Bioinspired "cage traps" for closed-loop lead management of perovskite solar cells under real-world contamination assessment.

Despite the remarkable progress made in perovskite solar cells, great concerns regarding potential Pb contamination risk and environmental vulnerability risks associated with perovskite solar cells pose a significant obstacle to their real-world commercialization. In this study, we took inspiration from the ensnaring prey behavior of spiders and chemical components in spider web to strategically implant a multifunctional mesoporous amino-grafted-carbon net into perovskite solar cells, creating a biomimetic cage traps that could effectively mitigate Pb leakage and shield the external invasion under extreme weather conditions. The synergistic Pb capturing mechanism in terms of chemical chelation and physical adsorption is in-depth explored. Additionally, the Pb contamination assessment of end-of-life perovskite solar cells in the real-world ecosystem, including Yellow River water and soil, is proposed. The sustainable closed-loop Pb management process is also successfully established involving four critical steps: Pb precipitation, Pb adsorption, Pb desorption, and Pb recycling. Our findings provide inspiring insights for promoting green and sustainable industrialization of perovskite solar cells.

An Economic Model of Human Cooperation Based on Indirect Reciprocity and Its Implication on Environmental Protection.

There has been an urgent challenge for environmental protection due to issues like population increase, climate change, and pollution. To address this challenge, sustained human cooperation is critical. However, how cooperation in human beings evolves is one of the 125 most challenging scientific questions, as announced by Science in its 125th anniversary. In this paper, we contribute to answering this question by building an economic game model based on indirect reciprocity and altruism behavior. In our model, there are three types of participants: cooperator, defector, and discriminator. In every round of the game, the cooperator chooses cooperation, the defector chooses non-cooperation, and the choice of the discriminator depends on the choice of his partner in the last round. Our analysis and main result shows that there is no stable evolution equilibrium in this game, which implies that the proportions of different types of players will keep changing instead of reaching a stable equilibrium. In other words, there is no guarantee that cooperation will be dominant in this game. An implication of this result is that to achieve cooperation and protect the environment more effectively, cooperators and discriminators in our society should be provided with incentives.