Canada's National Advisory Committee on immunization: Adaptations and challenges during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The COVID-19 pandemic has challenged traditional vaccine guidance infrastructure and frameworks, and added urgency and complexity to the operation of National Immunization Technical Advisory Groups (NITAGs). Canada's National Advisory Committee on Immunization (NACI) provides immunization guidance to the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) who publicly shares expert and evidence-informed guidance with Canadian provinces and territories. Throughout the pandemic, NACI and PHAC implemented many adaptations to meet urgent needs for pandemic vaccine guidance. In this paper, we describe: structural adaptations in response to the accelerated pace and amount of work required to issue recommendations that were timed around product authorizations and dynamic epidemiology; technical adaptations in response to rapidly evolving evidence of variable quality which required close monitoring, and which promoted reliance on basic vaccine principles due to incomplete direct evidence; the need to provide nimble advice (e.g., off-label recommendations, preferential recommendations); communications adaptations (e.g. identify sustainable spokespeople for the committee, receive stakeholder feedback, and ensure urgent nuanced advice was communicated to a diverse audience); and research adaptations focussing on solutions to constrained supply (e.g. prioritisation, extended intervals, and heterologous schedules). The early pandemic vaccine experience has created a roadmap of lessons and adaptations that should be leveraged in future pandemic vaccine programs, and has highlighted the essential role of NITAGs to complement regulatory structures during pandemics to ensure timely, impactful, and evidence-informed public health vaccine guidance.

Understanding human papillomavirus vaccination intentions: comparative utility of the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior in vaccine target age women and men.

INTRODUCTION: Human papillomavirus (HPV) is an exceedingly prevalent sexually transmitted infection with serious medical, sexual, and relationship consequences. HPV vaccine protection is available but vaccine uptake is very inconsistent. AIMS: This research applies two major theories of health behavior uptake, the Theory of Reasoned Action and the Theory of Planned Behavior, in an effort to understand intentions to receive HPV vaccine among vaccine target age women and men. The Theory of Reasoned Action asserts that attitudes toward HPV vaccination and perceptions of social support for HPV vaccination are the determinants of intentions to be vaccinated, whereas the Theory of Planned Behavior holds that attitudes toward vaccination, perceptions of social support for vaccination, and perceived ability to get vaccinated are the determinants of intentions to be vaccinated. METHODS: Canadian university men (N=118) and women (N=146) in the HPV vaccine target age range took part in this correlational study online. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Participants completed standard measures of attitudes toward HPV vaccination, perceptions of social support for vaccination, perceived ability to get vaccinated, beliefs about vaccination, and intentions to be vaccinated in the coming semester. RESULTS: Findings confirmed the propositions of the Theory of Reasoned Action and indicated that attitudes toward undergoing HPV vaccination and perceptions of social support for undergoing HPV vaccination contributed uniquely to the prediction of women's (R2=0.53) and men's (R2=0.44) intentions to be vaccinated in the coming semester. CONCLUSION: Clinical and public health education should focus on strengthening attitudes and perceptions of social support for HPV vaccination, and on the basic beliefs that appear to underlie attitudes and perceptions of social support for HPV vaccination, in efforts to promote HPV vaccine uptake.

Factors that led to the Walkerton tragedy.

In May 2000, bacterial contamination of municipal water in Walkerton, Ontario, resulted in the worst public health disaster involving municipal water in Canadian history. At least seven people died and 2300 became ill. A public inquiry led by judge Dennis O'Connor examined the events and delineated the causes of the outbreak, including physical causes, the role of the public utilities operators, the public utilities commissioners, the Ministry of the Environment (MOE), and the provincial government. Improper practices and systemic fraudulence by the public utility operators, the recent privatization of municipal water testing, the absence of criteria governing quality of testing, and the lack of provisions made for notification of results to multiple authorities all contributed to the crisis. The MOE noted significant concerns 2 years before the outbreak; however, no changes resulted because voluntary guidelines as opposed to legally binding regulations governed water safety. The inquiry concluded that budgetary restrictions introduced by the provincial government 4 years before the outbreak were enacted with no assessment of risk to human health. The ministers and the cabinet had received warnings about serious risks. Budgetary cuts destroyed the checks and balances that were necessary to ensure municipal water safety.