RESUMO
The public assistance system in Japan provides detailed and comprehensive livelihood support for low-income families with various needs. As one example, and the beneficiaries of the public welfare program in Japan can receive the same medical treatments as those insured of the universal public health insurance without any financial burdens. This system has greatly contributed to maintaining and improving the health of public assistance beneficiaries but may cause excessive healthcare utilization: moral hazard. This study uses a large sample taken from two nationally representative claim data for public assistance and public health insurance patients to estimate the magnitude of moral hazard effect in basic outpatient utilization. The results of the fixed-effect regression analysis utilizing the concept of pseudo panel data analysis and those of propensity score matching show that the average treatment effect of public assistance assignment on healthcare utilization is significantly positive. Specifically, public assistance assignment increases monthly healthcare expenditure by 17.5 to 22.9 percent and the monthly number of doctor visits by 23.1 to 27.8 percent, respectively. In addition, the average treatment effects on the treated are also significantly positive, suggesting that monthly healthcare expenditure significantly decreases by 22.7 to 25.0 percent and the number of visits by 27.6 to 29.7 percent, respectively, when imposing a copayment on public assistance beneficiaries. However, the estimated price elasticity based on these results is very small, approximately -0.02, indicating that the level of copayment rate has little effect on the intensive margin of outpatient healthcare utilization.
Assuntos
Gastos em Saúde , Aceitação pelo Paciente de Cuidados de Saúde , Atenção à Saúde , Humanos , Japão , PobrezaRESUMO
This paper uses two nationally representative sets of medical claims data from medical assistance and universal public health insurance systems to examine how medical assistance system assignment affects short-term inpatient health care provision. In Japan, the medical assistance system, which is part of a public assistance system, provides medical care services for its beneficiaries without imposing any financial burdens, such as copayments or advance premium payments. These circumstances can lead to inpatient costs, as physicians may provide more treatments because there is a financial incentive. Because the assignment of public assistance in Japan is not random but is subject to means testing by the local government, I employ the instrumental variable model to control the potential correlation. I find that medical expenditure is significantly higher for medical assistance patients than for universal public health insurance patients, with an arc elasticity of approximately 0.20. This elasticity is slightly greater than that found for inpatient care in the randomized RAND Health Insurance Experiment and recent empirical studies on low-income populations. In addition, the elasticities for patients who receive medication, treatment and surgery are greater.