Misperception of peer beliefs reinforces inequitable gender norms among Tanzanian men.

Gender role ideology, i.e. beliefs about how genders should behave, is shaped by social learning. Accordingly, if perceptions about the beliefs of others are inaccurate this may impact trajectories of cultural change. Consistent with this premise, recent studies report evidence of a tendency to overestimate peer support for inequitable gender norms, especially among men, and that correcting apparent 'norm misperception' promotes transitions to relatively egalitarian beliefs. However, supporting evidence largely relies on self-report measures vulnerable to social desirability bias. Consequently, observed patterns may reflect researcher measurement error rather than participant misperception. Addressing this shortcoming, we examine men's gender role ideology using both conventional self-reported and a novel wife-reported measure of men's beliefs in an urbanising community in Tanzania. We confirm that participants overestimate peer support for gender inequity. However, the latter measure, which we argue more accurately captures men's true beliefs, implies that this tendency is relatively modest in magnitude and scope. Overestimation was most pronounced among men holding relatively inequitable beliefs, consistent with misperception of peer beliefs reinforcing inequitable norms. Furthermore, older and poorly educated men overestimated peer support for gender inequity the most, suggesting that outdated and limited social information contribute to norm misperception in this context.

He for she? Variation and exaggeration in men's support for women's empowerment in northern Tanzania.

Achieving gender equality fundamentally requires a transfer of power from men to women. Yet data on men's support for women's empowerment (WE) remains scant and limited by reliance on self-report methodologies. Here, we examine men's support for WE as a sexual conflict trait, both via direct surveys (n = 590) and indirectly by asking men's wives (n = 317) to speculate on their husband's views. Data come from a semi-urban community in Mwanza, Tanzania. Consistent with reduced resource competition and increased exposure to relatively egalitarian gender norms, higher socioeconomic status predicted greater support for WE. However, potential demographic indicators of sexual conflict (high fertility, polygyny, large spousal age gap) were largely unrelated to men's support for WE. Contrasting self- and wife-reported measures suggests that men frequently exaggerate their support for women in self-reported attitudes. Discrepancies were especially pronounced among men claiming the highest support for WE, but smallest among men who held a professional occupation and whose wife participated in wage labour, indicating that these factors predict genuine support for WE. We discuss the implications of these results for our understanding of both individual variation and patriarchal gender norms, emphasising the benefits of greater exchange between the evolutionary human sciences and global health research on these themes.

What does the American public know about child marriage?

Global efforts to eradicate 'child marriage' (<18 years) increasingly target governments, the private sector and the general public as agents of change. However, understanding of child marriage may be subject to popular misconceptions, particularly because of ambiguity in the age threshold implied by the term 'child', and because awareness campaigns routinely emphasize extreme scenarios of very young girls forcibly married to much older men. Here, we ascertain public knowledge of child marriage via an online survey. Half of those surveyed mistakenly believed that the cut-off for child marriage is younger than the threshold of 18 years, and nearly three-quarters incorrectly believed that most child marriages occur at 15 years or below (it primarily occurs in later adolescence). Most participants also incorrectly believed that child marriage is illegal throughout the USA (it's illegal in only 4/50 states), substantially overestimated its global prevalence, and mistakenly believed that it primarily takes place among Muslim-majority world regions. Our results highlight important popular misconceptions of child marriage that may ultimately undermine global health goals and perpetuate harmful stereotypes. Organizations seeking to empower women by reducing child marriage should be cautious of these misunderstandings, and wary of the potential for their own activities to seed misinformation.

Sharing the Load: How Do Coresident Children Influence the Allocation of Work and Schooling in Northwestern Tanzania?

Economic and evolutionary models of parental investment often predict education biases toward earlier-born children, resulting from either household resource dilution or parental preference. Previous research, however, has not always found these predicted biases-perhaps because in societies where children work, older children are more efficient at household tasks and substitute for younger children, whose time can then be allocated to school. The role of labor substitution in determining children's schooling remains uncertain, however, because few studies have simultaneously considered intrahousehold variation in both children's education and work. Here, we investigate the influence of coresident children on education, work, and leisure in northwestern Tanzania, using detailed time use data collected from multiple children per household (n = 1,273). We find that age order (relative age, compared with coresident children) within the household is associated with children's time allocation, but these patterns differ by gender. Relatively young girls do less work, have more leisure time, and have greater odds of school enrollment than older girls. We suggest that this results from labor substitution: older girls are more efficient workers, freeing younger girls' time for education and leisure. Conversely, relatively older boys have the highest odds of school enrollment among coresident boys, possibly reflecting traditional norms regarding household work allocation and age hierarchies. Gender is also important in household work allocation: boys who coreside with more girls do fewer household chores. We conclude that considering children as both producers and consumers is critical to understanding intrahousehold variation in children's schooling and work.

Parent-offspring conflict unlikely to explain 'child marriage' in northwestern Tanzania.

Approximately 40% of women in sub-Saharan Africa marry before their eighteenth birthday1. Within the international development sector, this phenomenon is referred to as 'child marriage', widely equated to forced marriage, and recognized as damaging to multiple dimensions of female well-being1,2. An escalating global campaign to end early marriage typically assumes that its high prevalence is driven by a conflict of interests between parents and daughters, with parents coercing daughters to marry early for the parents' economic benefit3. However, a parent-offspring conflict model of early marriage has not been explicitly tested. Here we present a study of marriage transitions in rural Tanzania, where marriage before or just after 18 years of age is normative. Consistent with parental coercion, we find that bridewealth transfers are highest for younger brides. However, autonomy in partner choice is very common at all ages, relationships between age at marriage and female well-being are largely equivocal, and women who marry early achieve relatively higher reproductive success. We conclude that, in contexts in which adolescents have autonomy in marriage choices and in which marriage promotes economic and social security, early marriage may be better understood as serving the strategic interests of both parents and daughters.

No evidence that polygynous marriage is a harmful cultural practice in northern Tanzania.

Polygyny is cross-culturally common and a topic of considerable academic and policy interest, often deemed a harmful cultural practice serving the interests of men contrary to those of women and children. Supporting this view, large-scale studies of national African demographic surveys consistently demonstrate that poor child health outcomes are concentrated in polygynous households. Negative population-level associations between polygyny and well-being have also been reported, consistent with the hypothesis that modern transitions to socially imposed monogamy are driven by cultural group selection. We challenge the consensus view that polygyny is harmful, drawing on multilevel data from 56 ethnically diverse Tanzanian villages. We first demonstrate the vulnerability of aggregated data to confounding between ecological and individual determinants of health; while across villages polygyny is associated with poor child health and low food security, such relationships are absent or reversed within villages, particularly when children and fathers are coresident. We then provide data indicating that the costs of sharing a husband are offset by greater wealth (land and livestock) of polygynous households. These results are consistent with models of polygyny based on female choice. Finally, we show that village-level negative associations between polygyny prevalence, food security, and child health are fully accounted for by underlying differences in ecological vulnerability (rainfall) and socioeconomic marginalization (access to education). We highlight the need for improved, culturally sensitive measurement tools and appropriate scales of analysis in studies of polygyny and other purportedly harmful practices and discuss the relevance of our results to theoretical accounts of marriage and contemporary population policy.

Ethnicity and child health in northern Tanzania: Maasai pastoralists are disadvantaged compared to neighbouring ethnic groups.

The Maasai of northern Tanzania, a semi-nomadic ethnic group predominantly reliant on pastoralism, face a number of challenges anticipated to have negative impacts on child health, including marginalisation, vulnerabilities to drought, substandard service provision and on-going land grabbing conflicts. Yet, stemming from a lack of appropriate national survey data, no large-scale comparative study of Maasai child health has been conducted. Savannas Forever Tanzania surveyed the health of over 3500 children from 56 villages in northern Tanzania between 2009 and 2011. The major ethnic groups sampled were the Maasai, Sukuma, Rangi, and the Meru. Using multilevel regression we compare each ethnic group on the basis of (i) measurements of child health, including anthropometric indicators of nutritional status and self-reported incidence of disease; and (ii) important proximate determinants of child health, including food insecurity, diet, breastfeeding behaviour and vaccination coverage. We then (iii) contrast households among the Maasai by the extent to which subsistence is reliant on livestock herding. Measures of both child nutritional status and disease confirm that the Maasai are substantially disadvantaged compared to neighbouring ethnic groups, Meru are relatively advantaged, and Rangi and Sukuma intermediate in most comparisons. However, Maasai children were less likely to report malaria and worm infections. Food insecurity was high throughout the study site, but particularly severe for the Maasai, and reflected in lower dietary intake of carbohydrate-rich staple foods, and fruits and vegetables. Breastfeeding was extended in the Maasai, despite higher reported consumption of cow's milk, a potential weaning food. Vaccination coverage was lowest in Maasai and Sukuma. Maasai who rely primarily on livestock herding showed signs of further disadvantage compared to Maasai relying primarily on agriculture. We discuss the potential ecological, socioeconomic, demographic and cultural factors responsible for these differences and the implications for population health research and policy.

Sibling configuration predicts individual and descendant socioeconomic success in a modern post-industrial society.

Growing up with many siblings, at least in the context of modern post-industrial low fertility, low mortality societies, is predictive of relatively poor performance on school tests in childhood, lower levels of educational attainment, and lower income throughout adulthood. Recent studies further indicate these relationships hold across generations, so that the descendants of those who grow up with many siblings are also at an apparent socioeconomic disadvantage. In this paper we add to this literature by considering whether such relationships interact with the sex and relative age of siblings. To do this we utilise a unique Swedish multigenerational birth cohort study that provides sibling configuration data on over 10,000 individuals born in 1915-1929, plus all their direct genetic descendants to the present day. Adjusting for parental and birth characteristics, we find that the 'socioeconomic cost' of growing up in a large family is independent of both the sex of siblings and the sex of the individual. However, growing up with several older as opposed to several younger siblings is predictive of relatively poor performance on school tests and a lower likelihood of progression to tertiary education. This later-born disadvantage also holds across generations, with the children of those with many older siblings achieving lower levels of educational attainment. Despite these differences, we find that while individual and descendant income is negatively related to the number of siblings, it is not influenced by the relative age of siblings. Thus, our findings imply that the educational disadvantage of later-born children, demonstrated here and in numerous other studies, does not necessarily translate into reduced earnings in adulthood. We discuss potential explanations for this pattern of results, and consider some important directions for future research into sibling configuration and wellbeing in modern societies.

The life-history trade-off between fertility and child survival.

Evolutionary models of human reproduction argue that variation in fertility can be understood as the local optimization of a life-history trade-off between offspring quantity and 'quality'. Child survival is a fundamental dimension of quality in these models as early-life mortality represents a crucial selective bottleneck in human evolution. This perspective is well-rehearsed, but current literature presents mixed evidence for a trade-off between fertility and child survival, and little empirical ground to evaluate how socioecological and individual characteristics influence the benefits of fertility limitation. By compiling demographic survey data, we demonstrate robust negative relationships between fertility and child survival across 27 sub-Saharan African countries. Our analyses suggest this relationship is primarily accounted for by offspring competition for parental investment, rather than by reverse causal mechanisms. We also find that the trade-off increases in relative magnitude as national mortality declines and maternal somatic (height) and extrasomatic (education) capital increase. This supports the idea that socioeconomic development, and associated reductions in extrinsic child mortality, favour reduced fertility by increasing the relative returns to parental investment. Observed fertility, however, falls considerably short of predicted optima for maximizing total offspring survivorship, strongly suggesting that additional unmeasured costs of reproduction ultimately constrain the evolution of human family size.

Low fertility increases descendant socioeconomic position but reduces long-term fitness in a modern post-industrial society.

Adaptive accounts of modern low human fertility argue that small family size maximizes the inheritance of socioeconomic resources across generations and may consequently increase long-term fitness. This study explores the long-term impacts of fertility and socioeconomic position (SEP) on multiple dimensions of descendant success in a unique Swedish cohort of 14 000 individuals born during 1915-1929. We show that low fertility and high SEP predict increased descendant socioeconomic success across four generations. Furthermore, these effects are multiplicative, with the greatest benefits of low fertility observed when SEP is high. Low fertility and high SEP do not, however, predict increased descendant reproductive success. Our results are therefore consistent with the idea that modern fertility limitation represents a strategic response to the local costs of rearing socioeconomically competitive offspring, but contradict adaptive models suggesting that it maximizes long-term fitness. This indicates a conflict in modern societies between behaviours promoting socioeconomic versus biological success. This study also makes a methodological contribution, demonstrating that the number of offspring strongly predicts long-term fitness and thereby validating use of fertility data to estimate current selective pressures in modern populations. Finally, our findings highlight that differences in fertility and SEP can have important long-term effects on the persistence of social inequalities across generations.

Parental investment and the optimization of human family size.

Human reproductive behaviour is marked by exceptional variation at the population and individual level. Human behavioural ecologists propose adaptive hypotheses to explain this variation as shifting phenotypic optima in relation to local socioecological niches. Here we review evidence that variation in fertility (offspring number), in both traditional and modern industrialized populations, represents optimization of the life-history trade-off between reproductive rate and parental investment. While a reliance on correlational methods suggests the true costs of sibling resource competition are often poorly estimated, a range of anthropological and demographic studies confirm that parents balance family size against offspring success. Evidence of optimization is less forthcoming. Declines in fertility associated with modernization are particularly difficult to reconcile with adaptive models, because fertility limitation fails to enhance offspring reproductive success. Yet, considering alternative measures, we show that modern low fertility confers many advantages on offspring, which are probably transmitted to future generations. Evidence from populations that have undergone or initiated demographic transition indicate that these rewards to fertility limitation fall selectively on relatively wealthy individuals. The adaptive significance of modern reproductive behaviour remains difficult to evaluate, but may be best understood in response to rising investment costs of rearing socially and economically competitive offspring.

Optimizing Modern Family Size: Trade-offs between Fertility and the Economic Costs of Reproduction.

Modern industrialized populations lack the strong positive correlations between wealth and reproductive success that characterize most traditional societies. While modernization has brought about substantial increases in personal wealth, fertility in many developed countries has plummeted to the lowest levels in recorded human history. These phenomena contradict evolutionary and economic models of the family that assume increasing wealth reduces resource competition between offspring, favoring high fertility norms. Here, we review the hypothesis that cultural modernization may in fact establish unusually intense reproductive trade-offs in wealthy relative to impoverished strata, favoring low fertility. We test this premise with British longitudinal data (the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents and Children), exploring maternal self-perceptions of economic hardship in relation to increasing family size and actual socioeconomic status. Low-income and low-education-level mothers perceived the greatest economic costs associated with raising two versus one offspring. However, for all further increases to family size, reproduction appears most expensive for relatively wealthy and well-educated mothers. We discuss our results and review current literature on the long-term consequences of resource dilution in modern families.