RESUMO
There has been explosive growth in the market for expensive drugs for rare diseases (EDRDs). Traditional standards of evidence are not achievable for rare diseases, so lower standards are applied. The price of these drugs is extremely high. This combination of lower standards and higher prices make EDRDs attractive to manufacturers. Legislation designed to incentivize drug development for rare diseases contains loopholes that drive prices up worldwide. Canada compounds those problems with a complex network of agencies that impede communication between those providing market authorization and those purchasing drugs. Drug pricing is not related to metrics like investment or value, but rather willingness to pay. Without high-quality evidence to assess value, we inadvertently prioritize patients with rare diseases over those with common diseases, creating conflict among ethical principles such as social utility, justice and the rule of rescue. Lack of transparency over what is being funded and for whom makes it hard to mitigate challenges through effective policy development. We review the evidentiary, economic and ethical issues around EDRDs and ways to move forward, including enhanced transparency and the development of high-quality evidence to ensure that we do not pay for drugs that do not work.
Assuntos
Custos de Medicamentos , Doenças Raras , Humanos , Doenças Raras/tratamento farmacológico , Reembolso de Seguro de Saúde , Controle de Custos , CanadáRESUMO
BACKGROUND AND AIMS: The optimal duration of dose-intensified therapy following secondary loss of response [LOR] to anti-tumour necrosis factor [TNF] therapy remains unclear. Anti-TNF re-induction involves a finite period of intensified therapy and may be a cost-effective means of re-capturing response. This study aimed to compare the efficacy, durability, and cost of anti-TNF re-induction and dose interval shortening [DIS] for secondary LOR in Crohn's disease [CD]. METHODS: This was a retrospective observational study in CD patients who developed secondary LOR to maintenance anti-TNF therapy, requiring subsequent re-induction and/or DIS. The primary outcome was treatment failure within 12 months. Secondary outcomes included factors associated with time to failure, disease activity, and incremental anti-TNF costs. RESULTS: Of 423 patients with CD on anti-TNF therapy, 80 [19%] developed secondary LOR, with 33 and 55 patients undergoing subsequent anti-TNF re-induction and DIS, respectively. There was no significant difference in the incidence of treatment failure at 12 months following re-induction and DIS, respectively [p = 0.27]. Factors predictive of a longer time to failure included a higher baseline serum albumin, male sex, and thiopurine co-therapy [each p < 0.05], whereas higher baseline faecal calprotectin was associated with shorter time to failure. There was no significant difference in clinical remission or objective disease activity across both groups. The median incremental cost of re-induction and DIS was AUD 4 838 and AUD 13 190, respectively. CONCLUSIONS: In patients with CD who develop secondary LOR, re-induction may represent an effective and less expensive first-line strategy, reserving dose intensification strategies such as DIS for non-responders.