Individual costs and societal benefits of interventions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Individual and societal reactions to an ongoing pandemic can lead to social dilemmas: In some cases, each individual is tempted to not follow an intervention, but for the whole society, it would be best if they did. Now that in most countries, the extent of regulations to reduce SARS-CoV-2 transmission is very small, interventions are driven by individual decision-making. Assuming that individuals act in their best own interest, we propose a framework in which this situation can be quantified, depending on the protection the intervention provides to a user and to others, the risk of getting infected, and the costs of the intervention. We discuss when a tension between individual and societal benefits arises and which parameter comparisons are important to distinguish between different regimes of intervention use.

Social dilemmas of sociality due to beneficial and costly contagion.

Levels of sociality in nature vary widely. Some species are solitary; others live in family groups; some form complex multi-family societies. Increased levels of social interaction can allow for the spread of useful innovations and beneficial information, but can also facilitate the spread of harmful contagions, such as infectious diseases. It is natural to assume that these contagion processes shape the evolution of complex social systems, but an explicit account of the dynamics of sociality under selection pressure imposed by contagion remains elusive. We consider a model for the evolution of sociality strategies in the presence of both a beneficial and costly contagion. We study the dynamics of this model at three timescales: using a susceptible-infectious-susceptible (SIS) model to describe contagion spread for given sociality strategies, a replicator equation to study the changing fractions of two different levels of sociality, and an adaptive dynamics approach to study the long-time evolution of the population level of sociality. For a wide range of assumptions about the benefits and costs of infection, we identify a social dilemma: the evolutionarily-stable sociality strategy (ESS) is distinct from the collective optimum-the level of sociality that would be best for all individuals. In particular, the ESS level of social interaction is greater (respectively less) than the social optimum when the good contagion spreads more (respectively less) readily than the bad contagion. Our results shed light on how contagion shapes the evolution of social interaction, but reveals that evolution may not necessarily lead populations to social structures that are good for any or all.

Social dimensions of fertility behavior and consumption patterns in the Anthropocene.

We consider two aspects of the human enterprise that profoundly affect the global environment: population and consumption. We show that fertility and consumption behavior harbor a class of externalities that have not been much noted in the literature. Both are driven in part by attitudes and preferences that are not egoistic but socially embedded; that is, each household's decisions are influenced by the decisions made by others. In a famous paper, Garrett Hardin [G. Hardin, Science 162, 1243-1248 (1968)] drew attention to overpopulation and concluded that the solution lay in people "abandoning the freedom to breed." That human attitudes and practices are socially embedded suggests that it is possible for people to reduce their fertility rates and consumption demands without experiencing a loss in wellbeing. We focus on fertility in sub-Saharan Africa and consumption in the rich world and argue that bottom-up social mechanisms rather than top-down government interventions are better placed to bring about those ecologically desirable changes.

Economic and Behavioral Influencers of Vaccination and Antimicrobial Use.

Despite vast improvements in global vaccination coverage during the last decade, there is a growing trend in vaccine hesitancy and/or refusal globally. This has implications for the acceptance and coverage of a potential vaccine against COVID-19. In the United States, the number of children exempt from vaccination for "philosophical belief-based" non-medical reasons increased in 12 of the 18 states that allowed this policy from 2009 to 2017 (1). Meanwhile, the overuse and misuse of antibiotics, especially in young children, have led to increasing rates of drug resistance that threaten our ability to treat infectious diseases. Vaccine hesitancy and antibiotic overuse exist side-by-side in the same population of young children, and it is unclear why one modality (antibiotics) is universally seen as safe and effective, while the other (vaccines) is seen as potentially hazardous by some. In this review, we consider the drivers shaping the use of vaccines and antibiotics in the context of three factors: individual incentives, risk perceptions, and social norms and group dynamics. We illustrate how these factors contribute to the societal and individual costs of vaccine underuse and antimicrobial overuse. Ultimately, we seek to understand these factors that are at the nexus of infectious disease epidemiology and social science to inform policy-making.

Incentivizing hospital infection control.

Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) pose a significant burden to patient safety. Institutions can implement hospital infection control (HIC) measures to reduce the impact of HAIs. Since patients can carry pathogens between institutions, there is an economic incentive for hospitals to free ride on the HIC investments of other facilities. Subsidies for infection control by public health authorities could encourage regional spending on HIC. We develop coupled mathematical models of epidemiology and hospital behavior in a game-theoretic framework to investigate how hospitals may change spending behavior in response to subsidies. We demonstrate that under a limited budget, a dollar-for-dollar matching grant outperforms both a fixed-amount subsidy and a subsidy on uninfected patients in reducing the number of HAIs in a single institution. Additionally, when multiple hospitals serve a community, funding priority should go to the hospital with a lower transmission rate. Overall, subsidies incentivize HIC spending and reduce the overall prevalence of HAIs.

Localized prosocial preferences, public goods, and common-pool resources.

The presence of prosocial preferences is thought to reduce significantly the difficulty of solving societal collective action problems such as providing public goods (or reducing public bads). However, prosociality is often limited to members of an in-group. We present a general theoretical model where society is split into subgroups and people care more about the welfare of others in their own subgroup than they do about those in out-groups. Individual contributions to the public good spill over and benefit members in each group to different degrees. We then consider special cases of our general model under which we can examine the consequences of localized prosociality for the economic outcomes of society as a whole. We ask to what extent prosociality closes the welfare gap between the Nash equilibrium without prosociality and the social optimum. The answer depends on whether private and public inputs are good or poor substitutes in producing final output. Critically, the degree to which this welfare gap closes is a concave function of the level of prosociality in the case of poor substitutes, so even low levels of prosociality can lead to social welfare near the social optimum.

Global increase and geographic convergence in antibiotic consumption between 2000 and 2015.

Tracking antibiotic consumption patterns over time and across countries could inform policies to optimize antibiotic prescribing and minimize antibiotic resistance, such as setting and enforcing per capita consumption targets or aiding investments in alternatives to antibiotics. In this study, we analyzed the trends and drivers of antibiotic consumption from 2000 to 2015 in 76 countries and projected total global antibiotic consumption through 2030. Between 2000 and 2015, antibiotic consumption, expressed in defined daily doses (DDD), increased 65% (21.1-34.8 billion DDDs), and the antibiotic consumption rate increased 39% (11.3-15.7 DDDs per 1,000 inhabitants per day). The increase was driven by low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where rising consumption was correlated with gross domestic product per capita (GDPPC) growth (P = 0.004). In high-income countries (HICs), although overall consumption increased modestly, DDDs per 1,000 inhabitants per day fell 4%, and there was no correlation with GDPPC. Of particular concern was the rapid increase in the use of last-resort compounds, both in HICs and LMICs, such as glycylcyclines, oxazolidinones, carbapenems, and polymyxins. Projections of global antibiotic consumption in 2030, assuming no policy changes, were up to 200% higher than the 42 billion DDDs estimated in 2015. Although antibiotic consumption rates in most LMICs remain lower than in HICs despite higher bacterial disease burden, consumption in LMICs is rapidly converging to rates similar to HICs. Reducing global consumption is critical for reducing the threat of antibiotic resistance, but reduction efforts must balance access limitations in LMICs and take account of local and global resistance patterns.

Evolutionary dynamics of collective index insurance.

Index-based insurances offer promising opportunities for climate-risk investments in developing countries. Indeed, contracts conditional on, e.g., weather or livestock indexes can be cheaper to set up than conventional indemnity-based insurances, while offering a safety net to vulnerable households, allowing them to eventually escape poverty traps. Moreover, transaction costs by insurance companies may be additionally reduced if contracts, instead of arranged with single households, are endorsed by collectives of households that bear the responsibility of managing the division of the insurance coverage by its members whenever the index is surpassed, allowing for additional flexibility in what concerns risk-sharing and also allowing insurance companies to avoid the costs associated with moral hazard. Here we resort to a population dynamics framework to investigate under which conditions household collectives may find collective index insurances attractive, when compared with individual index insurances. We assume risk sharing among the participants of each collective, and model collective action in terms of an N-person threshold game. Compared to less affordable individual index insurances, we show how collective index insurances lead to a coordination problem in which the adoption of index insurances may become the optimal decision, spreading index insurance coverage to the entire population. We further investigate the role of risk-averse and risk-prone behaviors, as well as the role of partial correlation between insurance coverage and actual loss of crops, and in which way these affect the original coordination thresholds.

Does aquaculture add resilience to the global food system?

Aquaculture is the fastest growing food sector and continues to expand alongside terrestrial crop and livestock production. Using portfolio theory as a conceptual framework, we explore how current interconnections between the aquaculture, crop, livestock, and fisheries sectors act as an impediment to, or an opportunity for, enhanced resilience in the global food system given increased resource scarcity and climate change. Aquaculture can potentially enhance resilience through improved resource use efficiencies and increased diversification of farmed species, locales of production, and feeding strategies. However, aquaculture's reliance on terrestrial crops and wild fish for feeds, its dependence on freshwater and land for culture sites, and its broad array of environmental impacts diminishes its ability to add resilience. Feeds for livestock and farmed fish that are fed rely largely on the same crops, although the fraction destined for aquaculture is presently small (∼4%). As demand for high-value fed aquaculture products grows, competition for these crops will also rise, as will the demand for wild fish as feed inputs. Many of these crops and forage fish are also consumed directly by humans and provide essential nutrition for low-income households. Their rising use in aquafeeds has the potential to increase price levels and volatility, worsening food insecurity among the most vulnerable populations. Although the diversification of global food production systems that includes aquaculture offers promise for enhanced resilience, such promise will not be realized if government policies fail to provide adequate incentives for resource efficiency, equity, and environmental protection.

Global antibiotic consumption 2000 to 2010: an analysis of national pharmaceutical sales data.

BACKGROUND: Antibiotic drug consumption is a major driver of antibiotic resistance. Variations in antibiotic resistance across countries are attributable, in part, to different volumes and patterns for antibiotic consumption. We aimed to assess variations in consumption to assist monitoring of the rise of resistance and development of rational-use policies and to provide a baseline for future assessment. METHODS: With use of sales data for retail and hospital pharmacies from the IMS Health MIDAS database, we reviewed trends for consumption of standard units of antibiotics between 2000 and 2010 for 71 countries. We used compound annual growth rates to assess temporal differences in consumption for each country and Fourier series and regression methods to assess seasonal differences in consumption in 63 of the countries. FINDINGS: Between 2000 and 2010, consumption of antibiotic drugs increased by 36% (from 54 083 964 813 standard units to 73 620 748 816 standard units). Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa accounted for 76% of this increase. In most countries, antibiotic consumption varied significantly with season. There was increased consumption of carbapenems (45%) and polymixins (13%), two last-resort classes of antibiotic drugs. INTERPRETATION: The rise of antibiotic consumption and the increase in use of last-resort antibiotic drugs raises serious concerns for public health. Appropriate use of antibiotics in developing countries should be encouraged. However, to prevent a striking rise in resistance in low-income and middle-income countries with large populations and to preserve antibiotic efficacy worldwide, programmes that promote rational use through coordinated efforts by the international community should be a priority. FUNDING: US Department of Homeland Security, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, US National Institutes of Health, Princeton Grand Challenges Program.

Climate policies under wealth inequality.

Taming the planet's climate requires cooperation. Previous failures to reach consensus in climate summits have been attributed, among other factors, to conflicting policies between rich and poor countries, which disagree on the implementation of mitigation measures. Here we implement wealth inequality in a threshold public goods dilemma of cooperation in which players also face the risk of potential future losses. We consider a population exhibiting an asymmetric distribution of rich and poor players that reflects the present-day status of nations and study the behavioral interplay between rich and poor in time, regarding their willingness to cooperate. Individuals are also allowed to exhibit a variable degree of homophily, which acts to limit those that constitute one's sphere of influence. Under the premises of our model, and in the absence of homophily, comparison between scenarios with wealth inequality and without wealth inequality shows that the former leads to more global cooperation than the latter. Furthermore, we find that the rich generally contribute more than the poor and will often compensate for the lower contribution of the latter. Contributions from the poor, which are crucial to overcome the climate change dilemma, are shown to be very sensitive to homophily, which, if prevalent, can lead to a collapse of their overall contribution. In such cases, however, we also find that obstinate cooperative behavior by a few poor may largely compensate for homophilic behavior.

Intergenerational resource transfers with random offspring numbers.

A problem common to biology and economics is the transfer of resources from parents to children. We consider the issue under the assumption that the number of offspring is unknown and can be represented as a random variable. There are 3 basic assumptions. The first assumption is that a given body of resources can be divided into consumption (yielding satisfaction) and transfer to children. The second assumption is that the parents' welfare includes a concern for the welfare of their children; this is recursive in the sense that the children's welfares include concern for their children and so forth. However, the welfare of a child from a given consumption is counted somewhat differently (generally less) than that of the parent (the welfare of a child is "discounted"). The third assumption is that resources transferred may grow (or decline). In economic language, investment, including that in education or nutrition, is productive. Under suitable restrictions, precise formulas for the resulting allocation of resources are found, demonstrating that, depending on the shape of the utility curve, uncertainty regarding the number of offspring may or may not favor increased consumption. The results imply that wealth (stock of resources) will ultimately have a log-normal distribution.

Coupled ecological-social dynamics in a forested landscape: spatial interactions and information flow.

We develop an agent-based model for forest harvesting to study how interactions between neighboring land parcels and the degree of information flow among landowners influence harvesting patterns. We assume a forest is composed of a number of land parcels that are individually managed. Each parcel is either mature forested, just-harvested, or immature forested. The state transition of each parcel is described by a Markov chain that incorporates the successional dynamics of the forest ecosystem and landowners' decisions about harvesting. Landowners decide to cut trees based on the expected discounted utility of forested vs. harvested land. One landowner's decision to cut trees is assumed to cause the degradation of ecosystem services on the downstream forested parcels. We investigated two different scenarios: in a strongly-connected society, landowners are familiar with each other and have full information regarding the behavior of other landowners. In a weakly-connected society, landowners do not communicate and therefore need to make subjective predictions about the behavior of others without adequate information. Regardless of the type of society, we observed that the spatial interaction between management units caused a chain reaction of tree harvesting in the neighborhood even when healthy forested land provided greater utility than harvested land. The harvest rate was higher in a weakly-connected society than that in a strongly-connected society. If landowners employed a long-term perspective, the harvest rate declined, and a more robust forested landscape emerged. Our results highlight the importance of institutional arrangements that encourage a long-term perspective and increased information flow among landowners in order to achieve successful forest management.

The evolution of resource adaptation: how generalist and specialist consumers evolve.

Why and how specialist and generalist strategies evolve are important questions in evolutionary ecology. In this paper, with the method of adaptive dynamics and evolutionary branching, we identify conditions that select for specialist and generalist strategies. Generally, generalist strategies evolve if there is a switching benefit; specialists evolve if there is a switching cost. If the switching cost is large, specialists always evolve. If the switching cost is small, even though the consumer will first evolve toward a generalist strategy, it will eventually branch into two specialists.