A Transdiagnostic Study of Effort-Cost Decision-Making in Psychotic and Mood Disorders.

BACKGROUND: Research suggests that effort-cost decision-making (ECDM), the estimation of work required to obtain reward, may be a relevant framework for understanding motivational impairment in psychotic and mood pathology. Specifically, research has suggested that people with psychotic and mood pathology experience effort as more costly than controls, and thus pursue effortful goals less frequently. This study examined ECDM across psychotic and mood pathology. HYPOTHESIS: We hypothesized that patient groups would show reduced willingness to expend effort compared to controls. STUDY DESIGN: People with schizophrenia (N = 33), schizoaffective disorder (N = 28), bipolar disorder (N = 39), major depressive disorder (N = 40), and controls (N = 70) completed a physical ECDM task. Participants decided between completing a low-effort or high-effort option for small or larger rewards, respectively. Reward magnitude, reward probability, and effort magnitude varied trial-by-trial. Data were analyzed using standard and hierarchical logistic regression analyses to assess the subject-specific contribution of various factors to choice. Negative symptoms were measured with a clinician-rated interview. STUDY RESULTS: There was a significant effect of group, driven by reduced choice of high-effort options in schizophrenia. Hierarchical logistic regression revealed that reduced choice of high-effort options in schizophrenia was driven by weaker contributions of probability information. Use of reward information was inversely associated with motivational impairment in schizophrenia. Surprisingly, individuals with major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder did not differ from controls. CONCLUSIONS: Our results provide support for ECDM deficits in schizophrenia. Additionally, differences between groups in ECDM suggest a seemingly similar behavioral phenotype, reduced motivation, could arise from disparate mechanisms.

Sunk cost sensitivity during change-of-mind decisions is informed by both the spent and remaining costs.

Sunk cost sensitivity describes escalating decision commitment with increased spent resources. On neuroeconomic foraging tasks, mice, rats, and humans show similar escalations from sunk costs while quitting an ongoing countdown to reward. In a new analysis taken across computationally parallel foraging tasks across species and laboratories, we find that these behaviors primarily occur on choices that are economically inconsistent with the subject's other choices, and that they reflect not only the time spent, but also the time remaining, suggesting that these are change-of-mind re-evaluation processes. Using a recently proposed change-of-mind drift-diffusion model, we find that the sunk cost sensitivity in this model arises from decision-processes that directly take into account the time spent (costs sunk). Applying these new insights to experimental data, we find that sensitivity to sunk costs during re-evaluation decisions depends on the information provided to the subject about the time spent and the time remaining.

New titles can give new perspectives: Reflections on language and equity in clinical science.

Rebranding of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology as the Journal of Psychopathology and Clinical Science is insufficient, and will not move the dial on the stigma and discrimination against people suffering from mental illness without a good deal more effort on the part of our community of scholars. In this editorial to inaugurate the new title of this Journal, coauthored by the prompter of this change along with the current editor, we unpack ways in which researchers can be mindful of language, research practices such as representation, and advocacy to promote a healthier science going forward. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Sensitivity to Sunk Costs Depends on Attention to the Delay.

In the WebSurf task, humans forage for videos paying costs in terms of wait times on a time-limited task. A variant of the task in which demands during the wait time were manipulated revealed the role of attention in susceptibility to sunk costs. Consistent with parallel tasks in rodents, previous studies have found that humans (undergraduates measured in lab) preferred shorter delays, but waited longer for more preferred videos, suggesting that they were treating the delays economically. In an Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) sample, we replicated these predicted economic behaviors for a majority of participants. In the lab, participants showed susceptibility to sunk costs in this task, basing their decisions in part on time they have already waited, which we also observed in the subset of the mTurk sample that behaved economically. In another version of the task, we added an attention check to the wait phase of the delay. While that attention check further increased the proportion of subjects with predicted economic behaviors, it also removed the susceptibility to sunk costs. These findings have important implications for understanding how cognitive processes, such as the deployment of attention, are key to driving re-evaluation and susceptibility to sunk costs.

Mental health and clinical psychological science in the time of COVID-19: Challenges, opportunities, and a call to action.

COVID-19 presents significant social, economic, and medical challenges. Because COVID-19 has already begun to precipitate huge increases in mental health problems, clinical psychological science must assert a leadership role in guiding a national response to this secondary crisis. In this article, COVID-19 is conceptualized as a unique, compounding, multidimensional stressor that will create a vast need for intervention and necessitate new paradigms for mental health service delivery and training. Urgent challenge areas across developmental periods are discussed, followed by a review of psychological symptoms that likely will increase in prevalence and require innovative solutions in both science and practice. Implications for new research directions, clinical approaches, and policy issues are discussed to highlight the opportunities for clinical psychological science to emerge as an updated, contemporary field capable of addressing the burden of mental illness and distress in the wake of COVID-19 and beyond. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Sensitivity to "sunk costs" in mice, rats, and humans.

Sunk costs are irrecoverable investments that should not influence decisions, because decisions should be made on the basis of expected future consequences. Both human and nonhuman animals can show sensitivity to sunk costs, but reports from across species are inconsistent. In a temporal context, a sensitivity to sunk costs arises when an individual resists ending an activity, even if it seems unproductive, because of the time already invested. In two parallel foraging tasks that we designed, we found that mice, rats, and humans show similar sensitivities to sunk costs in their decision-making. Unexpectedly, sensitivity to time invested accrued only after an initial decision had been made. These findings suggest that sensitivity to temporal sunk costs lies in a vulnerability distinct from deliberation processes and that this distinction is present across species.

Affective and executive network processing associated with persuasive antidrug messages.

Previous research has highlighted brain regions associated with socioemotional processes in persuasive message encoding, whereas cognitive models of persuasion suggest that executive brain areas may also be important. The current study aimed to identify lateral prefrontal brain areas associated with persuasive message viewing and understand how activity in these executive regions might interact with activity in the amygdala and medial pFC. Seventy adolescents were scanned using fMRI while they watched 10 strongly convincing antidrug public service announcements (PSAs), 10 weakly convincing antidrug PSAs, and 10 advertisements (ads) unrelated to drugs. Antidrug PSAs compared with nondrug ads more strongly elicited arousal-related activity in the amygdala and medial pFC. Within antidrug PSAs, those that were prerated as strongly persuasive versus weakly persuasive showed significant differences in arousal-related activity in executive processing areas of the lateral pFC. In support of the notion that persuasiveness involves both affective and executive processes, functional connectivity analyses showed greater coactivation between the lateral pFC and amygdala during PSAs known to be strongly (vs. weakly) convincing. These findings demonstrate that persuasive messages elicit activation in brain regions responsible for both emotional arousal and executive control and represent a crucial step toward a better understanding of the neural processes responsible for persuasion and subsequent behavior change.