RESUMO
Although indirect reciprocity is a fundamental mechanism in the evolution of human cooperation, most studies assume public assessment in which individuals are not permitted to obtain private assessments of others. Existing studies on private assessment have used individual-based simulations because of the analytical difficulty involved. Here, we develop an analytical method using solitary observation to solve private assessment in indirect reciprocity problem without any approximation. In this study, we formulate a model of solitary observation and calculate the replicator dynamics systems of five leading norms of indirect reciprocity. Indirect reciprocity in private assessment provides a different result to that in public assessment. According to the existence proofs of cooperative evolutionarily stable (CES) points in the system, strict norms (stern judging and shunning) have no CES point in private assessment, while they do in public assessment. Image scoring does not change the system regardless of the assessment types because it does not use second-order information. In tolerant norms (simple standing and staying), the CES points move to co-existence of norms and unconditional cooperators. Despite the fact that there is no central coercive assessment system in private assessment, the average cooperation rate at the CES points in private assessment is greater than that in public assessment. This is because private assessment gives unconditional cooperators a role. Our results also show the superiority of the staying norm. Compared with simple standing, staying has three advantages in private assessment: a higher cooperation rate, easiness of invasion into defectors, and robustness to maintain cooperative evolutionarily stable situations. Our results are applicable to general social dilemmas in relation to private information. Under some dilemmas, norms or assessment rules should be carefully chosen to enable cooperation to evolve.
Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Relações Interpessoais , Modelos Psicológicos , HumanosRESUMO
Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for resolving social dilemmas. Previous studies explore several types of assessment rules that are evolutionarily stable for keeping cooperation regimes. However, little is known about the effects of private information on social systems. Most indirect reciprocity studies assume public monitoring in which individuals share a single assessment for each individual. Here, we consider a private monitoring system that loosens such an unnatural assumption. We explore the stable norms in the private system using an individual-based simulation. We have three main findings. First, narrow and unstable cooperation: cooperation in private monitoring becomes unstable and the restricted norms cannot maintain cooperative regimes while they can in public monitoring. Second, stable coexistence of discriminators and unconditional cooperators: under private monitoring, unconditional cooperation can play a role in keeping a high level of cooperation in tolerant norm situations. Finally, Pareto improvement: private monitoring can achieve a higher cooperation rate than does public monitoring.
RESUMO
Indirect reciprocity is a major mechanism in the maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Indirect reciprocity leads to conditional cooperation according to social norms that discriminate the good (those who deserve to be rewarded with help) and the bad (those who should be punished by refusal of help). Despite intensive research, however, there is no definitive consensus on what social norms best promote cooperation through indirect reciprocity, and it remains unclear even how those who refuse to help the bad should be assessed. Here, we propose a new simple norm called "Staying" that prescribes abstaining from assessment. Under the Staying norm, the image of the person who makes the decision to give help stays the same as in the last assessment if the person on the receiving end has a bad image. In this case, the choice about whether or not to give help to the potential receiver does not affect the image of the potential giver. We analyze the Staying norm in terms of evolutionary game theory and demonstrate that Staying is most effective in establishing cooperation compared to the prevailing social norms, which rely on constant monitoring and unconditional assessment. The application of Staying suggests that the strict application of moral judgment is limited.
Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Modelos Psicológicos , Princípios Morais , Evolução Biológica , Tomada de Decisões , HumanosRESUMO
Indirect reciprocity is one of the major mechanisms of the evolution of cooperation. Because constant monitoring and accurate evaluation in moral assessments tend to be costly, indirect reciprocity can be exploited by cost evaders. A recent study crucially showed that a cooperative state achieved by indirect reciprocators is easily destabilized by cost evaders in the case with no supportive mechanism. Here, we present a simple and widely applicable solution that considers pre-assessment of cost evaders. In the pre-assessment, those who fail to pay for costly assessment systems are assigned a nasty image that leads to them being rejected by discriminators. We demonstrate that considering the pre-assessment can crucially stabilize reciprocal cooperation for a broad range of indirect reciprocity models. In particular for the most leading social norms, we analyse the conditions under which a prosocial state becomes locally stable.
Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria dos Jogos , Modelos Psicológicos , Princípios Morais , Punição , Conformidade SocialRESUMO
It is well known that in contrast to the Prisoner's Dilemma, the snowdrift game can lead to a stable coexistence of cooperators and cheaters. Recent theoretical evidence on the snowdrift game suggests that gradual evolution for individuals choosing to contribute in continuous degrees can result in the social diversification to a 100% contribution and 0% contribution through so-called evolutionary branching. Until now, however, game-theoretical studies have shed little light on the evolutionary dynamics and consequences of the loss of diversity in strategy. Here, we analyze continuous snowdrift games with quadratic payoff functions in dimorphic populations. Subsequently, conditions are clarified under which gradual evolution can lead a population consisting of those with 100% contribution and those with 0% contribution to merge into one species with an intermediate contribution level. The key finding is that the continuous snowdrift game is more likely to lead to assimilation of different cooperation levels rather than maintenance of diversity. Importantly, this implies that allowing the gradual evolution of cooperative behavior can facilitate social inequity aversion in joint ventures that otherwise could cause conflicts that are based on commonly accepted notions of fairness.
Assuntos
Evolução Biológica , Comportamento Competitivo , Comportamento Cooperativo , Enganação , Teoria dos Jogos , Jogos Experimentais , Modelos Teóricos , HumanosRESUMO
Punishment is a popular tool when governing commons in situations where free riders would otherwise take over. It is well known that sanctioning systems, such as the police and courts, are costly and thus can suffer from those who free ride on other's efforts to maintain the sanctioning systems (second-order free riders). Previous game-theory studies showed that if populations are very large, pool punishment rarely emerges in public good games, even when participation is optional, because of second-order free riders. Here we show that a matching fund for rewarding cooperation leads to the emergence of pool punishment, despite the presence of second-order free riders. We demonstrate that reward funds can pave the way for a transition from a population of free riders to a population of pool punishers. A key factor in promoting the transition is also to reward those who contribute to pool punishment, yet not abstaining from participation. Reward funds eventually vanish in raising pool punishment, which is sustainable by punishing the second-order free riders. This suggests that considering the interdependence of reward and punishment may help to better understand the origins and transitions of social norms and institutions.
Assuntos
Comportamento Cooperativo , Teoria dos Jogos , Punição/psicologia , Comportamento Social , Humanos , Polícia/economia , Justiça Social/economiaRESUMO
OBJECTIVES: Phosphodiesterase (PDE) III inhibitor therapy is effective for treatment of acute decompensated heart failure (ADHF). Nevertheless, this drug is expensive than conventional inotropic agent dobutamine. We compared total medication costs of the patients treated with PDE III inhibitor amrinone therapy to that of the patients treated with conventional dobutamine therapy during initial hospitalization. METHODS: We analyzed 160 consecutive patients with ADHF admitted to our hospital. Shock, dehydration, severe infection, multiple organ failure, and mild heart failure (New York Heart Association class IIs) were not eligible for the study. Ninety-seven patients were divided into two groups: 1) DOB group treated with dobutamine therapy; and 2) AMR group treated with amrinone therapy. Total medication costs and cost for hospital room charge were calculated based on their usage during the initial hospitalization for each patient. Group comparison was done between the DOB and AMR groups. RESULTS: Length of stay was longer in the DOB group than in the AMR group. Mean calculated cost of intravenous drugs was higher in the DOB group (173,186 +/- 239,147 yen) than in the AMR group (63,145 +/- 47,223 yen, P < 0.05). Total medication costs were higher in the DOB group than in the AMR group. Cost for hospital room charge was higher in the DOB group than in the AMR group. CONCLUSIONS: In the treatment of ADHF, appropriate therapy even with expensive drugs makes total medication costs less expensive comparing with conventional therapy with cheaper drugs during initial hospitalization.