RESUMO
The article first examines the various objections to IVF: religious, health and safety and feminist. It is argued that none of these objections provides good reasons for banning IVF, though certain controls and procedures to protect individuals from harm and exploitation may be appropriate. Next, the article critiques John Robertson's strong conception of procreative liberty, which entails a right to be a surrogate mother or serve as a sperm donor. Roberton's interpretation misconceives the nature and value of the right to reproduce. The righ to reproduce is best interpreted as a right to have one's own children to rear. Where there is no intent or ability to rear, there is no fundamental moral right to reproduce. However, since assisted reproduction is used to enable individuals to have their own children to rear, it should be available to infertile individuals who cannot otherwise reproduce.
Assuntos
Bioética , Fertilização in vitro , Direitos Humanos , Técnicas Reprodutivas , Medição de Risco , Feminino , Humanos , Obrigações Morais , Doação de Oócitos , Seleção de Pacientes , Pessoalidade , Religião , Reprodução , Valores Sociais , Espermatozoides , Direitos da MulherAssuntos
Coerção , Anticoncepcionais Femininos , Ética , Direitos Civis , Anticoncepcionais Femininos/administração & dosagem , Preparações de Ação Retardada , Análise Ética , Feminino , Humanos , Levanogestrel , Princípios Morais , Motivação , Autonomia Pessoal , Assistência Pública/economia , Assistência Pública/legislação & jurisprudência , Medição de Risco , Estados UnidosRESUMO
Suits that claim that a child would be better off never having been born often founder on conceptual and logical dilemmas. However, the correct interpretation of "wrongful life" does not require a comparison between existence and nonexistence. The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in the Procanik case to limit damages to extraordinary medical expenses, barring recovery for pain and suffering, is a reasonable resolution.
KIE: With the 1 Aug 1984 decision of its Supreme Court in Procanik v. Cillo, New Jersey joined California and Washington as the only states to have recognized the right of an infant with birth defects to collect damages in a wrongful life suit. Steinbock reviews the precedents for Procanik as well as cases where courts have shied away from awarding damages to infants because of an unwillingness to compare the relative merits of nonlife versus an impaired life. She argues that the correct interpretation of "wrongful life" does not require such a comparison. She also contends that the decision in the Procanik case to limit damages to extraordinary medical expenses, barring recovery for pain and suffering, is a just solution.
Assuntos
Compensação e Reparação , Anormalidades Congênitas , Recém-Nascido , Imperícia , Filosofia Médica , Direitos Humanos , Humanos , Lactente , Responsabilidade Legal , Rubéola (Sarampo Alemão)/complicações , Estresse Psicológico , Valor da VidaRESUMO
KIE: A parental decision to forego corrective surgery for a baby born with spina bifida in October 1983 resulted in a legal controversy and a public debate about the care of all babies born with serious disabilities. Steinbock traces the medical and legal history of the "Baby Jane Doe" case, contrasts the approachs of the New York courts involved, and looks at two other decisions involving the treatment of minors with which the case has been compared. She considers the difficulties in establishing a prognosis for handicapped newborns, and concludes with a discussion of government intervention in decisions about their care.^ieng