Why do we never have enough time? Economic inequality fuels the perception of time poverty by aggravating status anxiety.

People in many societies report that they do not have enough time. What makes people feel so rushed? We propose that economic inequality leads to perceived time poverty by increasing status anxiety. Five studies examined this line of reasoning. Study 1 (N = 230) found a positive correlation between economic inequality and perceived time poverty. Study 2 (N = 194) manipulated economic inequality to test the causal link between economic inequality and perceived time poverty. The results showed that people perceived more time poverty in the high (vs. low) economic inequality condition. Study 3 (N = 381) supported the mediating role of status anxiety in the relationship between economic inequality and perceived time poverty using a questionnaire survey. Study 4 (pre-registered; N = 283) manipulated economic inequality in an ecological valid way and yielded further support for the hypotheses. In pre-registered Study 5 (N = 233), a blockage manipulation design was employed to test the mediating effect of status anxiety as a function of economic inequality, which provided causal evidence for the proposed mediator. Our findings suggest that economic inequality serves as a structural societal factor that fuels people's perception of time poverty.

How does economic inequality shape conspiracy theories? Empirical evidence from China.

Conspiracy theories tend to be prevalent, particularly in societies with high economic inequality. However, few studies have examined the relationship between economic inequality and belief in conspiracy theories. We propose that economic inequality leads people to believe conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups (i.e., upwards conspiracy theories) and that moral evaluations of those groups mediate this relationship. Study 1 (N = 300) found support for these ideas in a survey among Chinese residents. Study 2 (N = 160) manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in a virtual society. The manipulation shaped moral evaluations of economically advantaged groups, and conspiracy beliefs, in the predicted manner. In Study 3 (N = 191) and Study 4 (N = 210), we experimentally manipulated participants' perceptions of economic inequality in real Chinese society and replicated the results of Study 2. In addition, in Study 4, we find that economic inequality predicts belief in conspiracy theories about economically disadvantaged groups (i.e., downward conspiracy theories), which was mediated by anomie. We conclude that perceived economic inequality predicts conspiracy theories about economically advantaged groups and that moral evaluations account for this effect. Also, upward and downward conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with different psychological processes.

Positive fortune telling enhances men's financial risk taking.

Fortune telling is a widespread phenomenon, yet little is known about the extent to which people are affected by it-including those who consider themselves non-believers. The present research has investigated the power of a positive fortune telling outcome (vs. neutral vs. negative) on people's financial risk taking. In two online experiments (n1 = 252; n2 = 441), we consistently found that positive fortune telling enhanced financial risk taking particularly among men. Additionally, we used a real online gambling game in a lab setting (n3 = 193) and found that positive fortune telling enhanced the likelihood that college students gambled for money. Furthermore, a meta-analysis of these three studies demonstrated that the effect of positive fortune telling versus neutral fortune telling was significant for men, but virtually absent for women. Thus, positive fortune telling can yield increased financial risk taking in men, but not (or less so) in women.

Injustice Without Evidence: The Unique Role of Conspiracy Theories in Social Justice Research.

Conspiracy theories are widespread and have a profound impact on society. The present contribution proposes that conspiracy theories are explanatory narratives that necessarily contain justice judgments, as they include attributions of blame and accusations of unethical or criminal conduct. Conspiratorial narratives also are mental simulations, however, and may elicit genuine feelings of injustice also without evidence of actual malpractice. Indeed, conspiracy theories sometimes describe unfair events that are unlikely to have occurred, unethical authorities that might not actually exist, and so on. Here I propose two complementary processes that stimulate belief in evidence-free conspiracy theories: (1) Existential threats instigate biased mental processing and motivated reasoning, that jointly promote an alternative perception of reality; and (2) group allegiances shape how people perceive, interpret, and remember facts to highlight the immoral qualities of competing outgroups. Due to these processes, conspiracy theories elicit a set of distinct reactions such as poor health choices and rejection of science. Moreover, evidence-free conspiracy theories require interventions beyond traditional approaches to install justice principles, such as debunking falsehoods and reducing polarized intergroup distinctions. I conclude that the scientific study of conspiracy theories is part of, and has a unique place in, social justice research.

Enhancing feelings of security: How institutional trust promotes interpersonal trust.

Interpersonal trust is an important source of social and economic development. Over decades, researchers debated the question whether and how public institutions influence interpersonal trust, making this relationship a much-discussed issue for scientific debate. However, experimental and behavioral data and insights on this relationship and the underlying psychological processes are rare and often inconsistent. The present set of studies tests a model which proposes that institutional trust indirectly affects trust among unrelated strangers by enhancing individuals' feelings of security. Study 1 (survey on trust in a broad spectrum of state institutions), Study 2 (nationally representative data from 16 countries), and Study 3 (experimental manipulation of institutional trust) provide convergent support for this hypothesis. Also, the results show that the effect remains consistent even after controlling for individual dispositions linked to interpersonal and institutional trust (Study 1 and 3) and country level indicators of institutional performance (Study 2). Taken together, these findings inform and contribute to the debate about the relationship between institutions and interpersonal trust by showing that when institutions are trusted, they increase feelings of security, and therefore promote interpersonal trust among strangers.

Why we sometimes punish the innocent: The role of group entitativity in collective punishment.

Because punishments are expected to give offenders what they deserve proportionally to the severity of their offenses, the punishment of an entire group because of the misdeed of a few of its members is generally considered as unfair. Group entitativity might increase support for such collective punishment, because members of highly entitative groups are perceived as more similar and interchangeable. We designed three experiments comparing support for third-party collective punishment of low versus high entitative groups. As comparison base-rate, we included conditions in which participants punish an individual wrongdoer (Experiments 1 & 2). Results show that although support for individual punishment is higher than support for collective punishment, this difference was reduced (Experiment 1) or absent (Experiment 2) when the group was highly entitative. Experiment 3 replicated the increasing effect of group entitativity on support for collective punishment. We conclude that group entitativity increases the likelihood of an entire group being treated as a single unit, facilitating collective punishment when a few group members commit an offense.

The impact of choice on retributive reactions: how observers' autonomy concerns shape responses to criminal offenders.

The present research examined the psychological origins of retributive reactions, which are defined as independent observers' anger-based emotions, demonized perceptions, and punishment intentions in response to criminal offenders. Based on the idea that society's justice system has an autonomy-protective function, we reason that chronic autonomy interacts with situational autonomy cues (i.e., opportunities to make choices) to predict retributive reactions to criminal offenders. More specifically, we hypothesized that choice opportunities in an unrelated decision-making context would prompt people to display stronger retributive reactions to offenders than no-choice opportunities, and that these effects of choice would be particularly pronounced among people who chronically experience deprivation of autonomy needs. Results from two experiments supported this hypothesis. It is concluded that retributive reactions to criminal offenders originate from a desire to regulate basic autonomy needs.

Individualistic and social motives for justice judgments.

Justice judgments are subjective by nature, and are influenced substantially by motivational processes. In the present contribution, two motives underlying justice judgments are examined: individualistic motives to evaluate solutions to social problems that benefit the self in material or immaterial ways as fair versus social motives to conceptualize justice in terms of the well-being of others, such as a desire for equality, adherence to in-group norms, and a concern for the collective interest. A review of relevant research reveals evidence for both motivations when people make evaluations of justice. Moreover, which motive is most dominant in the justice judgment process depends on perceptual salience: whereas individualistic motives are activated when a perceiver's own needs and goals are perceptually salient, social motives are activated when others' needs and goals are perceptually salient. It is concluded that both individualistic and social motives contribute in predictable ways to justice judgments.

Injustice for all or just for me? Social value orientation predicts responses to own versus other's procedures.

In two experiments, the authors investigated how differences in social value orientation predict evaluations of procedures that were accorded to self and others. Proselfs versus prosocials were either granted or denied an opportunity to voice an opinion in a decision-making process and witnessed how someone else was either granted or denied such an opportunity. Consistent with the hypothesis, procedural evaluations of both proselfs and prosocials were influenced by own procedure when other was granted voice, but only proselfs were influenced by own procedure when other was denied voice. These findings were particularly attributable to prosocials' tendency to evaluate a situation where no-voice procedures are applied consistently between persons more positively than proselfs. It is concluded that proselfs are focused on procedural justice and injustice for self more than prosocials, whereas prosocials value equality in procedures more than proselfs-even when equality implies injustice for all.

We blame innocent victims more than I do: self-construal level moderates responses to just-world threats.

This study investigated the impact of self-construal levels on people's tendency to blame innocent victims for the victims' fates. The authors hypothesized that when the belief in a just world is threatened, social self-construal is associated with more victim blaming than individual self-construal is. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were primed with either the individual self (with the word I) or the social self (with the word we). Results indeed showed that when threats to just-world beliefs were high, social self-activation produced more victim blaming than individual self-activation did. This effect was not found when just-world threats were low. Extending on these findings, Experiment 3 revealed that, following a just-world threat, an independent self-construal measure was negatively related to victim blaming, and an interdependent self-construal measure was positively related to victim blaming. It is concluded that self-construal levels are important to understanding the justice motive.

Procedural justice in punishment systems: inconsistent punishment procedures have detrimental effects on cooperation.

The current research examines a moderator who predicts in what situations punishment can have detrimental effects on cooperation. We hypothesized that when a punishment system is perceived as procedurally unfair, people's cooperation level decreases. Results of two experiments indicated that participants cooperated less in a group-based trust game when punishment was inconsistent between persons (i.e. not all group members would be punished for defection) than when punishment was consistent between persons (i.e. any group member who defected would be punished) or when there was no punishment. These effects were mediated by perceived belongingness. The authors conclude that an unfair punishment system leads people to feel marginalized as a group member, and this prompts them to display less cooperation.

Procedural justice and the hedonic principle: how approach versus avoidance motivation influences the psychology of voice.

The authors investigate the relation between the hedonic principle (people's motivations to approach pleasure and to avoid pain) and procedural justice. They explore whether approach or avoidance motivation increases the effect that people feel they were treated more fairly following procedures that do versus do not allow them an opportunity to voice their opinion. Experiments 1 and 2 reveal that these procedures influence procedural justice judgments more strongly when people conduct approach motor action (arm flexion) than when they conduct avoidance motor action (arm extension). Experiment 3 indicates that individual-difference measures of participants' approach motivations predicted procedural justice judgments following voice versus no-voice procedures. The authors conclude that people's motivational orientations stimulate their fairness-based reactions to voice procedures.

Retributive reactions to suspected offenders: the importance of social categorizations and guilt probability.

In the current research, the author investigates the influence of social categorizations on retributive emotions (e.g., anger) and punishment intentions when people evaluate suspected offenders as independent observers. It is argued that information that guilt is certain or uncertain (i.e., guilt probability) has different consequences for retributive reactions to ingroup and outgroup suspects. In correspondence with predictions, results of four experiments showed that people reacted more negatively to ingroup than outgroup suspects when guilt was certain but that people reacted more negatively to outgroup than ingroup suspects when guilt was uncertain. It is concluded that guilt probability moderates the influence of social categorizations on people's retributive reactions to suspected offenders.

Group belongingness and procedural justice: social inclusion and exclusion by peers affects the psychology of voice.

The authors focus on the relation between group membership and procedural justice. They argue that whether people are socially included or excluded by their peers influences their reactions to unrelated experiences of procedural justice. Findings from 2 experiments corroborate the prediction that reactions to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures are affected more strongly when people are included in a group than when they are excluded from a group. These findings are extended with a 3rd experiment that shows that people who generally experience higher levels of inclusion in their lives respond more strongly to voice as opposed to no-voice procedures. It is concluded that people's reactions to procedural justice are moderated by people's level of inclusion in social groups.

Procedural justice and status: status salience as antecedent of procedural fairness effects.

The current article explores status as an antecedent of procedural fairness effects (the findings that perceived procedural fairness affects people's reactions, e.g., their relational judgments). On the basis of the literature, the authors proposed that salience of the general concept of status leads people to be more attentive to procedural fairness information and that, as a consequence, stronger procedural fairness effects should be found. In correspondence with this hypothesis, Experiment 1 showed stronger procedural fairness effects on people's relational treatment evaluations in a status salient condition compared with a control condition. Experiment 2 replicated this effect and, in further correspondence with the hypothesis, showed that status salience led to increased cognitive accessibility of fairness concerns. Implications for the psychology of procedural justice are discussed.