Replication Kinetics of B.1.351 and B.1.1.7 SARS-CoV-2 Variants of Concern Including Assessment of a B.1.1.7 Mutant Carrying a Defective ORF7a Gene.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the etiological agent of COVID-19, is a readily transmissible and potentially deadly pathogen which is currently re-defining human susceptibility to pandemic viruses in the modern world. The recent emergence of several genetically distinct descendants known as variants of concern (VOCs) is further challenging public health disease management, due to increased rates of virus transmission and potential constraints on vaccine effectiveness. We report the isolation of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs imported into Australia belonging to the B.1.351 lineage, first described in the Republic of South Africa (RSA), and the B.1.1.7 lineage originally reported in the United Kingdom, and directly compare the replication kinetics of these two VOCs in Vero E6 cells. In this analysis, we also investigated a B.1.1.7 VOC (QLD1516/2021) carrying a 7-nucleotide deletion in the open reading frame 7a (ORF7a) gene, likely truncating and rendering the ORF7a protein of this virus defective. We demonstrate that the replication of the B.1.351 VOC (QLD1520/2020) in Vero E6 cells can be detected earlier than the B.1.1.7 VOCs (QLD1516/2021 and QLD1517/2021), before peaking at 48 h post infection (p.i.), with significantly higher levels of virus progeny. Whilst replication of the ORF7a defective isolate QLD1516/2021 was delayed longer than the other viruses, slightly more viral progeny was produced by the mutant compared to the unmutated isolate QLD1517/2021 at 72 h p.i. Collectively, these findings contribute to our understanding of SARS-CoV-2 replication and evolutionary dynamics, which have important implications in the development of future vaccination, antiviral therapies, and epidemiological control strategies for COVID-19.

Assessment of Local Mosquito Species Incriminates Aedes aegypti as the Potential Vector of Zika Virus in Australia.

BACKGROUND: Within the last 10 years Zika virus (ZIKV) has caused unprecedented epidemics of human disease in the nations and territories of the western Pacific and South America, and continues to escalate in both endemic and non-endemic regions. We evaluated the vector competence of Australian mosquitoes for ZIKV to assess their potential role in virus transmission. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: Mosquitoes were exposed to infectious blood meals containing the prototype African ZIKV strain. After 14 days incubation at 28°C and high relative humidity, infection, dissemination and transmission rates were assessed. Infection in Culex annulirostris and Cx. sitiens could not be detected. 8% of Cx. quinquefasciatus were infected, but the virus did not disseminate in this species. Despite having infection rates > 50%, Aedes notoscriptus and Ae. vigilax did not transmit ZIKV. In contrast, Ae. aegypti had infection and transmission rates of 57% and 27%, respectively. In susceptibility trials, the virus dose required to infect 50% (ID50) of Ae. aegypti was106.4 tissue culture infectious dose50 (TCID50)/mL. Additionally, a threshold viral load within the mosquito of at least 105.1 TCID50 equivalents/mL had to be reached before virus transmission occurred. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: We confirmed Ae. aegypti to be the most likely mosquito vector of ZIKV in Australia, although the restricted distribution of this species will limit the receptive zone to northern Queensland where this species occurs. Importantly, the role in ZIKV transmission of Culex and other Aedes spp. tested will be negligible. Despite being the implicated vector, the relatively high ID50 and need for a high titer disseminated infection in Ae. aegypti suggest that high mosquito population densities will be required to facilitate epidemic ZIKV transmission among the currently immunologically naïve human population in Australia.

Operational trials of remote mosquito trap systems for Japanese encephalitis virus surveillance in the Torres Strait, Australia.

Japanese encephalitis virus (JEV) appears nearly annually in the Torres Strait in far northern Queensland, Australia, and is a threat to invade the Australian mainland. Surveillance has involved the use of sentinel pigs that develop detectable viremias and antibody titers to JEV. However, pigs are amplifying hosts for JEV, and thus pose a health risk to the public and to pig handlers who bleed the pigs. A remote mosquito trap system would not have these risks. We report on trials using a remote mosquito trap system for the surveillance of JEV in the Torres Strait. The Mosquito Magnet (MM) Pro, MM Liberty Plus, and a novel updraft trap, the NAQS Mozzie Trap, were run at Badu and Moa islands in the Torres Strait and at Bamaga in the northern Cape York Peninsula from 2002-2005. TaqMan real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) was used to detect JEV nucleic acid in weekly mosquito collections. Sentinel pigs located at Badu were also bled and the serum processed by reverse transcriptase (RT)-PCR for JEV antigen and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) for anti-JEV antibodies. JEV was detected in mosquito collections each year but not in each trap. No JEV was detected in trapped mosquitoes before detection in sentinel pigs. The mosquito trap system cost ca. AU$10,000 per site, about AU$5,000 less than a pig-based system. However, trap failures caused by mosquito-clogged motors, electrical faults, and blocked gas lines reduced the efficacy of some mosquito traps. Nonetheless, a remote mosquito trap system, employing stand alone traps and PCR for viral antigen detection, can be a safe, economical way to detect arbovirus activity in remote areas.