Government subsidy and benefit distribution mechanisms for transportation PPP projects: An evolutionary game perspective.

Public-private partnerships (PPP), as an important model for collaboration between the public and private sectors, is an urgent and critical topic due to the serious financial losses of governments involved in transportation PPP projects in recent years. Current research focuses on the government subsidy model, in which the effective implementation of government subsidies relies on the design of incentives for stakeholder behavior. Although the positive externalities are strong, they are prone to the problem of "free riding," which leads to low project performance and challenges in compensating for the government's financial losses. Therefore, this study proposes a novel dynamic subsidy mechanism that can be adjusted based on actual changes in transportation demand and that is linked to project performance. We use evolutionary game theory to construct a two-party evolutionary game model of the government and social capital, focusing on the stability and influencing factors of these interactions. Our research unveils that reaching specific thresholds in both the incentive coefficient and benefit distribution ratio induces an "positive management-negative management" shift in the behavior of involved parties, leading to enhanced project outcomes. Notably, fluctuations in operational quality substantially enhance the efficiency of the active management of private sector, with no discernible impact on the subsidy efficiency of the government. Therefore, our study provides a theoretical framework for improving the revenue allocation and government subsidy mechanism, which has theoretical and practical implications for enhancing the effect of government incentives and improving the quality of operational social capital.

An Interactive Model among Potential Human Risk Factors: 331 Cases of Coal Mine Roof Accidents in China.

In order to explore optimal strategies for managing potential human risk factors, this paper developed an interactive model among potential human risk factors based on the development processes of accidents. This model was divided into four stages, i.e., risk latency stage, risk accumulation stage, risk explosion stage and risk residue stage. Based on this model, this paper analyzed risk management procedures and relevant personal's responsibility in each stage, and then probed into the interactive mechanism among human risk factors in three aspects, i.e., knowledge, information and communication. The validity and feasibility of the model was validated by analyzing a coal mine roof accident in China. In addition, the contribution of different functional levels' personnel in risk evolution was discussed. It showed that this model can effectively reveal the interactive mechanism of potential human risk factors, and can thus give significant insights into the development of risk management theories and practices. It also proves that the contribution of different functional levels' personnel in the model is different. This can further help practitioners design enhanced Behavioral-Based Safety (BBS) intervention approaches which can have a more sustainable and persistent impact on corporate personnel's safety behavior. Specific recommendations and suggestions are provided fundamentally for future BBS practices in the coal mine industry.