Effects of private health insurance on waiting time in public hospitals.

The Australian government pays $6.7 billion per year in rebates to encourage Australians to purchase private health insurance (PHI) and an additional $6.1 billion to cover services provided in private hospitals. What is the justification for large government subsidies to a private industry when all Australians already have free coverage under Medicare? The government argues that more people buying PHI will relieve the burden on the public system and may reduce waiting times. However, the evidence supporting this is sparse. We use an instrumental variable approach to study the causal effects of higher PHI coverage in the area on waiting times in public hospitals in the same area. The instrument used is area-level average house prices, which correlate with average income and wealth, thus influencing the purchase of PHI due to tax incentives, but not directly affecting waiting times in public hospitals. We use 2014-2018 hospital admission and elective surgery waiting list data linked at the patient level from the Victorian Center for Data Linkage. These data cover all inpatient admissions in all hospitals in Victoria (both public and private hospitals) and those registered on the waiting list for elective surgeries in public hospitals in Victoria. We find that one percentage point increase in PHI coverage leads to about 0.34 days (or 0.5%) reduction in waiting times in public hospitals on average. The effects vary by surgical specialities and age groups. However, the practical significance of this effect is limited, if not negligible, despite its statistical significance. The small effect suggests that raising PHI coverage with the aim to taking the pressure off the public system is not an effective strategy in reducing waiting times in public hospitals. Alternative policies aiming at improving the efficiency of public hospitals and advancing equitable access to care should be a priority for policymakers.

"It's not a one operation fits all": A qualitative study exploring fee setting and participation in price transparency initiatives amongst medical specialists in the Australian private healthcare sector.

The Australian government, through Medicare, defines the type of medical specialist services it covers and subsidizes, but it does not regulate prices. Specialists in private practice can charge more than the fee listed by Medicare depending on what they feel 'the market will bear'. This can sometimes result in high and unexpected out-of-pocket (OOP) payments for patients. To reduce pricing uncertainty and 'bill shock' faced by consumers, the government introduced a price transparency website in December 2019. It is not clear how effective such a website will be and whether specialists and patients will use it. The aim of this qualitative study was to explore factors influencing how specialists set their fees, and their views on and participation in price transparency initiatives. We conducted 27 semi-structured interviews with surgical specialists. We analysed the data using thematic analysis and responses were mapped to the Theoretical Domains Framework and the Capability, Opportunity, Motivation and Behavior model. We identified several patient, specialist and system-level factors influencing fee setting. Patient-level factors included patient characteristics, circumstance, complexity, and assumptions regarding perceived value of care. Specialist-level factors included perceived experience and skills, ethical considerations, and gendered-behavior. System-level factors included the Australian Medical Association recommended price list, practice costs, and supply and demand factors including perceived competition and practice location. Specialists were opposed to price transparency websites and lacked motivation to participate because of the complexity of fee setting, concerns over unintended consequences, and feelings of frustration they were being singled out. If price transparency websites are to be pursued, specialists' lack of motivation to participate needs to be addressed.

Nursing Home Competition, Prices, and Quality: A Scoping Review and Policy Lessons.

BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES: In recent years, countries have increasingly relied on markets to improve efficiency, contain costs, and maintain quality in aged care. Under the right conditions, competition can spur providers to compete by offering better prices and higher quality of services. However, in aged care, market failures can be extensive. Information about prices and quality may not be readily available and search costs can be high. This study undertakes a scoping review on competition in the nursing home sector, with an emphasis on empirical evidence in relation to how competition affects prices and quality of care. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: Online databases were used to identify studies published in the English language between 1988 and 2020. A total of 50 studies covering 9 countries are reviewed. RESULTS: The review finds conflicting evidence on the relationship between competition and quality. Some studies find greater competition leading to higher quality, others find the opposite. Institutional features such as the presence of binding supply restrictions on nursing homes and public reporting of quality information are important considerations. Most studies find greater competition tends to result in lower prices, although the effect is small. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS: The literature offers several key policy lessons, including the relationship between supply restrictions and quality, which has implications on whether increasing subsidies can result in higher quality and the importance of price transparency and public reporting of quality.

Ownership, quality and prices of nursing homes in Australia: Why greater private sector participation did not improve performance.

OBJECTIVE: This study examines whether greater private-sector participation in aged care can lead to better outcomes by comparing quality of care and prices of residential aged care facilities across three ownership types: government-owned, private not-for-profit and for- profit facilities. Australia, like many other countries, has been implementing market-oriented reforms aiming to promote greater consumer choice and increase the role of markets and private-sector participation in aged care. METHODS: Using retrospective facility-level data, the study relates several measures of quality of care and a measure of price to ownership types while controlling for facility characteristics. The data covered six financial years (2013/14-2018/19) and contained 2,900 residential aged-care facilities, capturing almost all facilities in Australia. About 55% were private not-for-profit, 30% private for-profit and 15% government-owned. RESULTS: Government-owned facilities provide higher quality of care in most quality measures and charge the lowest average price than private for-profit and not-for-profit facilities. DISCUSSION: Reforms promoting private-sector participation in aged care are unlikely to result in effective competition to drive quality up or prices down unless sources of market failure are addressed. In Australia, the lack of public reporting of quality and the complex pricing structure are key issues that prevent market forces and consumer choice from working as intended.

Does socioeconomic status affect hospital utilization and health outcomes of chronic disease patients?

This study quantifies the extent socioeconomic status (SES) affects hospital utilization and adverse hospital events of chronic disease patients. After identifying the initial first-year spell of the disease, we examine six outcomes that include measures of utilization and incidence of adverse in-hospital events. Three years of hospital administrative data from the state of Victoria, Australia, are used to extract a sample of 237,743 patients with chronic disease spells. SES is measured using the utilization records of specific health and human services. The study finds that, compared to patients with no disadvantage, SES disadvantaged patients tend to incur higher hospital costs and longer utilization by about 20% and greater incidence of in-hospital adverse outcomes by up to 80% than non-disadvantaged patients. Further analysis shows that hospital adverse outcomes indirectly contribute to about a quarter of the observed difference in hospital costs between SES disadvantaged and non-disadvantaged patients.

Financial Incentives to Encourage Value-Based Health Care.

This article reviews the literature on the use of financial incentives to improve the provision of value-based health care. Eighty studies of 44 schemes from 10 countries were reviewed. The proportion of positive and statistically significant outcomes was close to .5. Stronger study designs were associated with a lower proportion of positive effects. There were no differences between studies conducted in the United States compared with other countries; between schemes that targeted hospitals or primary care; or between schemes combining pay for performance with rewards for reducing costs, relative to pay for performance schemes alone. Paying for performance improvement is less likely to be effective. Allowing payments to be used for specific purposes, such as quality improvement, had a higher likelihood of a positive effect, compared with using funding for physician income. Finally, the size of incentive payments relative to revenue was not associated with the proportion of positive outcomes.

Cream skimming and hospital transfers in a mixed public-private system.

The increasing prominence of the private sector in health care provision has generated considerable interest in understanding its implications on quality and cost. This paper investigates the phenomenon of cream skimming in a mixed public-private hospital setting using the novel approach of analysing hospital transfers. We analyse hospital administrative data of patients with ischemic heart disease from the state of Victoria, Australia. The data set contains approximately 1.77 million admission episodes in 309 hospitals, of which 132 are public hospitals, and 177 private hospitals. We ask if patients transferred between public and private hospitals differ systematically in the severity and complexity of their medical conditions; and if so, whether utilisation also differs. We find that patients with higher disease severity are more likely to be transferred from private to public hospitals whereas the opposite is true for patients transferred to private hospitals. We also find that patients transferred from private to public hospitals stayed longer and cost more than private-to-private transfer patients, after controlling for patients' observed health conditions and personal characteristics. Overall, the evidence is suggestive of the presence of cream skimming in the Victorian hospital system, although we cannot conclusively rule out other mechanisms that might influence hospital transfers.

Effects of competition on hospital quality: an examination using hospital administrative data.

This paper investigates the effects of competition on hospital quality using hospital administration data from the State of Victoria, Australia. Hospital quality is measured by 30-day mortality rates and 30-day unplanned readmission rates. Competition is measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the numbers of competing public and private hospitals. The paper finds that hospitals facing higher competition have lower unplanned admission rates. However, competition is related negatively to hospital quality when measured by mortality, albeit the effects are weak and barely statistically significant. The paper also finds that the positive effect of competition on quality as measured by unplanned readmission differs greatly depending on whether the hospital is publicly or privately owned.

Population ageing and its implications on aggregate health care demand: empirical evidence from 22 OECD countries.

Recent evidence indicates that the relationship between age and health care expenditure is not as straightforward as it appears. In fact, micro-level studies find that time to death, rather than ageing, is possibly the main driver of the escalating health care costs in developed countries. Unfortunately, the evidence at the macro level is less clear and often depends on the specification of the empirical model used. We use an aggregate demand framework to assess whether health expenditure is more likely to be driven by ageing per se or proximity to death. Using panel data from 22 OECD countries from the first half of the 1990s, we find population ageing to be negatively correlated with health expenditure once proximity to death is accounted for. This suggests that the effects of ageing on health expenditure growth might be overstated while the effects of the high costs of medical care at the end of life are potentially underestimated. With respect to the latter, our finding highlights the importance of long-term and hospice care management. An expanded long-term care program may not only improve patient welfare, but also reduce costs of care by reducing the duration of hospital care for terminally ill patients. If expensive medical treatment for patients near the end of life can be controlled for, health expenditure growth resulting from population ageing is unlikely to present a most serious problem.

The income distributive implications of recent private health insurance policy reforms in Australia.

The Australian government implemented a series of private health insurance (PHI) policy reforms between 1997 and 2000. As a result, the proportion of the population with PHI coverage increased by more than 35%. However, this study found significant evidence that the policy reform disproportionately favours high-income earners. In particular, the 30% premium subsidy represents a windfall gain for households which would have purchased PHI even without the rebate. The amount of such gain is estimated to be around $900 million per year, a large proportion of which went to higher income households.