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ABSTRACTIntroductionThis paper assesses the total medical costs associated with the US anthrax letter attacks of 2001. This information can be used to inform policies, which may help mitigate the potential economic impacts of similar bioterrorist attacks. METHODS: Journal publications and news reports were reviewed to establish the number of people who were exposed, were potentially exposed, received prophylactics, and became ill. Where available, cost data from the anthrax letter attacks were used. Where data were unavailable, high, low, and best cost estimates were developed from the broader literature to create a cost model and establish economic impacts. RESULTS: Medical spending totaled approximately $177 million. CONCLUSIONS: The largest expenditures stemmed from self-initiated prophylaxis (worried well): people who sought prophylactic treatment without any indication that they had been exposed to anthrax letters. This highlights an area of focus for mitigating the economic impacts of future disasters. (Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness. 2019;13:539-546).
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Antraz/economia , Correspondência como Assunto , Custos de Cuidados de Saúde/normas , Terrorismo/economia , Antraz/epidemiologia , Antraz/psicologia , Custos de Cuidados de Saúde/estatística & dados numéricos , Humanos , Meios de Comunicação de Massa/tendências , Profilaxia Pré-Exposição/economia , Terrorismo/psicologia , Terrorismo/estatística & dados numéricosRESUMO
Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, both caused accidentally by human error or natural/technological events and determined intentionally as criminal/malicious/terroristic acts, have consequences that could be differently characterized. In the last years many efforts to analyze the economic impact of terrorist threat have been carried out, while researches specifically concerning CBRN events have not been extensively undertaken. This paper in particular aims at proposing a methodological approach for studying macro-level economic impact profiles of biological incidents caused by weaponized and non-weaponized materials. The suggested approach investigates the economic consequences of biological incidents according to two main dimensions: type of large-scale effect and persistence of effect. Biological incident economic impacts are analyzed taking into account the persistence of effect during time as short-term impact (i.e. immediately after the incident), medium-term impact (i.e. by a month) and long-term impact (i.e. by years). The costs due to preventive countermeasure against biological threats (e.g. prevention, protection and preparedness expenses) are not taken into account. To this purpose, information on the key features of past biological incidents can be used as case studies to try to build impact profiles taking into account the proposed two main dimensions. Consequence management and effect mitigation of CBRN emergencies and disasters may benefit from an ex ante definition of the impact profiling related to this kind of incidents. The final goal of this paper is to define an approach to organize information on possible biological events according to their impact profile for supporting more effective and efficient first responders' prompt actions and policy makers' strategic decisions after the event occurrence.
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Derramamento de Material Biológico/economia , Antraz/economia , Bioterrorismo/economia , Custos e Análise de Custo , Humanos , Estados UnidosRESUMO
This article provides a methodology for the economic analysis of the potential consequences of a simulated anthrax terrorism attack on real estate within the Seattle metropolitan area. We estimate spatially disaggregated impacts on median sales price of residential housing within the Seattle metro area following an attack on the central business district (CBD). Using a combination of longitudinal panel regression and GIS analysis, we find that the median sales price in the CBD could decline by as much as $280,000, and by nearly $100,000 in nearby communities. These results indicate that total residential property values could decrease by over $50 billion for Seattle, or a 33% overall decline. We combine these estimates with HUD's 2009 American Housing Survey (AHS) to further predict 70,000 foreclosures in Seattle spatial zones following the terrorism event.
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Antraz/economia , Bioterrorismo/economia , Habitação/economia , Comércio/estatística & dados numéricos , Desastres/economia , Habitação/estatística & dados numéricos , Humanos , Modelos Econômicos , Análise de Regressão , Medição de Risco , Classe Social , WashingtonRESUMO
Rapid public health response to a large-scale anthrax attack would reduce overall morbidity and mortality. However, there is uncertainty about the optimal cost-effective response strategy based on timing of intervention, public health resources, and critical care facilities. We conducted a decision analytic study to compare response strategies to a theoretical large-scale anthrax attack on the Chicago metropolitan area beginning either Day 2 or Day 5 after the attack. These strategies correspond to the policy options set forth by the Anthrax Modeling Working Group for population-wide responses to a large-scale anthrax attack: (1) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, (2) postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination, (3) preattack vaccination with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis, and (4) preattack vaccination with postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination. Outcomes were measured in costs, lives saved, quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs), and incremental cost-effectiveness ratios (ICERs). We estimated that postattack antibiotic prophylaxis of all 1,390,000 anthrax-exposed people beginning on Day 2 after attack would result in 205,835 infected victims, 35,049 fulminant victims, and 28,612 deaths. Only 6,437 (18.5%) of the fulminant victims could be saved with the existing critical care facilities in the Chicago metropolitan area. Mortality would increase to 69,136 if the response strategy began on Day 5. Including postattack vaccination with antibiotic prophylaxis of all exposed people reduces mortality and is cost-effective for both Day 2 (ICER=$182/QALY) and Day 5 (ICER=$1,088/QALY) response strategies. Increasing ICU bed availability significantly reduces mortality for all response strategies. We conclude that postattack antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination of all exposed people is the optimal cost-effective response strategy for a large-scale anthrax attack. Our findings support the US government's plan to provide antibiotic prophylaxis and vaccination for all exposed people within 48 hours of the recognition of a large-scale anthrax attack. Future policies should consider expanding critical care capacity to allow for the rescue of more victims.
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Vacinas contra Antraz/economia , Antraz/tratamento farmacológico , Antraz/economia , Antibioticoprofilaxia/economia , Bioterrorismo/economia , Vacinação/economia , Antraz/prevenção & controle , Vacinas contra Antraz/administração & dosagem , Antibioticoprofilaxia/estatística & dados numéricos , Bacillus anthracis , Derramamento de Material Biológico , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/estatística & dados numéricos , Chicago , Análise Custo-Benefício , Serviços Médicos de Emergência/economia , Humanos , Fatores de Tempo , Vacinação/estatística & dados numéricosRESUMO
Decontaminating civilian facilities or large urban areas following an attack with Bacillus anthracis poses daunting challenges because of the lack of resources and proven technologies. Nevertheless, lessons learned from the 2001 cleanups together with advances derived from recent research have improved our understanding of what is required for effective decontamination. This article reviews current decontamination technologies appropriate for use in outdoor environments, on material surfaces, within large enclosed spaces, in water, and on waste contaminated with aerosolized B. anthracis spores.
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Antraz/prevenção & controle , Bacillus anthracis , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Descontaminação/métodos , Antraz/economia , Bioterrorismo/economia , Descontaminação/economia , Descontaminação/instrumentação , Desinfetantes , Órgãos Governamentais/organização & administração , Humanos , Estados Unidos , Gerenciamento de ResíduosRESUMO
All of the costs associated with decontamination following the 2001 anthrax letter attacks were summarized, estimated, and aggregated based on existing literature and news media reports. A comprehensive list of all affected structures was compiled. Costs were analyzed by building class and decontamination type. Sampling costs and costs of worker relocation were also included. Our analysis indicates that the total cost associated with decontamination was about $320 million.
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Antraz/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/economia , Descontaminação/economia , Antraz/economia , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Custos e Análise de Custo , Fumigação/economia , Humanos , Serviços Postais , Estados UnidosRESUMO
Although much research effort has been directed toward refining algorithms for disease outbreak alerting, considerably less attention has been given to the response to alerts generated from statistical detection algorithms. Given the inherent inaccuracy in alerting, it is imperative to develop methods that help public health personnel identify optimal policies in response to alerts. This study evaluates the application of dynamic decision making models to the problem of responding to outbreak detection methods, using anthrax surveillance as an example. Adaptive optimization through approximate dynamic programming is used to generate a policy for decision making following outbreak detection. We investigate the degree to which the model can tolerate noise theoretically, in order to keep near optimal behavior. We also evaluate the policy from our model empirically and compare it with current approaches in routine public health practice for investigating alerts. Timeliness of outbreak confirmation and total costs associated with the decisions made are used as performance measures. Using our approach, on average, 80 per cent of outbreaks were confirmed prior to the fifth day of post-attack with considerably less cost compared to response strategies currently in use. Experimental results are also provided to illustrate the robustness of the adaptive optimization approach and to show the realization of the derived error bounds in practice.
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Biovigilância/métodos , Técnicas de Apoio para a Decisão , Política de Saúde/economia , Algoritmos , Antraz/economia , Antraz/epidemiologia , Teorema de Bayes , Viés , Bioterrorismo , Simulação por Computador , Humanos , Cadeias de Markov , Vigilância da População/métodos , Fatores de TempoRESUMO
This study examined the roles of the public and private sectors as economic components of anthrax control with direct reference to the 2005 anthrax outbreak in livestock in North Dakota. Anthrax is an endemic disease in North Dakota, which often causes disease outbreaks in livestock, leading to economic losses to the livestock industry. The economic incentives and interests behind public and private control of an anthrax outbreak are investigated. Anthrax management is most effective with the participation of public and private firms. As anthrax is an infectious disease, its control also brings positive economic externalities, which are not accounted for in a producer's decision to protect animals. Therefore, public programs designed to control the disease must be implemented. The government can change producer response to anthrax by setting up policies and incentives that encourage their participation. However, these interventions must encourage compliance and not discourage producers from actively taking part in anthrax management. Producers have economy-based interests and personal reasons for controlling anthrax in their farms. The main reason behind government intervention is to provide assurance to the public who consume livestock products. Another reason is to assist producers and veterinarians, and to achieve biosecurity and biosafety objectives. The contribution of each animal healthcare partner in making anthrax management a success in North Dakota is discussed.
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Doenças dos Animais/prevenção & controle , Antraz/prevenção & controle , Antraz/veterinária , Setor Privado , Setor Público , Doenças dos Animais/economia , Doenças dos Animais/transmissão , Animais , Antraz/economia , Antraz/transmissão , Relações Comunidade-Instituição , Humanos , Relações Interinstitucionais , North Dakota , Setor Privado/economia , Setor Público/economia , Medicina Veterinária/métodos , Medicina Veterinária/normas , ZoonosesRESUMO
OBJECTIVES: Workers' compensation insurance in some states may not provide coverage for medical evaluation costs of workplace exposures related to potential bioterrorism acts if there is no diagnosed illness or disease. Personal insurance also may not provide coverage for these exposures occurring at the workplace. Governmental entities, insurers, and employers need to consider how to address such situations and the associated costs. The objective of this study was to examine characteristics of workers and total costs associated with workers' compensation claims alleging potential exposure to the bioterrorism organism B. anthracis. METHODS: We examined 192 claims referred for review to the Ohio Bureau of Workers' Compensation (OBWC) from October 10, 2001, through December 20, 2004. RESULTS: Although some cases came from out-of-state areas where B. anthracis exposure was known to exist, no Ohio claim was associated with true B. anthracis exposure or B. anthracis-related illness. Of the 155 eligible claims, 126 included medical costs averaging dollar 219 and ranging from dollar 24 to dollar 3,126. There was no difference in mean cost for government and non-government employees (p = 0.202 Wilcoxon). CONCLUSIONS: The number of claims and associated medical costs for evaluation and treatment of potential workplace exposure to B. anthracis were relatively small. These results can be attributed to several factors, including no documented B. anthracis exposures and disease in Ohio and prompt transmission of recommended diagnostic and prophylactic treatment protocols to physicians. How employers, insurers, and jurisdictions address payment for evaluation and treatment of potential or documented exposures resulting from a potential terrorism-related event should be addressed proactively.
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Antraz/diagnóstico , Bacillus anthracis , Bioterrorismo , Exposição Ocupacional , Indenização aos Trabalhadores/economia , Adulto , Antraz/economia , Feminino , Humanos , Masculino , Ocupações/classificação , Ohio , Indenização aos Trabalhadores/estatística & dados numéricosRESUMO
Eleven known cases of bioterrorism-related inhalational anthrax (IA) were treated in the United States during 2001. We retrospectively compared 2 methods that have been proposed to screen for IA. The 2 screening protocols for IA were applied to the emergency department charts of patients who presented with possible signs or symptoms of IA at Inova Fairfax Hospital (Falls Church, Virginia) from 20 October 2001 through 3 November 2001. The Mayer criteria would have screened 4 patients (0.4%; 95% CI, 0.1%-0.9%) and generated charges of 1900 dollars. If 29 patients (2.6%; 95% CI, 1.7%-3.7%) with >or=5 symptoms (but without fever and tachycardia) were screened, charges were 13,325 dollars. The Hupert criteria would have screened 273 patients (24%; 95% CI, 22%-27%) and generated charges of 126,025 dollars. In this outbreak of bioterrorism-related IA, applying the Mayer criteria would have identified both patients with IA and would have generated fewer charges than applying the Hupert criteria.
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Antraz/diagnóstico , Bioterrorismo , Surtos de Doenças , Programas de Rastreamento , Adulto , Antraz/diagnóstico por imagem , Antraz/tratamento farmacológico , Antraz/economia , Antraz/epidemiologia , Guerra Biológica , Doxiciclina/uso terapêutico , Diagnóstico Precoce , Humanos , Inalação , Radiografia , Estudos Retrospectivos , VirginiaRESUMO
As state governments in the United States slash their public health budgets, federal money is pouring in for bioterror preparedness.
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Antraz/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo/prevenção & controle , Viroses/prevenção & controle , Antraz/economia , Bioterrorismo/economia , Planejamento em Desastres/economia , Financiamento Governamental , Alocação de Recursos para a Atenção à Saúde , Humanos , Administração em Saúde Pública/economia , Viroses/economiaRESUMO
The decades-long contamination of Gruinard Island by anthrax is now a well-known part of the history of biological weapons (BW) development, as well as that of military encroachments in the Scottish Highlands and Islands (and the authorities' rather less persistent efforts at damage limitation). Some accounts have included the related episode, reportedly well-remembered by local people, of anthrax contamination on the mainland close to Gruinard. This occurred in 1942--43, when BW experiments were conducted on the island as part of the war effort by scientists from Porton Down under the auspices of the British government. After much top-level discussion, payments were made to the owners of animals that had died as a result of the contamination. The episode had a bearing on discussions about the future of the island and on subsequent policy with regard to the siting, conduct and secrecy of BW experiments.
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Antraz/economia , Guerra Biológica/história , Compensação e Reparação , Resíduos Perigosos/efeitos adversos , Intoxicação/economia , Animais , Antraz/epidemiologia , Confidencialidade , Hébridas/epidemiologia , História do Século XX , Humanos , Intoxicação/microbiologia , Escócia/epidemiologia , Ovinos , Reino Unido , II Guerra MundialAssuntos
Antraz/tratamento farmacológico , Antraz/epidemiologia , Anti-Infecciosos/uso terapêutico , Ciprofloxacina/uso terapêutico , Comércio/estatística & dados numéricos , Surtos de Doenças/estatística & dados numéricos , Internet/estatística & dados numéricos , Serviços Postais/estatística & dados numéricos , Antraz/economia , Anti-Infecciosos/economia , Ciprofloxacina/economia , Comércio/educação , Surtos de Doenças/economia , Humanos , Internet/economia , Serviços Postais/economia , Fatores de TempoAssuntos
Antraz/prevenção & controle , Bioterrorismo , Pesquisadores , Roubo , Antraz/economia , Bacillus anthracis , Órgãos Governamentais , Humanos , Laboratórios , Recompensa , Estados Unidos , UniversidadesAssuntos
Indústria Farmacêutica/legislação & jurisprudência , Medicamentos Genéricos/provisão & distribuição , Patentes como Assunto/legislação & jurisprudência , Antraz/tratamento farmacológico , Antraz/economia , Fármacos Anti-HIV/provisão & distribuição , Anti-Infecciosos/provisão & distribuição , Ciprofloxacina/provisão & distribuição , Infecções por HIV/tratamento farmacológico , Infecções por HIV/economia , Humanos , Agências Internacionais , África do Sul , Estados UnidosAssuntos
Antraz/microbiologia , Bacillus anthracis/genética , Bioterrorismo/economia , Organização do Financiamento , Genoma Bacteriano , Antraz/economia , Bacillus anthracis/patogenicidade , Florida , Humanos , Masculino , Maryland , Plasmídeos/genética , Análise de Sequência de DNA , Virulência/genéticaAssuntos
Antraz , Pesquisa Biomédica , Surtos de Doenças , Estudos de Avaliação como Assunto , Saúde Pública , Animais , Animais Domésticos/fisiologia , Animais Domésticos/psicologia , Antraz/economia , Antraz/etnologia , Antraz/história , Pesquisa Biomédica/economia , Pesquisa Biomédica/educação , Pesquisa Biomédica/história , Pesquisa Biomédica/legislação & jurisprudência , Surtos de Doenças/economia , Surtos de Doenças/história , Surtos de Doenças/legislação & jurisprudência , História da Medicina , História do Século XIX , Humanos , Liechtenstein , Microbiologia/economia , Microbiologia/educação , Microbiologia/história , Microbiologia/legislação & jurisprudência , Médicos/economia , Médicos/história , Médicos/legislação & jurisprudência , Médicos/psicologia , Saúde Pública/economia , Saúde Pública/educação , Saúde Pública/história , Saúde Pública/legislação & jurisprudênciaRESUMO
Understanding and quantifying the impact of a bioterrorist attack are essential in developing public health preparedness for such an attack. We constructed a model that compares the impact of three classic agents of biologic warfare (Bacillus anthracis, Brucella melitensis, and Francisella tularensis) when released as aerosols in the suburb of a major city. The model shows that the economic impact of a bioterrorist attack can range from an estimated $477.7 million per 100,000 persons exposed (brucellosis scenario) to $26.2 billion per 100,000 persons exposed (anthrax scenario). Rapid implementation of a postattack prophylaxis program is the single most important means of reducing these losses. By using an insurance analogy, our model provides economic justification for preparedness measures.