Modeling Poliovirus Surveillance and Immunization Campaign Quality Monitoring Costs for Pakistan and Afghanistan for 2019-2023.

BACKGROUND: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) Strategic Plan for 2019-2023 includes commitments to monitor the quality of immunization campaigns using lot quality assurance sampling surveys (LQAS) and to support poliovirus surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan. METHODS: We analyzed LQAS and poliovirus surveillance data between 2016 and 2020, which included both acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) case-based detection and the continued expansion of environmental surveillance (ES). Using updated estimates for unit costs, we explore the costs of different options for future poliovirus monitoring and surveillance for Pakistan and Afghanistan. RESULTS: The relative value of the information provided by campaign quality monitoring and surveillance remains uncertain and depends on the design, implementation, and performance of the systems. Prospective immunization campaign quality monitoring (through LQAS) and poliovirus surveillance will require tens of millions of dollars each year for the foreseeable future for Pakistan and Afghanistan. CONCLUSIONS: LQAS campaign monitoring as currently implemented in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides limited and potentially misleading information about immunization quality. AFP surveillance in Pakistan and Afghanistan provides the most reliable evidence of transmission, whereas ES provides valuable supplementary information about the extent of transmission in the catchment areas represented at the time of sample collection.

Global Transmission of Live Polioviruses: Updated Dynamic Modeling of the Polio Endgame.

Nearly 20 years after the year 2000 target for global wild poliovirus (WPV) eradication, live polioviruses continue to circulate with all three serotypes posing challenges for the polio endgame. We updated a global differential equation-based poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to include programmatic and epidemiological experience through January 2020. We used the model to explore the likely dynamics of poliovirus transmission for 2019-2023, which coincides with a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative Strategic Plan. The model stratifies the global population into 72 blocks, each containing 10 subpopulations of approximately 10.7 million people. Exported viruses go into subpopulations within the same block and within groups of blocks that represent large preferentially mixing geographical areas (e.g., continents). We assign representative World Bank income levels to the blocks along with polio immunization and transmission assumptions, which capture some of the heterogeneity across countries while still focusing on global poliovirus transmission dynamics. We also updated estimates of reintroduction risks using available evidence. The updated model characterizes transmission dynamics and resulting polio cases consistent with the evidence through 2019. Based on recent epidemiological experience and prospective immunization assumptions for the 2019-2023 Strategic Plan, the updated model does not show successful eradication of serotype 1 WPV by 2023 or successful cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine serotype 2-related viruses.

Updated Characterization of Post-OPV Cessation Risks: Lessons from 2019 Serotype 2 Outbreaks and Implications for the Probability of OPV Restart.

After the globally coordinated cessation of any serotype of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), some risks remain from undetected, existing homotypic OPV-related transmission and/or restarting transmission due to several possible reintroduction risks. The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of serotype 2-containing OPV (OPV2) in 2016. Following OPV2 cessation, the GPEI and countries implemented activities to withdraw all the remaining trivalent OPV, which contains all three poliovirus serotypes (i.e., 1, 2, and 3), from the supply chain and replace it with bivalent OPV (containing only serotypes 1 and 3). However, as of early 2020, monovalent OPV2 use for outbreak response continues in many countries. In addition, outbreaks observed in 2019 demonstrated evidence of different types of risks than previously modeled. We briefly review the 2019 epidemiological experience with serotype 2 live poliovirus outbreaks and propose a new risk for unexpected OPV introduction for inclusion in global modeling of OPV cessation. Using an updated model of global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution with and without consideration of this new risk, we explore the implications of the current global situation with respect to the likely need to restart preventive use of OPV2 in OPV-using countries. Simulation results without this new risk suggest OPV2 restart will likely need to occur (81% of 100 iterations) to manage the polio endgame based on the GPEI performance to date with existing vaccine tools, and with the new risk of unexpected OPV introduction the expected OPV2 restart probability increases to 89%. Contingency planning requires new OPV2 bulk production, including genetically stabilized OPV2 strains.

Updated Characterization of Outbreak Response Strategies for 2019-2029: Impacts of Using a Novel Type 2 Oral Poliovirus Vaccine Strain.

Delays in achieving the global eradication of wild poliovirus transmission continue to postpone subsequent cessation of all oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) use. Countries must stop OPV use to end all cases of poliomyelitis, including vaccine-associated paralytic polio (VAPP) and cases caused by vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). The Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) coordinated global cessation of all type 2 OPV (OPV2) use in routine immunization in 2016 but did not successfully end the transmission of type 2 VDPVs (VDPV2s), and consequently continues to use type 2 OPV (OPV2) for outbreak response activities. Using an updated global poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model, we characterize outbreak response options for 2019-2029 related to responding to VDPV2 outbreaks with a genetically stabilized novel OPV (nOPV2) strain or with the currently licensed monovalent OPV2 (mOPV2). Given uncertainties about the properties of nOPV2, we model different assumptions that appear consistent with the evidence on nOPV2 to date. Using nOPV2 to respond to detected cases may reduce the expected VDPV and VAPP cases and the risk of needing to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization compared to mOPV2 use for outbreak response. The actual properties, availability, and use of nOPV2 will determine its effects on type 2 poliovirus transmission in populations. Even with optimal nOPV2 performance, countries and the GPEI would still likely need to restart OPV2 use in routine immunization in OPV-using countries if operational improvements in outbreak response to stop the transmission of cVDPV2s are not implemented effectively.

Characterising the costs of the Global Polio Laboratory Network: a survey-based analysis.

OBJECTIVE: To characterise the costs, including for environmental surveillance (ES), of the Global Polio Laboratory Network (GPLN) that provides laboratory support to the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI). DESIGN AND PARTICIPANTS: We conducted a survey of the network across 92 countries of the 146 GPLN laboratories plus three non-GPLN laboratories that concentrate environmental samples to collect information about their activities, characteristics and costs during 2016. We estimate the total costs using regression of reported responses and complementing the findings with GPEI data. RESULTS: We received responses from 132 (89%) of the 149 laboratories, with variable response rates for individual questions. We estimate that processing samples of patients with acute flaccid paralysis leads to total costs of approximately $28 million per year (2016 US$) based on extrapolation from reported costs of $16 million, of which 61% were supported by internal (national) funds. Fifty-nine (45%) of the 132 responding laboratories reported supporting ES and we estimate an additional $5.3 million of recurring costs for ES activities performed by the laboratories. The reported costs do not include an estimated additional $10 million of annual global and regional costs to coordinate and support the GPLN. On average, the staff supported by funding for polio in the responding laboratories spent 30% of their time on non-polio activities. We estimate total costs for laboratory support of approximately $43 million (note that this estimate does not include any field or other non-laboratory costs of polio surveillance). CONCLUSIONS: Although countries contribute significantly to the GPLN financing, many laboratories currently depend on GPEI funds, and these laboratories also support the laboratory component of surveillance activities for other diseases. Sustaining critical global surveillance for polioviruses and transitioning support for other disease programmes will require continued significant funding after polio certification.

Modeling Undetected Live Poliovirus Circulation After Apparent Interruption of Transmission: Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Since most poliovirus infections occur with no paralytic symptoms, the possibility of silent circulation complicates the confirmation of the end of poliovirus transmission. Based on empirical field experience and theoretical modeling results, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative identified three years without observing paralytic cases from wild polioviruses with good acute flaccid paralysis surveillance as an indication of sufficient confidence that poliovirus circulation stopped. The complexities of real populations and the imperfect nature of real surveillance systems subsequently demonstrated the importance of specific modeling for areas at high risk of undetected circulation, resulting in varying periods of time required to obtain the same level of confidence about no undetected circulation. Using a poliovirus transmission model that accounts for variability in transmissibility and neurovirulence for different poliovirus serotypes and characterizes country-specific factors (e.g., vaccination and surveillance activities, demographics) related to wild and vaccine-derived poliovirus transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan, we consider the probability of undetected poliovirus circulation for those countries once apparent die-out occurs (i.e., in the absence of any epidemiological signals). We find that gaps in poliovirus surveillance or reaching elimination with borderline sufficient population immunity could significantly increase the time to reach high confidence about interruption of live poliovirus transmission, such that the path taken to achieve and maintain poliovirus elimination matters. Pakistan and Afghanistan will need to sustain high-quality surveillance for polioviruses after apparent interruption of transmission and recognize that as efforts to identify cases or circulating live polioviruses decrease, the risks of undetected circulation increase and significantly delay the global polio endgame.

Modeling Poliovirus Transmission in Pakistan and Afghanistan to Inform Vaccination Strategies in Undervaccinated Subpopulations.

Due to security, access, and programmatic challenges in areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, both countries continue to sustain indigenous wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission and threaten the success of global polio eradication and oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) cessation. We fitted an existing differential-equation-based poliovirus transmission and OPV evolution model to Pakistan and Afghanistan using four subpopulations to characterize the well-vaccinated and undervaccinated subpopulations in each country. We explored retrospective and prospective scenarios for using inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) in routine immunization or supplemental immunization activities (SIAs). The undervaccinated subpopulations sustain the circulation of serotype 1 WPV and serotype 2 circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus. We find a moderate impact of past IPV use on polio incidence and population immunity to transmission mainly due to (1) the boosting effect of IPV for individuals with preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection and (2) the effect of IPV-only on oropharyngeal transmission for individuals without preexisting immunity from a live poliovirus infection. Future IPV use may similarly yield moderate benefits, particularly if access to undervaccinated subpopulations dramatically improves. However, OPV provides a much greater impact on transmission and the incremental benefit of IPV in addition to OPV remains limited. This study suggests that despite the moderate effect of using IPV in SIAs, using OPV in SIAs remains the most effective means to stop transmission, while limited IPV resources should prioritize IPV use in routine immunization.

Insights from a Systematic Search for Information on Designs, Costs, and Effectiveness of Poliovirus Environmental Surveillance Systems.

Poliovirus surveillance plays a critical role in achieving and certifying eradication and will play a key role in the polio endgame. Environmental surveillance can provide an opportunity to detect circulating polioviruses prior to the observation of any acute flaccid paralysis cases. We completed a systematic review of peer-reviewed publications on environmental surveillance for polio including the search terms "environmental surveillance" or "sewage," and "polio," "poliovirus," or "poliomyelitis," and compared characteristics of the resulting studies. The review included 146 studies representing 101 environmental surveillance activities from 48 countries published between 1975 and 2016. Studies reported taking samples from sewage treatment facilities, surface waters, and various other environmental sources, although they generally did not present sufficient details to thoroughly evaluate the sewage systems and catchment areas. When reported, catchment areas varied from 50 to over 7.3 million people (median of 500,000 for the 25% of activities that reported catchment areas, notably with 60% of the studies not reporting this information and 16% reporting insufficient information to estimate the catchment area population size). While numerous studies reported the ability of environmental surveillance to detect polioviruses in the absence of clinical cases, the review revealed very limited information about the costs and limited information to support quantitative population effectiveness of conducting environmental surveillance. This review motivates future studies to better characterize poliovirus environmental surveillance systems and the potential value of information that they may provide in the polio endgame.

Guidance for Assessment of Poliovirus Vaccination Status and Vaccination of Children Who Have Received Poliovirus Vaccine Outside the United States.

In 1988, the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate poliomyelitis (polio). Since then, wild poliovirus (WPV) cases have declined by >99.9%, from an estimated 350,000 cases of polio each year to 74 cases in two countries in 2015 (1). This decrease was achieved primarily through the use of trivalent oral poliovirus vaccine (tOPV), which contains types 1, 2, and 3 live, attenuated polioviruses. Since 2000, the United States has exclusively used inactivated polio vaccine (IPV), which contains all three poliovirus types (2,3). In 2013, the World Health Organization (WHO) set a target of a polio-free world by 2018 (4). Of the three WPV types, type 2 was declared eradicated in September 2015. To remove the risk for infection with circulating type 2 vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV), which can lead to paralysis similar to that caused by WPV, all OPV-using countries simultaneously switched in April 2016 from tOPV to bivalent OPV (bOPV), which contains only types 1 and 3 polioviruses (5). This report summarizes current Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) recommendations for poliovirus vaccination and provides CDC guidance, in the context of the switch from tOPV to bOPV, regarding assessment of vaccination status and vaccination of children who might have received poliovirus vaccine outside the United States, to ensure that children living in the United States (including immigrants and refugees) are protected against all three poliovirus types. This guidance is not new policy and does not change the recommendations of ACIP for poliovirus vaccination in the United States. Children living in the United States who might have received poliovirus vaccination outside the United States should meet ACIP recommendations for poliovirus vaccination, which require protection against all three poliovirus types by age-appropriate vaccination with IPV or tOPV. In the absence of vaccination records indicating receipt of these vaccines, only vaccination or revaccination in accordance with the age-appropriate U.S. IPV schedule is recommended. Serology to assess immunity for children with no or questionable documentation of poliovirus vaccination will no longer be an available option and therefore is no longer recommended, because of increasingly limited availability of antibody testing against type 2 poliovirus.

Characterization of outbreak response strategies and potential vaccine stockpile needs for the polio endgame.

BACKGROUND: Following successful eradication of wild polioviruses and planned globally-coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), national and global health leaders may need to respond to outbreaks from reintroduced live polioviruses, particularly vaccine-derived polioviruses (VDPVs). Preparing outbreak response plans and assessing potential vaccine needs from an emergency stockpile require consideration of the different national risks and conditions as they change with time after OPV cessation. METHODS: We used an integrated global model to consider several key issues related to managing poliovirus risks and outbreak response, including the time interval during which monovalent OPV (mOPV) can be safely used following homotypic OPV cessation; the timing, quality, and quantity of rounds required to stop transmission; vaccine stockpile needs; and the impacts of vaccine choices and surveillance quality. We compare the base case scenario that assumes aggressive outbreak response and sufficient mOPV available from the stockpile for all outbreaks that occur in the model, with various scenarios that change the outbreak response strategies. RESULTS: Outbreak response after OPV cessation will require careful management, with some circumstances expected to require more and/or higher quality rounds to stop transmission than others. For outbreaks involving serotype 2, using trivalent OPV instead of mOPV2 following cessation of OPV serotype 2 but before cessation of OPV serotypes 1 and 3 would represent a good option if logistically feasible. Using mOPV for outbreak response can start new outbreaks if exported outside the outbreak population into populations with decreasing population immunity to transmission after OPV cessation, but failure to contain outbreaks resulting in exportation of the outbreak poliovirus may represent a greater risk. The possibility of mOPV use generating new long-term poliovirus excretors represents a real concern. Using the base case outbreak response assumptions, we expect over 25% probability of a shortage of stockpiled filled mOPV vaccine, which could jeopardize the achievement of global polio eradication. For the long term, responding to any poliovirus reintroductions may require a global IPV stockpile. Despite the risks, our model suggests that good risk management and response strategies can successfully control most potential outbreaks after OPV cessation. CONCLUSIONS: Health leaders should carefully consider the numerous outbreak response choices that affect the probability of successfully managing poliovirus risks after OPV cessation.

An economic analysis of poliovirus risk management policy options for 2013-2052.

BACKGROUND: The Global Polio Eradication Initiative plans for coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) after interrupting all wild poliovirus (WPV) transmission, but many questions remain related to long-term poliovirus risk management policies. METHODS: We used an integrated dynamic poliovirus transmission and stochastic risk model to simulate possible futures and estimate the health and economic outcomes of maintaining the 2013 status quo of continued OPV use in most developing countries compared with OPV cessation policies with various assumptions about global inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) adoption. RESULTS: Continued OPV use after global WPV eradication leads to continued high costs and/or high cases. Global OPV cessation comes with a high probability of at least one outbreak, which aggressive outbreak response can successfully control in most instances. A low but non-zero probability exists of uncontrolled outbreaks following a poliovirus reintroduction long after OPV cessation in a population in which IPV-alone cannot prevent poliovirus transmission. We estimate global incremental net benefits during 2013-2052 of approximately $16 billion (US$2013) for OPV cessation with at least one IPV routine immunization dose in all countries until 2024 compared to continued OPV use, although significant uncertainty remains associated with the frequency of exportations between populations and the implementation of long term risk management policies. CONCLUSIONS: Global OPV cessation offers the possibility of large future health and economic benefits compared to continued OPV use. Long-term poliovirus risk management interventions matter (e.g., IPV use duration, outbreak response, containment, continued surveillance, stockpile size and contents, vaccine production site requirements, potential antiviral drugs, and potential safer vaccines) and require careful consideration. Risk management activities can help to ensure a low risk of uncontrolled outbreaks and preserve or further increase the positive net benefits of OPV cessation. Important uncertainties will require more research, including characterizing immunodeficient long-term poliovirus excretor risks, containment risks, and the kinetics of outbreaks and response in an unprecedented world without widespread live poliovirus exposure.

Modeling the prevalence of immunodeficiency-associated long-term vaccine-derived poliovirus excretors and the potential benefits of antiviral drugs.

BACKGROUND: A small number of individuals with B-cell-related primary immunodeficiency diseases (PIDs) may exhibit long-term (prolonged or chronic) excretion of immunodeficiency-associated vaccine-derived polioviruses (iVDPVs) following infection with oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). These individuals pose a risk of live poliovirus reintroduction into the population after global wild poliovirus eradication and subsequent OPV cessation. Treatment with polio antiviral drugs may potentially stop excretion in some of these individuals and thus may reduce the future population risk. METHODS: We developed a discrete event simulation model to characterize the global prevalence of long-term iVDPV excretors based on the best available evidence. We explored the impact of different assumptions about the effectiveness of polio antiviral drugs and the fraction of long-term excretors identified and treated. RESULTS: Due to the rarity of long-term iVDPV excretion and limited data on the survival of PID patients in developing countries, uncertainty remains about the current and future prevalence of long-term iVDPV excretors. While the model suggests only approximately 30 current excretors globally and a rapid decrease after OPV cessation, most of these excrete asymptomatically and remain undetected. The possibility that one or more PID patients may continue to excrete iVDPVs for several years after OPV cessation represents a risk for reintroduction of live polioviruses after OPV cessation, particularly for middle-income countries. With the effectiveness of a single polio antiviral drug possibly as low as 40% and no system in place to identify and treat asymptomatic excretors, the impact of passive use of a single polio antiviral drug to treat identified excretors appears limited. Higher drug effectiveness and active efforts to identify long-term excretors will dramatically increase the benefits of polio antiviral drugs. CONCLUSIONS: Efforts to develop a second polio antiviral compound to increase polio antiviral effectiveness and/or to maximize the identification and treatment of affected individuals represent important risk management opportunities for the polio endgame. Better data on the survival of PID patients in developing countries and more longitudinal data on their exposure to and recovery from OPV infections would improve our understanding of the risks associated with iVDPV excretors and the benefits of further investments in polio antiviral drugs.

Progress in the development of poliovirus antiviral agents and their essential role in reducing risks that threaten eradication.

Chronic prolonged excretion of vaccine-derived polioviruses by immunodeficient persons (iVDPV) presents a personal risk of poliomyelitis to the patient as well as a programmatic risk of delayed global eradication. Poliovirus antiviral drugs offer the only mitigation of these risks. Antiviral agents may also have a potential role in the management of accidental exposures and in certain outbreak scenarios. Efforts to discover and develop poliovirus antiviral agents have been ongoing in earnest since the formation in 2007 of the Poliovirus Antivirals Initiative. The most advanced antiviral, pocapavir (V-073), is a capsid inhibitor that has recently demonstrated activity in an oral poliovirus vaccine human challenge model. Additional antiviral candidates with differing mechanisms of action continue to be profiled and evaluated preclinically with the goal of having 2 antivirals available for use in combination to treat iVDPV excreters.

Review and assessment of poliovirus immunity and transmission: synthesis of knowledge gaps and identification of research needs.

With the intensifying global efforts to eradicate wild polioviruses, policymakers face complex decisions related to achieving eradication and managing posteradication risks. These decisions and the expanding use of inactivated poliovirus vaccine (IPV) trigger renewed interest in poliovirus immunity, particularly the role of mucosal immunity in the transmission of polioviruses. Sustained high population immunity to poliovirus transmission represents a key prerequisite to eradication, but poliovirus immunity and transmission remain poorly understood despite decades of studies. In April 2010, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention convened an international group of experts on poliovirus immunology and virology to review the literature relevant for modeling poliovirus transmission, develop a consensus about related uncertainties, and identify research needs. This article synthesizes the quantitative assessments and research needs identified during the process. Limitations in the evidence from oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV) challenge studies and other relevant data led to differences in expert assessments, indicating the need for additional data, particularly in several priority areas for research: (1) the ability of IPV-induced immunity to prevent or reduce excretion and affect transmission, (2) the impact of waning immunity on the probability and extent of poliovirus excretion, (3) the relationship between the concentration of poliovirus excreted and infectiousness to others in different settings, and (4) the relative role of fecal-oral versus oropharyngeal transmission. This assessment of current knowledge supports the immediate conduct of additional studies to address the gaps.

Modeling population immunity to support efforts to end the transmission of live polioviruses.

Eradication of wild poliovirus (WPV) types 1 and 3, prevention and cessation of circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses, and achievement and maintenance of a world free of paralytic polio cases requires active risk management by focusing on population immunity and coordinated cessation of oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV). We suggest the need for a complementary and different conceptual approach to achieve eradication compared to the current case-based approach using surveillance for acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) to identify symptomatic poliovirus infections. Specifically, we describe a modeling approach to characterize overall population immunity to poliovirus transmission. The approach deals with the realities that exposure to live polioviruses (e.g., WPV, OPV) and/or vaccination with inactivated poliovirus vaccine provides protection from paralytic polio (i.e., disease), but does not eliminate the potential for reinfection or asymptomatic participation in poliovirus transmission, which may increase with time because of waning immunity. The AFP surveillance system provides evidence of symptomatic poliovirus infections detected, which indicate immunity gaps after outbreaks occur, and this system represents an appropriate focus for controlling disease outbreaks. We describe a conceptual dynamic model to characterize population immunity to poliovirus transmission that helps identify risks created by immunity gaps before outbreaks occur, which provides an opportunity for national and global policymakers to manage the risk of poliovirus and prevent outbreaks before they occur. We suggest that dynamically modeling risk represents an essential tool as the number of cases approaches zero.

Economic analysis of the global polio eradication initiative.

The global polio eradication initiative (GPEI), which started in 1988, represents the single largest, internationally coordinated public health project to date. Completion remains within reach, with type 2 wild polioviruses apparently eradicated since 1999 and fewer than 2000 annual paralytic poliomyelitis cases of wild types 1 and 3 reported since then. This economic analysis of the GPEI reflects the status of the program as of February 2010, including full consideration of post-eradication policies. For the GPEI intervention, we consider the actual pre-eradication experience to date followed by two distinct potential future post-eradication vaccination policies. We estimate GPEI costs based on actual and projected expenditures and poliomyelitis incidence using reported numbers corrected for underreporting and model projections. For the comparator, which assumes only routine vaccination for polio historically and into the future (i.e., no GPEI), we estimate poliomyelitis incidence using a dynamic infection transmission model and costs based on numbers of vaccinated children. Cost-effectiveness ratios for the GPEI vs. only routine vaccination qualify as highly cost-effective based on standard criteria. We estimate incremental net benefits of the GPEI between 1988 and 2035 of approximately 40-50 billion dollars (2008 US dollars; 1988 net present values). Despite the high costs of achieving eradication in low-income countries, low-income countries account for approximately 85% of the total net benefits generated by the GPEI in the base case analysis. The total economic costs saved per prevented paralytic poliomyelitis case drive the incremental net benefits, which become positive even if we estimate the loss in productivity as a result of disability as below the recommended value of one year in average per-capita gross national income per disability-adjusted life year saved. Sensitivity analysis suggests that the finding of positive net benefits of the GPEI remains robust over a wide range of assumptions, and that consideration of the additional net benefits of externalities that occurred during polio campaigns to date, such as the mortality reduction associated with delivery of Vitamin A supplements, significantly increases the net benefits. This study finds a strong economic justification for the GPEI despite the rising costs of the initiative.

Optimal vaccine stockpile design for an eradicated disease: application to polio.

Eradication of a disease promises significant health and financial benefits. Preserving those benefits, hopefully in perpetuity, requires preparing for the possibility that the causal agent could re-emerge (unintentionally or intentionally). In the case of a vaccine-preventable disease, creation and planning for the use of a vaccine stockpile becomes a primary concern. Doing so requires consideration of the dynamics at different levels, including the stockpile supply chain and transmission of the causal agent. This paper develops a mathematical framework for determining the optimal management of a vaccine stockpile over time. We apply the framework to the polio vaccine stockpile for the post-eradication era and present examples of solutions to one possible framing of the optimization problem. We use the framework to discuss issues relevant to the development and use of the polio vaccine stockpile, including capacity constraints, production and filling delays, risks associated with the stockpile, dynamics and uncertainty of vaccine needs, issues of funding, location, and serotype dependent behavior, and the implications of likely changes over time that might occur. This framework serves as a helpful context for discussions and analyses related to the process of designing and maintaining a stockpile for an eradicated disease.

Uncertainty and sensitivity analyses of a decision analytic model for posteradication polio risk management.

Decision analytic modeling of polio risk management policies after eradication may help inform decisionmakers about the quantitative tradeoffs implied by various options. Given the significant dynamic complexity and uncertainty involving posteradication decisions, this article aims to clarify the structure of a decision analytic model developed to help characterize the risks, costs, and benefits of various options for polio risk management after eradication of wild polioviruses and analyze the implications of different sources of uncertainty. We provide an influence diagram of the model with a description of each component, explore the impact of different assumptions about model inputs, and present probability distributions of model outputs. The results show that choices made about surveillance, response, and containment for different income groups and immunization policies play a major role in the expected final costs and polio cases. While the overall policy implications of the model remain robust to the variations of assumptions and input uncertainty we considered, the analyses suggest the need for policymakers to carefully consider tradeoffs and for further studies to address the most important knowledge gaps.

The risks, costs, and benefits of possible future global policies for managing polioviruses.

OBJECTIVES: We assessed the costs, risks, and benefits of possible future major policy decisions on vaccination, surveillance, response plans, and containment following global eradication of wild polioviruses. METHODS: We developed a decision analytic model to estimate the incremental cost-effectiveness ratios and net benefits of risk management options for polio for the 20-year period and stratified the world according to income level to capture important variability between nations. RESULTS: For low-, lower-middle-, and upper-middle-income groups currently using oral poliovirus vaccine (OPV), we found that after successful eradication of wild polioviruses, OPV cessation would save both costs and lives when compared with continued use of OPV without supplemental immunization activities. We found cost-effectiveness ratios for switching from OPV to inactivated poliovirus vaccine to be higher (i.e., less desirable) than other health investment opportunities, depending on the actual inactivated poliovirus vaccine costs and assumptions about whether supplemental immunization activities with OPV would continue. CONCLUSIONS: Eradication promises billions of dollars of net benefits, although global health policy leaders face difficult choices about future policies. Until successful eradication and coordination of posteradication policies, health authorities should continue routine polio vaccination and supplemental immunization activities.

Evaluation of response scenarios to potential polio outbreaks using mathematical models.

Appropriate response to polio outbreaks represents an important prerequisite for achieving and maintaining global polio eradication. We use an existing dynamic disease transmission model to evaluate the impact of different aspects of immunization campaigns in response to polio outbreaks occurring in previously polio-free areas. This analysis yields several important insights about response strategies. We find that delay in response represents a crucial risk factor for occurrence of large outbreaks and we characterize the tradeoffs associated with delaying the initial response to achieve better population coverage. We also demonstrate that controlling most potential outbreaks will likely require at least three immunization rounds, although the impact of the optimal interval between rounds varies. Finally, long after oral poliovirus vaccine cessation the choice of target age groups during a response represents an important consideration.