RESUMO
The dual-use dilemma in the life sciences-that illicit applications draw on the same science and technology base as legitimate applications-makes it inherently difficult to control one without inhibiting the other. Since before the September 11 attacks, the science and security communities in the United States have struggled to develop governance processes that can simultaneously minimize the risk of misuse of the life sciences, promote their beneficial applications, and protect the public trust. What has become clear over that time is that while procedural steps can be specified for assessing and managing dual-use risks in the review of research proposals, oversight of ongoing research, and communication of research results, the actions or decisions to be taken at each of these steps to mitigate dual-use risk defy codification. Yet the stakes are too high to do nothing, or to be seen as doing nothing. The U.S. government should therefore adopt an oversight framework largely along the lines recommended by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity almost 5 years ago-one that builds on existing processes, can gain buy-in from the scientific community, and can be implemented at modest cost (both direct and opportunity), while providing assurance that a considered and independent examination of dual-use risks is being applied. Without extraordinary visibility into the actions of those who would misuse biology, it may be impossible to know how well such an oversight system will actually succeed at mitigating misuse. But maintaining the public trust will require a system to be established in which reasonably foreseeable dual-use consequences of life science research are anticipated, evaluated, and addressed.
Assuntos
Disciplinas das Ciências Biológicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Armas Biológicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Guerra Biológica/prevenção & controle , Defesa Civil/legislação & jurisprudência , Regulamentação Governamental , Pesquisa/legislação & jurisprudência , Medidas de Segurança/legislação & jurisprudência , Acesso à Informação/legislação & jurisprudência , Guerra Biológica/legislação & jurisprudência , Cooperação Internacional , Formulação de Políticas , Editoração/legislação & jurisprudência , Estados UnidosRESUMO
The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that 'we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority'. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak 'could cripple an already fragile global economy'. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses how it fits into Obama's broader foreign policy agenda; and analyses critical issues that will have to be addressed in order to implement the strategy successfully.
Assuntos
Armas Biológicas , Guerra Biológica , Bioterrorismo , Defesa Civil , Surtos de Doenças , Governo , Saúde Pública , Guerra Biológica/economia , Guerra Biológica/etnologia , Guerra Biológica/história , Guerra Biológica/legislação & jurisprudência , Guerra Biológica/psicologia , Armas Biológicas/economia , Armas Biológicas/história , Armas Biológicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Bioterrorismo/economia , Bioterrorismo/etnologia , Bioterrorismo/história , Bioterrorismo/legislação & jurisprudência , Bioterrorismo/psicologia , Defesa Civil/economia , Defesa Civil/educação , Defesa Civil/história , Defesa Civil/legislação & jurisprudência , Surtos de Doenças/economia , Surtos de Doenças/história , Surtos de Doenças/legislação & jurisprudência , Governo/história , História do Século XXI , Cooperação Internacional/história , Cooperação Internacional/legislação & jurisprudência , Pandemias/economia , Pandemias/história , Pandemias/legislação & jurisprudência , Saúde Pública/economia , Saúde Pública/educação , Saúde Pública/história , Saúde Pública/legislação & jurisprudência , Medidas de Segurança/economia , Medidas de Segurança/história , Medidas de Segurança/legislação & jurisprudência , Estados Unidos/etnologiaAssuntos
Armas Biológicas , Toxinas Botulínicas Tipo A/economia , Toxinas Botulínicas , Comércio , Indústria Farmacêutica , Fraude , Armas Biológicas/economia , Armas Biológicas/legislação & jurisprudência , Toxinas Botulínicas/economia , Toxinas Botulínicas/toxicidade , Comércio/legislação & jurisprudência , Enganação , Contaminação de Medicamentos , Internet , Legislação de MedicamentosRESUMO
A recent approach for bioterrorism risk management calls for stricter regulations over biotechnology as a way to control subversion of technology that may be used to create a man-made pandemic. This approach is largely unworkable given the increasing pervasiveness of molecular techniques and tools throughout society. Emerging technology has provided the tools to design much deadlier pathogens but concomitantly the ability to respond to emerging pandemics to reduce mortality has also improved significantly in recent decades. In its historical context determining just how 'risky' biological weapons is an important consideration for decision making and resource allocation. Management should attempt to increase capacity, share resources, provide accurate infectious disease reporting, deliver information transparency and improve communications to help mitigate the magnitude of future pandemics.