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1.
Carbohydr Polym ; 338: 122183, 2024 Aug 15.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-38763721

RESUMO

Phosphorus is a critical factor in the control of eutrophication. We developed a three-dimensional porous, bimetallic-modified adsorbent La-Ca-CS/ATP to remove excess phosphate from water. Langmuir model showed that the theoretical adsorption capacity of La-Ca-CS/ATP was up to 123 mg P/g. The amount of La and Ca leached by La-Ca-CS/ATP was small, and the adsorption of 36.08 mg P/g was maintained during the five cycles of La-Ca-CS/ATP. The La-Ca-CS/ATP adsorption mechanism mainly involved surface precipitation, ligand exchange, electrostatic attraction, and inner-sphere complexation. Molecular dynamics demonstrated that La and Ca had complementary effects on binding sites and energy barriers within the range of 0.5-0.7 nm and 1.2-2 nm, enhancing the adsorption effect of La-Ca-CS/ATP. The life cycle assessment results showed that adding calcium could help reduce the environmental impact of lanthanum and chitosan. The production of La-Ca-CS/ATP adsorbed 73.88 P mg/g and emitted 24.73 kg CO2 eq, which was less than other adsorbents.

2.
PLoS One ; 17(10): e0276272, 2022.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-36251726

RESUMO

With the advancement of urbanization and the expansion of urban areas, NIMBY (not in my back yard) environmental public facilities are increasing day by day. It is meaningful to incorporate public participation into the regulatory process for the existing pollution NIMBY facility enterprises. Through the establishment of the tripartite game model of local government, polluting NIMBY facility enterprises and the public, the evolution stability analysis and simulation analysis of their strategies are carried out, and the Pareto optimal solution is obtained. The results show that: The strategy choices of the players of the three-party game are different under different stability conditions. The system can be broken out of the bad state by increasing government punishment, local governments strictly controlling the potential profits, the potential losses of polluting enterprises not rebuilding, the long-term public benefits and reducing the cost of public participation, etc., and the three-party common governance mode can be formed. The strategy evolution speed of a player in a three-party game is affected by his own strategy choice proportion and the strategy choice proportion of the other two players, but no matter how the strategy choice proportion of the player in a three-party game changes, it will not change the final game result. On the basis of comprehensive analysis, a series of relevant suggestions are put forward from the three aspects of government, enterprises and the public, so as to provide certain reference for the design of the public participation system of polluting NIMBY facilities.


Assuntos
Participação da Comunidade , Poluição Ambiental , China , Teoria dos Jogos , Governo , Habitação , Humanos , Punição
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