Parthenogenesis, identity, and value.

Parthenogenesis is a form of asexual reproduction in which a gamete (ovum or sperm) develops without being fertilized. Tomer Jordi Chaffer uses parthenogenesis to challenge Don Marquis' future-like-ours (FLO) argument against abortion. According to Marquis, (1) what makes it morally wrong to kill us is that it would deprive us of a possible future that we might come to value-a future "like ours" (FLO) and (2) human fetuses are numerically identical to any adult human organism they may develop into, and thus have a FLO. Chaffer contends that if human ova are capable of parthenogenesis, then they would have a FLO, which contraception may deprive them of, but contends this is absurd. Bruce P. Blackshaw challenges Chaffer, contending sexually fertilized embryos are not identical to unfertilized ovum, but this would yield a more absurd implication, that fertilization deprives an ovum of a FLO! Here I show Marquis' account of identity rules out both Chaffer's and Blackshaw's accounts.

Legal Risks and Ethical Dilemmas for Clinicians in the Aftermath of Dobbs.

This Viewpoint discusses the ways in which the Supreme Court's ruling in Dobbs v Jackson Women's Health Organization, which triggered abortion bans or restrictions in half of states, presents serious legal risks to clinicians and major ethical dilemmas.

If fetuses are persons, abortion is a public health crisis.

Pro-life advocates commonly argue that fetuses have the moral status of persons, and an accompanying right to life, a view most pro-choice advocates deny. A difficulty for this pro-life position has been Judith Jarvis Thomson's violinist analogy, in which she argues that even if the fetus is a person, abortion is often permissible because a pregnant woman is not obliged to continue to offer her body as life support. Here, we outline the moral theories underlying public health ethics, and examine the COVID-19 pandemic as an example of public health considerations overriding individual rights. We argue that if fetuses are regarded as persons, then abortion is of such prevalence in society that it also constitutes a significant public health crisis. We show that on public health considerations, we are justified in overriding individual rights to bodily autonomy by prohibiting abortion. We conclude that in a society that values public health, abortion can only be tolerated if fetuses are not regarded as persons.

Amnesty International's updated policy on abortion: A resource for medical providers.

Treating abortion as a matter of reproductive autonomy is essential to promoting health, complying with medical ethics, and advancing human rights. When pregnant people can make autonomous decisions about their pregnancies, their health and human rights outcomes improve. Additionally, medical providers that support autonomous sexual and reproductive health decision-making can provide care in line with the highest ethical standards and promote pregnant individuals' human rights. This article highlights Amnesty International's updated institutional abortion policy which uses a reproductive autonomy frame to promote the full realization of human rights for all pregnant people. The policy relies on decades of evidence, the organization's learning from abortion research and advocacy around the world, and evolving human rights law and standards. While not specifically developed for a medical audience, Amnesty International's updated policy can be a useful resource for providers who seek to promote reproductive autonomy and achieve better health outcomes for their patients.

Tensions Between Ethics and the Law: Examination of a Legal Case by Two Midwives Invoking a Conscientious Objection to Abortion in Scotland.

This paper examines a legal case arising from a workplace grievance that progressed to being heard at the UK's Supreme Court. The case of Doogan and Wood versus Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board concerned two senior midwives in Scotland, both practicing Roman Catholics, who exercised their perceived rights in accordance with section 4(1) of the Abortion Act not to participate in the treatment of women undergoing abortions. The key question raised by this case was: "Is Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board entitled to require the midwives to delegate, supervise and support staff in the treatment of patients undergoing termination of pregnancy?" The ethical issues concerning conscientious objection to abortion have been much debated although the academic literature is mainly concerned with the position of medical practitioners rather than what the World Health Organization terms "mid-level professionals" such as midwives. This paper examines the arguments put forward by the midwives to justify their refusal to carry out tasks they felt contravened their legal right to make a conscientious objection. We then consider professional codes, UK legislation and church legislation. While the former are given strong weighting the latter was been ignored in this case, although cases in other European countries have been prevented from escalating to such a high level by the intervention of prominent church figures. The paper concludes by stating that the question put to the courts remains as yet unanswered but offers some recommendations for future policy making and research.

Majority support for access to abortion care including later abortion in South Australia.

OBJECTIVE: To measure public opinion about access to abortion in South Australia. METHODS: An online survey conducted in 2019. SPSS statistical package version 22 was used for data analysis, with data weighted by age, gender, and region. RESULTS: The majority (65%) of the 1,012 respondents supported the ready availability of abortion care and an additional 25% supported availability in certain circumstances. Most (70%) were unaware that abortion remains in criminal law and 80% supported decriminalisation. Support for safe access zones (88%) and the application of existing protections (69%) and obligations (94%) for conscientious objectors was high. A majority (63%) considered that later abortion should be available 'when the woman and her healthcare team decide it is necessary'. CONCLUSIONS: These results confirm the trend of increasing support for access to abortion and add two new insights. There was majority support for using existing general protections for the rights and obligations of those with a conscientious objection to abortion. Second, there was strong support for decisions about later abortion to be decided through normal clinical consultation. These results indicate general community approval of abortion being normalised as healthcare, with the safeguards and accountabilities that status entails. Implications for public health: These results invite repeal of special laws about abortion care, to enable better access.

Schrödinger's Fetus.

This paper defends and develops Elizabeth Harman's Actual Future Principle with a concept called Schrödinger's Fetus. I argue that all early fetuses are Schrödinger's Fetuses: those early fetuses that survive and become conscious beings have full moral status already as early fetuses, but those fetuses that die as early fetuses lack moral status. With Schrödinger's Fetus, it becomes possible to accept two widely held but contradictory intuitions to be true, and to avoid certain reductiones ad absurdum that pro-life and pro-choice positions face. It also gives a simple solution to the problem of prenatal harm.

Gestation, equality and freedom: ectogenesis as a political perspective.

The benefits of full ectogenesis, that is, the gestation of human fetuses outside the maternal womb, for women ground many contemporary authors' arguments on the ethical desirability of this practice. In this paper, I present and assess two sets of arguments advanced in favour of ectogenesis: arguments stressing ectogenesis' equality-promoting potential and arguments stressing its freedom-promoting potential. I argue that although successfully grounding a positive case for ectogenesis, these arguments have limitations in terms of their reach and scope. Concerning their limited reach, I contend that ectogenesis will likely benefit a small subset of women and, arguably, not the group who most need to achieve equality and freedom. Concerning their limited scope, I contend that these defences do not pay sufficient attention to the context in which ectogenesis would be developed and that, as a result, they risk leaving the status quo unchanged. After providing examples of these limitations, I move to my proposal concerning the role of ectogenesis in promoting women's equality and freedom. This proposal builds on Silvia Federici's, Mariarosa Dalla Costa's and Selma James' readings of the international feminist campaign 'Wages for Housework'. It maintains that the political perspective and provocation that ectogenesis can advance should be considered and defended.

Conflicting abortion laws in India: Unintended barriers to safe abortion for adolescent girls.

This article examines the laws related to abortion in India, demonstrating how conflicting laws create unintended barriers to safe abortion for adolescent girls. It focuses specifically on the situation of adolescent girls seeking abortion, showcasing the unintended consequences that arise from the existing lack of clarity in the legal regime. The article also discusses the recommendations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child and the United Nations' Convention on the Rights of the Child.

[Bioethics theories, the protection of life and natural law]. / Teorías bioéticas, protección de la vida y ley natural.

Principlist Bioethics by Beauchamp and Childress has reached a prominent status in contemporary Bioethics. Nevertheless, it includes some important theoretical problems: some lacks when defining some concepts, a tendency to ethical relativism, etc. Among the ethical alternative approaches from which such problems can be solved, we think that the most appropiate is the Natural Law theory. It offers a reasoned reflection on the concept of good and on human basic goods and their relation with moral general principles. From such goods, this ethical theory supports the existence of actions that are always maleficent acts, that is, intrinsically and universally evil acts. The article applies the Natural Law theory to issues related to the protection of human life (abortion, euthanasia, self-defense and genetic manipulation)..

The Ethics of Killing: Strengthening the Substance View with Time-relative Interests.

The substance view is an account of personhood that regards all human beings as possessing instrinsic value and moral status equivalent to that of an adult human being. Consequently, substance view proponents typically regard abortion as impermissible in most circumstances. The substance view, however, has difficulty accounting for certain intuitions regarding the badness of death for embryos and fetuses, and the wrongness of killing them. Jeff McMahan's time-relative interest account is designed to cater for such intuitions, and so I present a proposal for strengthening the substance view by incorporating McMahan's account - the Dual-Aspect Account of the morality of killing. I show that it resolves some important issues for the substance view while preserving its central premise of moral equality for all human beings. I then compare the Dual-Aspect Account with McMahan's Two-Tiered Account of the morality of killing, which he derives from his time-relative interest account.

Patients Need Doctors with Consciences.

"Conscience clauses" define conscience as "religious beliefs" or "moral convictions," and they come up, therefore, usually in relation to women's reproductive rights. This article argues that conscience is better understood as a feeling of integrity, rightness, and self, and that we need it especially now, as huge corporations take over health care. After an illustrative story, the author reviews the history of patients' rights and also the health-care consumer movement, which introduced the idea that health care is a commodity, and the doctor, therefore, simply a tradesman, whose duty is to provide what his patient wants. The author examines where this new commercial model of medicine leads: patients demanding treatments that are bad for them and expensive for the health-care system; doctors who are forced to do what they think is wrong; a world where patients cannot trust their physicians to do their best for them. Patients need their doctors to have consciences. But in this time of expanding corporate power in health care, can the right to have a conscience also be a Trojan horse? Protecting corporate entities who legally are also entitled to have a conscience? The author proposes that the most powerful rule of conscience is the oldest, the Hippocratic oath's formulation that doctors should enter the exam room solely for the benefit of their patients. When the definition of "benefit" comes into question, then we should use the strategies developed over the past 45 years-shared decision making, ethics committees, media oversight-all of which will become ever more important as technology creates ever new dilemmas for conscience.

When the law makes doors slightly open: ethical dilemmas among abortion service providers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

BACKGROUND: In 2005, Ethiopia changed its abortion law to curb its high maternal mortality. This has led to a considerable reduction in deaths from unsafe abortions. Abortion is now legal if the woman's pregnancy is a result of rape or incest, if her health is endangered, if the fetus has a serious deformity, if she suffers from a physical or mental deficiency, or if she is under 18 years of age. The word of the woman, if in compliance with the law, is sufficient to qualify for an abortion. In this context, where the law makes the door slightly open, health workers become important in deciding who gets access to safe services and who doesn't, thus creating considerable ethical dilemmas. METHODS: The objective of this study was to explore abortion service providers' personal experiences and reflections, perceptions of the abortion law, and ethical and dilemmas that arise. Data collection took place from March to May 2016 in Addis Ababa, at different health clinics providing abortion services. Thirty in-depth interviews and three focus group discussions were conducted with 41 abortion service providers at governmental and non-governmental clinics. Content analysis was drawn upon in the interpretation of the findings. RESULTS: When working in a context where the law has slightly opened the door for abortion seeking women, the health workers describe conflicting concerns, burdensome responsibilities, and ambiguity concerning how to interpret and implement the law. They describe efforts to balance their religious faith and values against their professional obligations and concern for women's health and well-being. This negotiation is particularly evident in the care of women who fall outside the law's indications. They usually handle ethical dilemmas and decision-making alone without guidance. Moreover, many health workers face a stigma from fellow colleagues not performing abortions and therefore keep their job a secret from family and friends. CONCLUSIONS: Health workers in Ethiopia experience ethical dilemmas trying to maneuver between the abortion law, their personal values, and their genuine concern for the health of women. More research is needed to further explore this.

Substance, rights, value, and abortion.

Most serious contemporary opposition to abortion is grounded on the belief that human fetuses are members of the same moral category as beings like us, and that the loss of any such life is one of the worst possible losses. Substance view theorists oppose abortion for this reason: in their view beings like us are essentially rational substances with inherent moral worth, and those who perform induced abortion fail to recognize this moral worth. In a recent series of articles, Rob Lovering presents reductio-style arguments against the substance view, in part arguing that it is inconsistent with our intuitions in rescue and spontaneous abortion cases. In a recent reply, Henrik Friberg-Fernros argues that the substance view can evade these problematic implications because of a distinction between killing and letting die. According to this argument, the fetus's right to life is a negative right not to be killed, not a positive right to be rescued, thus the anti-abortion theorist who lets fetuses die acts acceptably. I argue this stance fails to recognize the inherent moral worth that the substance view contends fetuses possess. One who refrains from saving a person, or doesn't care how many people she saves, cannot reasonably claim to value life. Furthermore, this stance is at odds with most contemporary anti-abortion views that oppose induced abortions of both the killing and letting die variety.

The Problem of Spontaneous Abortion: Is the Pro-Life Position Morally Monstrous?

A substantial proportion of human embryos spontaneously abort soon after conception, and ethicists have argued this is problematic for the pro-life view that a human embryo has the same moral status as an adult from conception. Firstly, if human embryos are our moral equals, this entails spontaneous abortion is one of humanity's most important problems, and it is claimed this is absurd, and a reductio of the moral status claim. Secondly, it is claimed that pro-life advocates do not act as if spontaneous abortion is important, implying they are failing to fulfill their moral obligations. We report that the primary cause of spontaneous abortion is chromosomal defects, which are currently unpreventable, and show that as the other major cause of prenatal death is induced abortion, pro-life advocates can legitimately continue efforts to oppose it. We also defend the relevance of the killing and letting die distinction, which provides further justification for pro-life priorities.