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1.
J Bioeth Inq ; 12(3): 383-7, 2015 Sep.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-26133892

RESUMO

Surrogate motherhood is treated as a form of adoption in many countries: the birth mother and her partner are presumed to be the parents of the child, while the intended parents have to adopt the baby once it is born. Other than compensation for expenses related to the pregnancy, payment to surrogates is not permitted. We believe that the failure to compensate surrogate mothers for their labour as well as the significant risks they undertake is both unfair and exploitative. We accept that introducing payment for surrogates would create a significant tension in the adoption model. However, we recommend rejecting the adoption model altogether rather than continuing to prohibit compensation to surrogates.


Assuntos
Adoção/legislação & jurisprudência , Bioética , Mães , Remuneração , Reprodução/ética , Justiça Social , Mães Substitutas/legislação & jurisprudência , Feminino , Humanos , Gravidez
2.
N Z Bioeth J ; 3(1): 18-27, 2002 Feb.
Artigo em Inglês | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-15587484

RESUMO

Following the recent revival of virtue ethics, a number of ethicists have discussed the moral problems surrounding euthanasia by drawing on concepts such as compassion, benevolence, death with dignity, mercy, and by inquiring whether euthanasia is compatible with human flourishing. Most of these writers assert, or simply assume, that their arguments concerning the morality of euthanasia also support their views with regard to legislation. I argue, against these writers, that legislation cannot and should not be based on our moral and religious beliefs concerning whether euthanasia allows a person to die a good death. I then outline an Aristotelian approach to the role of law and government in a good society, according to which the task of the legislator is not to ensure that people actually act virtuously, but is instead to make it possible for them to choose to live (and die) well by ensuring that they have access to the goods that are necessary for flourishing. In the second half of the paper I apply this approach to the question of whether voluntary active euthanasia should be legalised by asking (1) whether euthanasia always deprives people of the necessary conditions for flourishing, and (2) whether the option to request euthanasia is ever necessary for flourishing.


Assuntos
Teoria Ética , Eutanásia Ativa Voluntária/ética , Eutanásia Ativa Voluntária/legislação & jurisprudência , Filosofia , Política Pública , Virtudes , Doença Crônica , Governo , Regulamentação Governamental , Guias como Assunto , Humanos , Paternalismo/ética , Autonomia Pessoal , Qualidade de Vida , Doente Terminal , Argumento Refutável
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