An analysis of strategies for adopting blockchain in green supply chains under corporate social responsibility.

In recent years, green products have received increasing attention by firms and consumers, but consumers often have uncertainty about the green degree of products. Many firms adopt blockchain technology to solve this problem, but blockchain adoption will bring privacy concerns to consumers. Meanwhile, corporate social responsibility has become one of the hot topics concerned by firms. Based on this, a Stackelberg game model dominated by the manufacturer is constructed to study the strategies of blockchain adoption for green supply chains under corporate social responsibility. The interaction of corporate social responsibility awareness and blockchain adoption in different models is verified through the calculation and simulation analysis of the optimal decision of the supply chain members. The research results show that no matter whether supply chain members have corporate social responsibility awareness, the manufacturer should adopt blockchain technology only when the privacy cost of consumers is low. After blockchain technology is adopted, the profit and utility of retailer, the manufacturer's utility, consumer surplus, and social welfare will be higher. However, when the manufacturer has corporate social responsibility awareness, the manufacturer's profit may be damaged by blockchain adoption. In addition, when supply chain members have corporate social responsibility awareness, the manufacturer is more likely to adopt blockchain technology. And with the enhancement of corporate social responsibility awareness, blockchain technology is more likely to be adopted. It provides a reference for the blockchain adoption strategies of the green supply chain under corporate social responsibility.

Coordinating a three-level contract farming supply chain with option contracts considering risk-averse farmer and retailer.

We considered a three-level contract farming supply chain comprising a risk-averse farmer, a risk-neutral supplier, and a risk-averse retailer. The farmer plants and grows fresh agricultural products with yield uncertainty, the supplier is the leader of the supply chain and the designer of the contracts, and the retailer sells processed products with random demand. Under CVaR criterion, this paper discusses three option contracts between the supplier and the retailer, as well as wholesale price contracts or replenishment cost-sharing contracts between the supplier and the farmer. Results show that when the farmer is risk-neutral, option contracts with or without replenishment cost-sharing contracts can maximize the total profit and increase the profits of all members simultaneously. When the farmer and the retailer are risk-averse, only option contracts with replenishment cost-sharing contracts can ensure supply chain full coordination and Pareto improvement by adjusting the option parameters and making the farmer's sharing ratio equal to his risk aversion coefficient. Moreover, through numerical analysis, we discovered that the interval of the Pareto improvement decreases with the retailer's risk aversion coefficient and the quantity loss rate, and increases with the farmer's risk aversion coefficient. The supplier will not be able to increase his own profits when the loss rate is excessively large. Therefore, the leader should consider the risk aversion degree of all parties and the quantity loss rate of fresh agricultural products before choosing contracts.