A pronatalist turn in population policies in Iran and its likely adverse impacts on reproductive rights, health and inequality: a critical narrative review.

Iran has witnessed three major reversals of population policies since their inception in the 1960s. In response to a rapid decline in fertility to very low levels, the latest policy shift has led to the development of legislation that aims to encourage marriage and fertility, particularly the "Youthful Population and Protection of the Family" law approved in 2021. This study reviews the changes in population policy and their interrelations with fertility trends, focusing mainly on the shift towards pronatalist policies since 2005, and accompanying restriction of reproductive health and family planning services. Combining international and national sources, we position the new pronatalist drive in the country within the broader trend of government attempts to reverse fertility decline and promote conservative family values. Our study has three main aims. (1) We provide an overview of fertility trends, policy discourses and policy shifts in the context of the changes in the societal and political structures of Iran during the last half a century. (2) We highlight and discuss the most problematic features of the new Family Law, especially the legislation pertaining to maternal and reproductive health, access to abortion and contraception, and incentives supporting earlier marriage and higher fertility. (3) We discuss the likely consequences of the new legislation for maternal and child health and sexual and reproductive rights, for women in general, and the country's socio-economic disparities. As well as violating reproductive rights, the new policy is unlikely to achieve its aim of initiating a sustained rise in fertility in Iran.

Declining realisation of reproductive intentions with age.

STUDY QUESTION: What is the likelihood of having a child within 4 years for men and women with strong short-term reproductive intentions, and how is it affected by age? SUMMARY ANSWER: For women, the likelihood of realising reproductive intentions decreased steeply from age 35: the effect of age was weak and not significant for men. WHAT IS KNOWN ALREADY: Men and women are postponing childbearing until later ages. For women, this trend is associated with a higher risk that childbearing plans will not be realised due to increased levels of infertility and pregnancy complications. STUDY DESIGN, SIZE, DURATION: This study analyses two waves of the nationally representative Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. The analytical sample interviewed in 2011 included 447 men aged 18-45 and 528 women aged 18-41. These respondents expressed a strong intention to have a child in the next 3 years. We followed them up in 2015 to track whether their reproductive intention was achieved or revised. PARTICIPANTS/MATERIALS, SETTINGS, METHODS: Multinomial logistic regression is used to account for the three possible outcomes: (i) having a child, (ii) not having a child but still intending to have one in the future and (iii) not having a child and no longer intending to have one. We analyse how age, parity, partnership status, education, perceived ability to conceive, self-rated health, BMI and smoking status are related to realising or changing reproductive intentions. MAIN RESULTS AND THE ROLE OF CHANCE: Almost two-thirds of men and women realised their strong short-term fertility plans within 4 years. There was a steep age-related decline in realising reproductive intentions for women in their mid- and late-30s, whereas men maintained a relatively high probability of having the child they intended until age 45. Women aged 38-41 who planned to have a child were the most likely to change their plan within 4 years. The probability of realising reproductive intention was highest for married and highly educated men and women and for those with one child. LIMITATIONS, REASONS FOR CAUTION: Our study cannot separate biological, social and cultural reasons for not realising reproductive intentions. Men and women adjust their intentions in response to their actual circumstances, but also in line with their perceived ability to have a child or under the influence of broader social norms on reproductive age. WIDER IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS: Our results give a new perspective on the ability of men and women to realise their reproductive plans in the context of childbearing postponement. They confirm the inequality in the individual consequences of delayed reproduction between men and women. They inform medical practitioners and counsellors about the complex biological, social and normative barriers to reproduction among women at higher childbearing ages. STUDY FUNDING/COMPETING INTEREST(S): This research was partly supported by a Research School of Social Sciences Visiting Fellowship at the Australian National University and an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP150104248). Éva Beaujouan's work was partly funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) project 'Later Fertility in Europe' (Grant agreement no. P31171-G29). This paper uses unit record data from the HILDA Survey. The HILDA Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Social Services (DSS) and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research (Melbourne Institute). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the authors and should not be attributed to either DSS or the Melbourne Institute. The authors have no conflicts of interest.

Seeding the gender revolution: Women's education and cohort fertility among the baby boom generations.

In Europe and the United States, women's educational attainment started to increase around the middle of the twentieth century. The expected implication was fertility decline and postponement, whereas in fact the opposite occurred. We analyse trends in the quantum of cohort fertility among the baby boom generations in 15 countries and how these relate to women's education. Over the 1901-45 cohorts, the proportion of parents with exactly two children rose steadily and homogeneity in family sizes increased. Progression to a third child and beyond declined in all the countries, continuing the ongoing trends of the fertility transition. In countries with a baby boom, and especially among women with post-primary education, this was compensated for by decreasing childlessness and increasing progression to a second child. These changes, linked to earlier stages of the fertility transition, laid the foundations for later fertility patterns associated with the gender revolution.

POST-TRANSITIONAL FERTILITY: THE ROLE OF CHILDBEARING POSTPONEMENT IN FUELLING THE SHIFT TO LOW AND UNSTABLE FERTILITY LEVELS.

This study discusses fertility trends and variation in countries that completed the transition from high to around-replacement fertility in the 1950s to 1980s, especially in Europe, East Asia and North America, and summarizes the key relevant findings for those countries with a more recent experience of fertility decline towards replacement level. A central finding is that there is no obvious theoretical or empirical threshold around which period fertility tends to stabilize. Period fertility rates usually continue falling once the threshold of replacement fertility is crossed, often to very low levels. While cohort fertility rates frequently stabilize or change gradually, period fertility typically remains unstable. This instability also includes marked upturns and reversals in Total Fertility Rates (TFRs), as experienced in many countries in Europe in the early 2000s. The long-lasting trend towards delayed parenthood is central for understanding diverse, low and unstable post-transitional fertility patterns. In many countries in Europe this shift to a late childbearing pattern has negatively affected the TFR for more than four decades. Many emerging post-transitional countries and regions are likely to experience a similar shift over the next two to three decades, with a depression of their TFRs to very low levels.

A demographic explanation for the recent rise in European fertility.

Between 1998 and 2008 European countries experienced the first continent-wide increase in the period total fertility rate (TFR) since the 1960s. After discussing period and cohort influences on fertility trends, we examine the role of tempo distortions of period fertility and different methods for removing them. We highlight the usefulness of a new indicator: the tempo- and parity-adjusted total fertility rate (TFRp*). This variant of the adjusted total fertility rate proposed by Bongaarts and Feeney also controls for the parity composition of the female population and provides more stable values than the indicators proposed in the past. Finally, we estimate levels and trends in tempo and parity distribution distortions in selected countries in Europe. Our analysis of period and cohort fertility indicators in the Czech Republic, Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden shows that the new adjusted measure gives a remarkable fit with the completed fertility of women in prime childbearing years in a given period, which suggests that it provides an accurate adjustment for tempo and parity composition distortions. Using an expanded dataset for ten countries, we demonstrate that adjusted fertility as measured by TFRp* remained nearly stable since the late 1990s. This finding implies that the recent upturns in the period TFR in Europe are largely explained by a decline in the pace of fertility postponement. Other tempo-adjusted fertility indicators have not indicated such a large role for the diminishing tempo effect in these TFR upturns. As countries proceed through their postponement transitions, tempo effects will decline further and eventually disappear, thus putting continued upward pressure on period fertility. However, such an upward trend may be obscured for a few years by the effects of economic recession.

Economic recession and fertility in the developed world.

This article reviews research on the effects of economic recessions on fertility in the developed world. We study how economic downturns, as measured by various indicators, especially by declining GDP levels, falling consumer confidence, and rising unemployment, were found to affect fertility. We also discuss particular mechanisms through which the recession may have influenced fertility behavior, including the effects of economic uncertainty, falling income, changes in the housing market, and rising enrollment in higher education, and also factors that influence fertility indirectly such as declining marriage rates. Most studies find that fertility tends to be pro-cyclical and often rises and declines with the ups and downs of the business cycle. Usually, these aggregate effects are relatively small (typically, a few percentage points) and of short durations; in addition they often influence especially the timing of childbearing and in most cases do not leave an imprint on cohort fertility levels. Therefore, major long-term fertility shifts often continue seemingly uninterrupted during the recession­including the fertility declines before and during the Great Depression of the 1930s and before and during the oil shock crises of the 1970s. Changes in the opportunity costs of childbearing and fertility behavior during economic downturn vary by sex, age, social status, and number of children; childless young adults are usually most affected. Furthermore, various policies and institutions may modify or even reverse the relationship between recessions and fertility. The first evidence pertaining to the recent recession falls in line with these findings. In most countries, the recession has brought a decline in the number of births and fertility rates, often marking a sharp halt to the previous decade of rising fertility rates.