'Having the card makes us feel worthless': the negative value of government-funded health insurance in India.

Since the 2000s, hundreds of government-funded health insurance (GFHI) schemes were introduced in India. These schemes are meant to prevent poorer households from incurring catastrophic health expenditures. Through GFHIs, policy-makers want to mobilize the decision-making powers of private consumers in a liberalized healthcare market. Patients are called upon to act as 'co-creators' of healthcare value by optimizing supply through demand. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork with insurance users in South India, we argue that GFHIs fail because people experience the value of insurance in drastically different ways that only partly overlap with how the policy assumes they value insurance. In addition, the hollow promises of health coverage can be experienced as so frustrating that signing up for health insurance actually makes people feel devalued.

On hunger and child mortality in India.

Despite accelerated growth there is pervasive hunger, child undernutrition and mortality in India. Our analysis focuses on their determinants. Raising living standards alone will not reduce hunger and undernutrition. Reduction of rural/urban disparities, income inequality, consumer price stabilization, and mothers' literacy all have roles of varying importance in different nutrition indicators. Somewhat surprisingly, public distribution system (PDS) do not have a significant effect on any of them. Generally, child undernutrition and mortality rise with poverty. Our analysis confirms that media exposure triggers public action, and helps avert child undernutrition and mortality. Drastic reduction of economic inequality is in fact key to averting child mortality, conditional upon a drastic reordering of social and economic arrangements.

National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, poverty and prices in rural India.

The objective of this analysis is mainly to construct an intuitive measure of the performance of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) in India. The focus is on divergence between demand and supply at the district level. Some related issues addressed are: (i) whether the gap between demand and supply responds to poverty; and (ii) whether recent hikes in NREGS wages are inflationary. Our analysis confirms responsiveness of the positive gap between demand and supply to poverty. Also, apprehensions expressed about the inflationary potential of recent hikes in NREGS wages have been confirmed. More importantly, higher NREGS wages are likely to undermine self-selection of the poor in it.