RESUMO
In 1966, about 1,600 US military men-mostly Air Force-participated in a cleanup of plutonium dispersed from two nuclear bombs in Palomares, Spain. As a base for future analyses, we provide a history of the Palomares incident, including the dosimetry and risk analyses carried out to date and the compensation assessments made for veterans. By law, compensation for illnesses attributed to ionizing radiation is based on maximum estimated doses and standard risk coefficients, with considerable benefit of the doubt given to claimants when there is uncertainty. In the Palomares case, alpha activity in urine fell far faster than predicted by plutonium biokinetic excretion models used at the time. Most of the measurements were taken on-site but were disqualified on the grounds that they were "unreasonably high" and because there was a possibility of environmental contamination. Until the end of 2013, the Air Force used low dose estimates derived from environmental measurements carried out well after the cleanup. After these estimates were questioned by Congress, the Air Force adopted higher dose estimates based on plutonium concentration measurements in urine samples collected from 26 veterans after they left Palomares. The Air Force assumed that all other cleanup veterans received lower doses and therefore assigned to them maximum organ doses based on the individual among the 26 with the lowest urine measurements. These resulting maximum organ doses appear to be sufficient to justify compensation to all Palomares veterans with lung and bone cancer and early-onset liver cancer and leukemia but not other radiogenic cancers.