A new statistical approach for China road freight transport at a subnational level.

Currently, there is a large deviation between official road freight data and real road freight performance at a subnational level in China. In order to deal with this deviation, the new concept of local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers is presented in this paper based on the territoriality principle, where either the origin or the destination of goods transported is local. Also, the statistic procedures and estimation models of the local freight tonnage and ton-kilometers are proposed based on five accessible basic datasets. Finally, an empirical study in Sichuan province of China is conducted. The statistical results show that there is a large amount of local freight transported by local non-commercial trucks and non-local trucks, which is ignored in the existing road freight statistics. Especially, the higher the level of local economic development, the greater the deviation between the official road freight data and the real road freight performance at a subnational level.

Energy-saving and pricing decisions in a sustainable supply chain considering behavioral concerns.

With the rising environmental concerns among consumers all over the world, sustainability has received considerable attention, and numerous enterprises are adopting various practices such as investing in energy-saving to improve sustainability in supply chains. However, many previous researches always assume that decision makers are perfectly rational and neglect the behavioral concerns of decision makers. This paper considers a two-stage sustainable supply chain with behavioral concerns in order to develop more realistic models, and mainly focuses on the energy-saving and pricing decisions in the decentralized system, as well as how to improve energy-saving level and profits. We develop decentralized decision-making models under two types of behavioral concerns: fairness concern and risk aversion, and derive the optimal strategy for each member with a Stackelberg game in which the manufacturer acts as the leader. The effect of the behavioral concerns on the optimal decisions and corresponding profits is discussed in detail. Theoretical analysis verified by numerical experiments shows that the fairness behavior always causes a negative effect on the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, while it could benefit the retailer in profits. The risk aversion behavior always benefits the manufacturer, total supply chain, and energy conservation, whereas it could make the retailer suffer. Note that both the optimal energy-saving level and corresponding profit of the total supply chain under two types of behavioral concerns are lower than that in the centralized system, thereby we propose a revenue-cost-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain, under which both the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win outcome and the energy-saving level can be improved. In addition, some managerial implications through our analytical and numerical results are summarized in this paper.