 2010. RELEVANT CHANGES: In 2014, the surveillance activities had expanded to 299 sites, with active surveillance for measles, rubella and neonatal tetanus, including weekly visits from 15 surveillance medical officers. Sentinel surveillance for Japanese encephalitis consisted of 132 sites. Since 2002, staff from the eradication programme have helped to introduce six new vaccines and helped to secure funding from Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance. Staff have also assisted in responding to other health events in the country. LESSON LEARNT: By expanding the activities of its polio eradication programme, Nepal has improved its surveillance and immunization systems and increased vaccination coverage of other vaccine-preventable diseases. Continued donor support, a close collaboration with the Expanded Programme on Immunization, and the retention of the polio eradication programme's skilled workforce were important for this expansion.

Global Routine Vaccination Coverage, 2015.

In 1974, the World Health Organization (WHO) established the Expanded Program on Immunization* to provide protection against six vaccine-preventable diseases through routine infant immunization (1). Based on 2015 WHO and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) estimates, global coverage with the third dose of diphtheria-tetanus-pertussis vaccine (DTP3), the first dose of measles-containing vaccine (MCV1) and the third dose of polio vaccine (Pol3) has remained stable (84%-86%) since 2010. From 2014 to 2015, estimated global coverage with the second MCV dose (MCV2) increased from 39% to 43% by the end of the second year of life and from 58% to 61% when older age groups were included. Global coverage was higher in 2015 than 2010 for newer or underused vaccines, including rotavirus vaccine, pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV), rubella vaccine, Haemophilus influenzae type b (Hib) vaccine, and 3 doses of hepatitis B (HepB3) vaccine. Coverage estimates varied widely by WHO Region, country, and district; in addition, for the vaccines evaluated (MCV, DTP3, Pol3, HepB3, Hib3), wide disparities were found in coverage by country income classification. Improvements in equity of access are necessary to reach and sustain higher coverage and increase protection from vaccine-preventable diseases for all persons.

Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of inadvertent trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine use.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication includes coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), starting with the cessation of vaccine containing OPV serotype 2 (OPV2) by switching all trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV). The logistics associated with this global switch represent a significant undertaking, with some possibility of inadvertent tOPV use after the switch. METHODS: We used a previously developed poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to explore the relationships between the extent of inadvertent tOPV use, the time after the switch of the inadvertent tOPV use and corresponding population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission, and the ability of the inadvertently introduced viruses to cause a serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreak in a hypothetical population. We then estimated the minimum time until inadvertent tOPV use in a supplemental immunization activity (SIA) or in routine immunization (RI) can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak in realistic populations with properties like those of northern India, northern Pakistan and Afghanistan, northern Nigeria, and Ukraine. RESULTS: At low levels of inadvertent tOPV use, the minimum time after the switch for the inadvertent use to cause a cVDPV2 outbreak decreases sharply with increasing proportions of children inadvertently receiving tOPV. The minimum times until inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA or in RI can lead to a cVDPV2 outbreak varies widely among populations, with higher basic reproduction numbers, lower tOPV-induced population immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission prior to the switch, and a lower proportion of transmission occurring via the oropharyngeal route all resulting in shorter times. In populations with the lowest expected immunity to serotype 2 poliovirus transmission after the switch, inadvertent tOPV use in an SIA leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if it occurs as soon as 9 months after the switch with 0.5 % of children aged 0-4 years inadvertently receiving tOPV, and as short as 6 months after the switch with 10-20 % of children aged 0-1 years inadvertently receiving tOPV. In the same populations, inadvertent tOPV use in RI leads to a cVDPV2 outbreak if 0.5 % of OPV RI doses given use tOPV instead of bOPV for at least 20 months after the switch, with the minimum length of use dropping to at least 9 months if inadvertent tOPV use occurs in 50 % of OPV RI doses. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to ensure timely and complete tOPV withdrawal at all levels, particularly from locations storing large amounts of tOPV, will help minimize risks associated with the tOPV-bOPV switch. Under-vaccinated populations with poor hygiene become at risk of a cVDPV2 outbreak in the event of inadvertent tOPV use the soonest after the tOPV-bOPV switch and therefore should represent priority areas to ensure tOPV withdrawal from all OPV stocks.

Implementation of coordinated global serotype 2 oral poliovirus vaccine cessation: risks of potential non-synchronous cessation.

BACKGROUND: The endgame for polio eradication involves coordinated global cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) with cessation of serotype 2 OPV (OPV2 cessation) implemented in late April and early May 2016 and cessation of serotypes 1 and 3 OPV (OPV13 cessation) currently planned for after 2018. The logistics associated with globally switching all use of trivalent OPV (tOPV) to bivalent OPV (bOPV) represent a significant undertaking, which may cause some complications, including delays that lead to different timing of the switch across shared borders. METHODS: Building on an integrated global model for long-term poliovirus risk management, we consider the expected vulnerability of different populations to transmission of OPV2-related polioviruses as a function of time following the switch. We explore the relationship between the net reproduction number (Rn) of OPV2 at the time of the switch and the time until OPV2-related viruses imported from countries still using OPV2 can establish transmission. We also analyze some specific situations modeled after populations at high potential risk of circulating serotype 2 vaccine-derived poliovirus (cVDPV2) outbreaks in the event of a non-synchronous switch. RESULTS: Well-implemented tOPV immunization activities prior to the tOPV to bOPV switch (i.e., tOPV intensification sufficient to prevent the creation of indigenous cVDPV2 outbreaks) lead to sufficient population immunity to transmission to cause die-out of any imported OPV2-related viruses for over 6 months after the switch in all populations in the global model. Higher Rn of OPV2 at the time of the switch reduces the time until imported OPV2-related viruses can establish transmission and increases the time during which indigenous OPV2-related viruses circulate. Modeling specific connected populations suggests a relatively low vulnerability to importations of OPV2-related viruses that could establish transmission in the context of a non-synchronous switch from tOPV to bOPV, unless the gap between switch times becomes very long (>6 months) or a high risk of indigenous cVDPV2s already exists in the importing and/or the exporting population. CONCLUSIONS: Short national discrepancies in the timing of the tOPV to bOPV switch will likely not significantly increase cVDPV2 risks due to the insurance provided by tOPV intensification efforts, although the goal to coordinate national switches within the globally agreed April 17-May 1, 2016 time window minimized the risks associated with cross-border importations.

Cost-effectiveness of using 2 vs 3 primary doses of 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVE: Although effective in preventing pneumococcal disease, 13-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine (PCV13) is the most expensive vaccine on the routinely recommended pediatric schedule in the United States. We examined the cost-effectiveness of switching from 4 total doses to 3 total doses by removing the third dose in the primary series in the United States. METHODS: We used a probabilistic model following a single birth cohort of 4.3 million to calculate societal cost savings and increased disease burden from removing the 6-month dose of PCV13. Based on modified estimates of 7-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine from randomized trials and observational studies, we assumed that vaccine effectiveness under the 2 schedules is identical for the first 6 months of life and largely similar after administration of the 12- to 15-month booster dose. RESULTS: Removing the third dose of PCV13 would annually save $500 million (in 2011$) but would also result in an estimated 2.5 additional deaths among inpatients with pneumonia or invasive pneumococcal disease. Such dose removal would also result in 261,000 estimated otitis media and 12,000 estimated pneumonia cases annually. These additional illnesses could be prevented through modest increases in coverage. Overall, societal savings per additional life-year lost would be ∼$6 million. When nonfatal outcomes are also considered, savings would range from $143,000 to $4 million per additional quality adjusted life-year lost, depending on the assumptions used for otitis media. CONCLUSIONS: Sizable societal cost savings and a moderate pneumococcal disease increase could be expected from removing the PCV13 primary series' third dose.

7-Valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccine and otitis media: effectiveness of a 2-dose versus 3-dose primary series.

BACKGROUND: Seven-valent pneumococcal conjugate vaccination (PCV7) has been shown to reduce rates of otitis media (OM) when given as a 2- or 3-dose primary series followed by a booster dose. However, data on the 2- or 3-dose primary series' relative effectiveness against OM is very limited. Using data from the United States after the 2000 introduction of PCV7, we compared the effectiveness of a 2- versus a 3-dose primary series against acute otitis media (AOM). METHODS: We examined the 2002 birth cohort from the Medstat MarketScan insurance claims database and compared the incidence of AOM in children that received two or three doses in the primary PCV7 series using propensity score matching. We assessed AOM rates after completion of the primary series and before the booster dose, and after the booster dose until four years of age. RESULTS: Among the 2002 birth cohort captured by MarketScan, we identified 38,786 children we could match with immunization data; of these 8515 (22%) received a 2-dose primary series and 10,152 (26%) received a 3-dose primary series. After matching, cumulative AOM incidence between 6 and 12 months among children who did not receive a PCV7 dose between the primary series and the booster dose was 37.6% for the 2-dose series and 35.0% for the 3-dose series. This difference was not statistically significant (p=0.22). Cumulative AOM incidence between one and four years, i.e., after the booster dose, was 104.4% for the 2-dose primary series and 102.5% for the 3-dose primary series, and the difference between them was also statistically insignificant. CONCLUSION: In a population of highly-insured children, a 2-dose primary series of PCV7 appears to provide similar protection against AOM as a 3-dose primary series. These data have important implications for national immunization programs where AOM is an important driver of cost-effectiveness.