Impact of a Pay-for-Performance Program on Care for Black Patients with Hypertension: Important Answers in the Era of the Affordable Care Act.

OBJECTIVE: Evaluate the effect of a pay-for-performance intervention on the quality of hypertension care provided to black patients and determine whether it produced risk selection. DATA SOURCE/STUDY SETTING: Primary data collected between 2007 and 2009 from Veterans Affairs physicians and their primary care panels. STUDY DESIGN: Nested study within a cluster randomized controlled trial of three types of financial incentives and no incentives (control). We compared the proportion of physicians' black patients meeting hypertension performance measures for baseline and final performance periods. We measured risk selection by comparing the proportion of patients who switched providers, patient visit frequency, and panel turnover. Due to limited power, we prespecified in the analysis plan combining the three incentive groups and oversampling black patients. DATA COLLECTION/EXTRACTION METHOD: Data collected electronically and by chart review. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: The proportion of black patients who achieved blood pressure control or received an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in the final period was 6.3 percent (95 percent confidence interval, 0.8-11.7 percent) greater for physicians who received an incentive than for controls. There was no difference between intervention and controls in the proportion of patients who switched providers, visit frequency, or panel turnover. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: A pay-for-performance intervention improved blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure in black patients and did not produce risk selection.

Statin Use and Its Facility-Level Variation in Patients With Diabetes: Insight From the Veterans Affairs National Database.

We sought to determine use of any and at least moderate-intensity statin therapy in a national sample of patients with diabetes mellitus (DM), with the hypothesis that nationwide frequency and facility-level variation in statin therapy are suboptimal. We sampled patients with DM age 40 to 75 years receiving primary care between October 1, 2012, and September 30, 2013, at 130 parent facilities and associated community-based outpatient clinics in the Veterans Affairs Health Care System. We examined frequency and facility-level variation in use of any or at least moderate-intensity statin therapy (mean daily dose associated with ≥30% low-density lipoprotein cholesterol lowering). In 911 444 patients with DM, 68.3% and 58.4% were receiving any and moderate- to high-intensity statin therapy, respectively. Patients receiving statin had higher burden of cardiovascular disease, were more likely to be on nonstatin lipid-lowering therapy and to receive care at a teaching facility, and had more frequent primary-care visits. Median facility-level uses of any and at least moderate-intensity statin therapy were 68.7% (interquartile range, 65.9%-70.8%) and 58.6% (interquartile range, 55.8%-61.4%), respectively. After adjusting for several patient-related and some facility-related characteristics, the median rate ratios for any and moderate- to high-intensity statin therapy were 1.20 (95% confidence interval: 1.18-1.22) and 1.29 (95% confidence interval: 1.24-1.33) respectively, indicating 20% to 29% variation in statin use between 2 identical patients receiving care at 2 random facilities. Statin use was suboptimal in a national sample of patients with DM with modest facility-level variation, likely indicating differences in statin-prescribing patterns.

Calculations of Financial Incentives for Providers in a Pay-for-Performance Program: Manual Review Versus Data From Structured Fields in Electronic Health Records.

BACKGROUND: Hospital report cards and financial incentives linked to performance require clinical data that are reliable, appropriate, timely, and cost-effective to process. Pay-for-performance plans are transitioning to automated electronic health record (EHR) data as an efficient method to generate data needed for these programs. OBJECTIVE: To determine how well data from automated processing of structured fields in the electronic health record (AP-EHR) reflect data from manual chart review and the impact of these data on performance rewards. RESEARCH DESIGN: Cross-sectional analysis of performance measures used in a cluster randomized trial assessing the impact of financial incentives on guideline-recommended care for hypertension. SUBJECTS: A total of 2840 patients with hypertension assigned to participating physicians at 12 Veterans Affairs hospital-based outpatient clinics. Fifty-two physicians and 33 primary care personnel received incentive payments. MEASURES: Overall, positive and negative agreement indices and Cohen's kappa were calculated for assessments of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medication use, blood pressure (BP) control, and appropriate response to uncontrolled BP. Pearson's correlation coefficient was used to assess how similar participants' calculated earnings were between the data sources. RESULTS: By manual chart review data, 72.3% of patients were considered to have received guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications compared with 65.0% by AP-EHR review (κ=0.51). Manual review indicated 69.5% of patients had controlled BP compared with 66.8% by AP-EHR review (κ=0.87). Compared with 52.2% of patients per the manual review, 39.8% received an appropriate response by AP-EHR review (κ=0.28). Participants' incentive payments calculated using the 2 methods were highly correlated (r≥0.98). Using the AP-EHR data to calculate earnings, participants' payment changes ranged from a decrease of $91.00 (-30.3%) to an increase of $18.20 (+7.4%) for medication use (interquartile range, -14.4% to 0%) and a decrease of $100.10 (-31.4%) to an increase of $36.40 (+15.4%) for BP control or appropriate response to uncontrolled BP (interquartile range, -11.9% to -6.1%). CONCLUSIONS: Pay-for-performance plans that use only EHR data should carefully consider the measures and the structure of the EHR before data collection and financial incentive disbursement. For this study, we feel that a 10% difference in the total amount of incentive earnings disbursed based on AP-EHR data compared with manual review is acceptable given the time and resources required to abstract data from medical records.

Effects of individual physician-level and practice-level financial incentives on hypertension care: a randomized trial.

IMPORTANCE: Pay for performance is intended to align incentives to promote high-quality care, but results have been contradictory. OBJECTIVE: To test the effect of explicit financial incentives to reward guideline-recommended hypertension care. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: Cluster randomized trial of 12 Veterans Affairs outpatient clinics with 5 performance periods and a 12-month washout that enrolled 83 primary care physicians and 42 nonphysician personnel (eg, nurses, pharmacists). INTERVENTIONS: Physician-level (individual) incentives, practice-level incentives, both, or none. Intervention participants received up to 5 payments every 4 months; all participants could access feedback reports. MAIN OUTCOMES AND MEASURES: Among a random sample, number of patients achieving guideline-recommended blood pressure thresholds or receiving an appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure, number of patients prescribed guideline-recommended medications, and number who developed hypotension. RESULTS: Mean (SD) total payments over the study were $4270 ($459), $2672 ($153), and $1648 ($248) for the combined, individual, and practice-level interventions, respectively. The unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change over the study in patients meeting the combined blood pressure/appropriate response measure were 75% to 84% and 8.84% (95% CI, 4.20% to 11.80%) for the individual group, 80% to 85% and 3.70% (95% CI, 0.24% to 7.68%) for the practice-level group, 79% to 88% and 5.54% (95% CI, 1.92% to 9.52%) for the combined group, and 86% to 86% and 0.47% (95% CI, -3.12% to 4.04%) for the control group. The adjusted absolute estimated difference in the change between the proportion of patients with blood pressure control/appropriate response for individual incentive and control groups was 8.36% (95% CI, 2.40% to 13.00%; P=.005). The other incentive groups did not show a significant change compared with controls for this outcome. For medications, the unadjusted baseline and final percentages and the adjusted absolute change were 61% to 73% and 9.07% (95% CI, 4.52% to 13.44%), 56% to 65% and 4.98% (95% CI, 0.64% to 10.08%), 65% to 80% and 7.26% (95% CI, 2.92% to 12.48%), and 63% to 72% and 4.35% (95% CI, -0.28% to 9.28%), respectively. These changes in the use of guideline-recommended medications were not significant in any of the incentive groups compared with controls, nor was the incidence of hypotension. The effect of the incentive was not sustained after a washout. CONCLUSIONS AND RELEVANCE: Individual financial incentives, but not practice-level or combined incentives, resulted in greater blood pressure control or appropriate response to uncontrolled blood pressure; none of the incentives resulted in greater use of guideline-recommended medications or increased incidence of hypotension compared with controls. Further research is needed on the factors that contributed to these findings. TRIAL REGISTRATION: clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.

Impact of clinical complexity on the quality of diabetes care.

OBJECTIVES: To assess the impact of clinical complexity on 3 dimensions of diabetes care. STUDY DESIGN: We identified 35,872 diabetic patients receiving care at 7 Veterans Affairs facilities between July 2007 and June 2008 using administrative and clinical data. We examined control at index and appropriate care (among uncontrolled patients) within 90 days, for blood pressure (<130/80 mm Hg), glycated hemoglobin (<7%), and low-density lipoprotein cholesterol (<100 mg/dL). We used ordered logistic regression to examine the impact of complexity, defined by comorbidities count and illness burden, on control at index and a combined measure of quality (control at index or appropriate follow-up care) for all 3 measures. RESULTS: There were 6260 (17.5%) patients controlled at index for all 3 quality indicators. Patients with >3 comorbidities (odds ratio [OR], 1.94; 95% confidence interval [CI], 1.67-2.26) and illness burden >2.00 (OR, 1.22; 95% CI, 1.13-1.32) were more likely than the least complex patients to be controlled for all 3 measures. Patients with >3 comorbidities (OR, 2.30; 95% CI, 2.07-2.54) and illness burden >2.00 (OR, 1.25; 95% CI, 1.18-1.33) were also more likely than the least complex patients to meet the combined quality indicator for all 3 measures. CONCLUSIONS: Patients with greatest complexity received higher quality diabetes care compared with less complex patients, regardless of the definition of complexity chosen. Although providers may appropriately target complex patients for aggressive control, deficits in guideline achievement among all diabetic patients highlight the challenges of caring for chronically ill patients and the importance of structuring primary care to promote higher-quality, patient-centered care.

Design, rationale, and baseline characteristics of a cluster randomized controlled trial of pay for performance for hypertension treatment: study protocol.

BACKGROUND: Despite compelling evidence of the benefits of treatment and well-accepted guidelines for treatment, hypertension is controlled in less than one-half of United States citizens. METHODS/DESIGN: This randomized controlled trial tests whether explicit financial incentives promote the translation of guideline-recommended care for hypertension into clinical practice and improve blood pressure (BP) control in the primary care setting. Using constrained randomization, we assigned 12 Veterans Affairs hospital outpatient clinics to four study arms: physician-level incentive; group-level incentive; combination of physician and group incentives; and no incentives (control). All participants at the hospital (cluster) were assigned to the same study arm. We enrolled 83 full-time primary care physicians and 42 non-physician personnel. The intervention consisted of an educational session about guideline-recommended care for hypertension, five audit and feedback reports, and five disbursements of incentive payments. Incentive payments rewarded participants for chart-documented use of guideline-recommended antihypertensive medications, BP control, and appropriate responses to uncontrolled BP during a prior four-month performance period over the 20-month intervention. To identify potential unintended consequences of the incentives, the study team interviewed study participants, as well as non-participant primary care personnel and leadership at study sites. Chart reviews included data collection on quality measures not related to hypertension. To evaluate the persistence of the effect of the incentives, the study design includes a washout period. DISCUSSION: We briefly describe the rationale for the interventions being studied, as well as the major design choices. Rigorous research designs such as the one described here are necessary to determine whether performance-based payment arrangements such as financial incentives result in meaningful quality improvements. TRIAL REGISTRATION: http://www.clinicaltrials.govNCT00302718.

Improving benchmarking by using an explicit framework for the development of composite indicators: an example using pediatric quality of care.

BACKGROUND: The measurement of healthcare provider performance is becoming more widespread. Physicians have been guarded about performance measurement, in part because the methodology for comparative measurement of care quality is underdeveloped. Comprehensive quality improvement will require comprehensive measurement, implying the aggregation of multiple quality metrics into composite indicators. OBJECTIVE: To present a conceptual framework to develop comprehensive, robust, and transparent composite indicators of pediatric care quality, and to highlight aspects specific to quality measurement in children. METHODS: We reviewed the scientific literature on composite indicator development, health systems, and quality measurement in the pediatric healthcare setting. Frameworks were selected for explicitness and applicability to a hospital-based measurement system. RESULTS: We synthesized various frameworks into a comprehensive model for the development of composite indicators of quality of care. Among its key premises, the model proposes identifying structural, process, and outcome metrics for each of the Institute of Medicine's six domains of quality (safety, effectiveness, efficiency, patient-centeredness, timeliness, and equity) and presents a step-by-step framework for embedding the quality of care measurement model into composite indicator development. CONCLUSIONS: The framework presented offers researchers an explicit path to composite indicator development. Without a scientifically robust and comprehensive approach to measurement of the quality of healthcare, performance measurement will ultimately fail to achieve its quality improvement goals.

Will hypertension performance measures used for pay-for-performance programs penalize those who care for medically complex patients?

BACKGROUND: There is concern that performance measures, patient ratings of their care, and pay-for-performance programs may penalize healthcare providers of patients with multiple chronic coexisting conditions. We examined the impact of coexisting conditions on the quality of care for hypertension and patient perception of overall quality of their health care. METHODS AND RESULTS: We classified 141 609 veterans with hypertension into 4 condition groups: those with hypertension-concordant (diabetes mellitus, ischemic heart disease, dyslipidemia) and/or -discordant (arthritis, depression, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) conditions or neither. We measured blood pressure control at the index visit, overall good quality of care for hypertension, including a follow-up interval, and patient ratings of satisfaction with their care. Associations between condition type and number of coexisting conditions on receipt of overall good quality of care were assessed with logistic regression. The relationship between patient assessment and objective measures of quality was assessed. Of the cohort, 49.5% had concordant-only comorbidities, 8.7% had discordant-only comorbidities, 25.9% had both, and 16.0% had none. Odds of receiving overall good quality after adjustment for age were higher for those with concordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.78; 95% confidence interval, 1.70 to 1.87), discordant comorbidities (odds ratio, 1.32; 95% confidence interval, 1.23 to 1.41), or both (odds ratio, 2.25; 95% confidence interval, 2.13 to 2.38) compared with neither. Findings did not change after adjustment for illness severity and/or number of primary care and specialty care visits. Patient assessment of quality did not vary by the presence of coexisting conditions and was not related to objective ratings of quality of care. CONCLUSIONS: Contrary to expectations, patients with greater complexity had higher odds of receiving high-quality care for hypertension. Subjective ratings of care did not vary with the presence or absence of comorbid conditions. Our findings should be reassuring to those who care for the most medically complex patients and are concerned that they will be penalized by performance measures or patient ratings of their care.

Does pay-for-performance improve the quality of health care?

BACKGROUND: Most physicians and hospitals are paid the same regardless of the quality of the health care they provide. This produces no financial incentives and, in some cases, produces disincentives for quality. Increasing numbers of programs link payment to performance. PURPOSE: To systematically review studies assessing the effect of explicit financial incentives for improved performance on measures of health care quality. DATA SOURCES: PubMed search of English-language literature (1 January 1980 to 14 November 2005), and reference lists of retrieved articles. STUDY SELECTION: Empirical studies of the relationship between explicit financial incentives designed to improve health care quality and a quantitative measure of health care quality. DATA EXTRACTION: The authors categorized studies according to the level of the incentive (individual physician, provider group, or health care payment system) and the type of quality measure rewarded. DATA SYNTHESIS: Thirteen of 17 studies examined process-of-care quality measures, most of which were for preventive services. Five of the 6 studies of physician-level financial incentives and 7 of the 9 studies of provider group-level financial incentives found partial or positive effects on measures of quality. One of the 2 studies of incentives at the payment-system level found a positive effect on access to care, and 1 showed evidence of a negative effect on access to care for the sickest patients. In all, 4 studies suggested unintended effects of incentives. The authors found no studies examining the optimal duration of financial incentives for quality or the persistence of their effects after termination. Only 1 study addressed cost-effectiveness. LIMITATIONS: Few empirical studies of explicit financial incentives for quality were available for review. CONCLUSIONS: Ongoing monitoring of incentive programs is critical to determine the effectiveness of financial incentives and their possible unintended effects on quality of care. Further research is needed to guide implementation of financial incentives and to assess their cost-effectiveness.