Construção e validação de instrumento para avaliação das medidas de biossegurança em bioterrorismo pelos bombeiros / Construction and validation of and assessment tool for biosafety measures in bioterrorism for firefighters / Construcción y validación de un instrumento para evaluar las medidas de bioseguridad en el bioterrorismo de los bomberos

Objetivo: Este estudo teve como objetivo desenvolver e validar um instrumento de avaliação das medidas de Biossegurança adotadas pelos bombeiros militares, para a contenção dos agentes biológicos frente a um evento de bioterrorismo. Métodos: Tratou-se de um estudo descritivo de abordagem quantitativa, de desenvolvimento metodológico e do tipo de validação de conteúdo de um instrumento de avaliação. O estudo foi dividido nas fases de desenvolvimento e validação do instrumento. Para o desenvolvimento do instrumento foram feitas revisões da literatura e para a validação do instrumento foi utilizado o método Delphi. Para o estudo foram incluídos 6 juízes que avaliaram o instrumento através da escala numérica tipo Likert. Resultados: Os juízes avaliaram que o instrumento proposto está bem estruturado, possuindo boa clareza e coesão de escrita, com aplicabilidade no campo de estudo e de grande relevância, principalmente em vista a ausência desse tipo de instrumento para a população de bombeiros militares. Para avaliar a concordância entre os juízes foi utilizado o índice de Validade de Conteúdo, que alcançou 98% de concordância e o Índice de Fidedignidade Interavaliadores, que alcançou os conceitos bom e muito bom, mostrando baixa variância das respostas dos juízes, sendo estatisticamente válido. Conclusão: O estudo descreveu o processo de construção e validação do instrumento, provando ser apropriado e confiável para ser utilizado.

Objective: This study aimed to develop and validate an instrument to assess the Biosafety measures adopted by firefighters, for the containment of biological agents in the face of a bioterrorism event. Methods: This is a descriptive study with a quantitative approach, methodological development, and the type of content validation of an assessment instrument. The study was divided into instrument development and validation phases. For the development of the instrument, literature reviews were conducted and for the instrument validation, the Delphi method was used. For the study, 6 judges were included who evaluated the instrument using the Likert-type numerical scale. Results: The judges evaluated that the proposed instrument is well structured, with good clarity and cohesion of writing, with applicability in the field of study and of great relevance, especially considering the absence of this type of instrument for the military firefighter population. To evaluate the agreement between the judges, we used the Content Validity Index which reached 98% of agreement and the Interrate agreement, which reached the concepts good and very good, showing low variance of the judges' answers, being statistically valid. Conclusion: The study described the process of construction and validation of the instrument, proving to be appropriate and reliable to be used.

Objetivo: Este estudio tenía como objetivo desarrollar y validar un instrumento para evaluar las medidas de bioseguridad adoptadas por los bomberos militares para contener los agentes biológicos durante un evento de bioterrorismo. Métodos: Se trata de un estudio descriptivo de abordaje cuantitativo, de desarrollo metodológico y del tipo de validación de contenido de un instrumento de evaluación. El estudio se dividió en las fases de desarrollo y validación del instrumento. Para la elaboración del instrumento se realizaron revisiones bibliográficas y para la validación del mismo se utilizó el método Delphi. Para el estudio se incluyeron 6 jueces que evaluaron el instrumento mediante una escala numérica tipo Likert. Resultados: Los jueces evaluaron que el instrumento propuesto está bien estructurado, poseyendo buena claridad y cohesión de redacción, con aplicabilidad en el campo de estudio y de gran relevancia, especialmente en vista de la ausencia de este tipo de instrumento para la población de bomberos militares. Se utilizó el Índice de Validez de Contenido para evaluar la concordancia entre los jueces, alcanzando un 98% de acuerdo y el Índice de Fiabilidad Inter-registrador, que alcanzó conceptos buenos y muy buenos, mostrando una baja varianza en las respuestas de los jueces, siendo estadísticamente válido. Conclusión: El estudio describió el proceso de construcción y validación del instrumento, demostrando ser apropiado y confiable para ser utilizado.

Biodefence research two decades on: worth the investment?

For the past 20 years, the notion of bioterror has been a source of considerable fear and panic worldwide. In response to the terror attacks of 2001 in the USA, extensive research funding was awarded to investigate bioterror-related pathogens. The global scientific legacy of this funding has extended into the present day, highlighted by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Unsurprisingly, the surge in biodefence-related research and preparedness has been met with considerable apprehension and opposition. Here, we briefly outline the history of modern bioterror threats and biodefence research, describe the scientific legacy of biodefence research by highlighting advances pertaining to specific bacterial and viral pathogens, and summarise the future of biodefence research and its relevance today. We sought to address the sizeable question: have the past 20 years of investment into biodefence research and preparedness been worth it? The legacy of modern biodefence funding includes advancements in biosecurity, biosurveillence, diagnostics, medical countermeasures, and vaccines. In summary, we feel that these advances justify the substantial biodefence funding trend of the past two decades and set a precedent for future funding.

Improving Biosecurity in Pakistan: Current Efforts, Challenges, and Recommendations on a Multidimensional Management Strategy.

Rapidly advancing biotechnological research and easy access to biological information have created challenges for preventing their intentional misuse. Because of the dedicated efforts of science and policy leaders in Pakistan, the country is on the road to becoming a regional role model in ensuring biosafety and capacity for biosecurity. Although Pakistan has made remarkable efforts promoting a culture of biosafety and biosecurity, several constraints persist related to sustainable development and the expansion of the biosecurity capacity in Pakistan. Studies suggest there is little understanding of dual-use research of concern among the majority of life scientists in Pakistan. Further, Pakistan has yet to fully develop and implement approaches for risk assessment, frameworks for oversight and regulation, or tools and procedures for monitoring and reporting situations in which misuse of biological materials might occur. More data are needed to answer questions about key biosecurity hazards specific to the country or region and the procedures that may be required for periodic risk assessments. Integrating biosecurity into the existing infrastructure with limited resources is key challenge in implementation. More coordination is required among various stakeholders to develop an effective biosecurity framework. This article focuses on Pakistan's strides toward biosecurity preparedness in terms of protecting pathogens, toxins, or biological technologies with dual-use risks to prevent their malevolent use. We propose a multidimensional biosecurity management model at the national level to strengthen the biosecurity enterprise in Pakistan.

Accelerating Action in Global Health Security: Global Biosecurity Dialogue as a Model for Advancing the Global Health Security Agenda.

Biosecurity and biosafety measures are designed to mitigate intentional and accidental biological risks that pose potentially catastrophic consequences to a country's health system, security, and political and economic stability. Unfortunately, biosecurity and biosafety are often under-prioritized nationally, regionally, and globally. Security leaders often deemphasize accidental and deliberate biological threats relative to other challenges to peace and security. Given emerging biological risks, including those associated with rapid technological advances and terrorist and state interest in weapons of mass destruction, biosecurity deserves stronger emphasis in health and security fora. The Global Biosecurity Dialogue (GBD) was initiated to align national and regional donor initiatives toward a common set of measurable targets. The GBD was launched by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), with support from Global Affairs Canada's Weapons Threat Reduction Program and the Open Philanthropy Project, and in coordination with the government of The Netherlands as the 2018-19 Chair of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) Action Package Prevent-3 (APP3) on Biosafety and Biosecurity. The GBD provides a multisectoral forum for sharing models, enabling new actions to achieve biosecurity-related targets, and promoting biosecurity as an integral component of health security. The GBD has contributed to new national and continent-wide actions, including the African Union and Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention's new regional Initiative to Strengthen Biosafety and Biosecurity in Africa. Here we present the GBD as a model for catalyzing action within APP3. We describe how the benefits of this approach could expand to other GHSA Action Packages and international health security initiatives.

Biodefense Policy Analysis-A Systems-based Approach.

Understanding the overall biosecurity and biodefense policy landscape, the relationships between policies and their effects on each other, and the mechanisms for leveraging advances in science and technology to enhance defensive capabilities is crucial for ensuring that policy strategies address long-standing gaps and challenges. To date, policy analyses have been conducted primarily on single issues, which limits analyses of broader effects of policies, particularly after implementation. Here we describe the first-ever systems-based analysis of the US biosecurity and biodefense policy landscape to analyze functional relationships between policies, including examination of the unintended positive or negative consequences of policy actions. This analysis revealed a striking bifurcation of the US policy landscape for countering biological threats, with one grouping of policies focused on prevention of theft, diversion, or deliberate malicious use of biological sciences knowledge, skills, materials, and technologies (ie, biosecurity) and a second grouping on development of capabilities and knowledge to assess, detect, monitor, respond to, and attribute biological threats (ie, biodefense). An analysis of indirect effects demonstrated that policies within groups may result in mutual benefit, but policies in different groups may counteract each other, limiting achievement of the policy objectives in either group. The current policy landscape predominantly focuses on pathogens and toxins, having limited focus on rapidly changing biotechnologies with potential to positively contribute to biodefense capabilities or introduce unknown and/or unacceptable security risk. Based on our analyses, we present actions for implementing biosecurity and biodefense policy in the United States that intends to harness the benefits of science and technology while also minimizing potential risks. This article synthesizes and highlights the major findings and conclusions from the detailed analyses, which can be found in the full report ( http://www.gryphonscientific.com/biosecurity-policy/ ).

Assessment of Closed Point-of-Dispensing (POD) Preparedness in St. Louis County, Missouri, 2012-2016.

Little is known about closed point-of-dispensing (POD) site preparedness-especially how these entities progress in their preparedness efforts over time. The purpose of this study was to assess the preparedness of a closed POD network. Between 2012 and 2016, 30% to 50% of POD entities in the St. Louis County region were assessed each year, for a total of 138 site evaluations from 62 entities. The assessment tool included 41 components of closed POD preparedness, each scored either 0 = not met or 1 = met. POD preparedness scores could range from 0 to 41. Chi-square tests were conducted to compare the percentage of entities that had each preparedness indicator. A multilevel linear model with a random intercept for each agency was used to model longitudinal changes in closed POD preparedness. POD preparedness scores were higher in 2016 than in 2012 (31.5 vs. 26.5, t = 14.3, p < .001); however, there was a negative yearly trend in preparedness, and, on average, entities met only 65.4% of the preparedness indicators. Only a third of entities reported hosting a POD exercise at least once every 2 years (32.3%, n = 20). From the multilevel regression, determinants of better POD preparedness include having been assessed more often, employing a business continuity expert, and not being a long-term care agency. Closed POD entities should continue to work toward better preparedness, to better ensure successful deployment. Findings from this study indicate that more frequent assessments likely enhance preparedness at closed POD entities.

The use of animals as a surveillance tool for monitoring environmental health hazards, human health hazards and bioterrorism.

This review discusses the utilization of wild or domestic animals as surveillance tools for monitoring naturally occurring environmental and human health hazards. Besides providing early warning to natural hazards, animals can also provide early warning to societal hazards like bioterrorism. Animals are ideal surveillance tools to humans because they share the same environment as humans and spend more time outdoors than humans, increasing their exposure risk. Furthermore, the biologically compressed lifespans of some animals may allow them to develop clinical signs more rapidly after exposure to specific pathogens. Animals are an excellent channel for monitoring novel and known pathogens with outbreak potential given that more than 60 % of emerging infectious diseases in humans originate as zoonoses. This review attempts to highlight animal illnesses, deaths, biomarkers or sentinel events, to remind human and veterinary public health programs that animal health can be used to discover, monitor or predict environmental health hazards, human health hazards, or bioterrorism. Lastly, we hope that this review will encourage the implementation of animals as a surveillance tool by clinicians, veterinarians, ecosystem health professionals, researchers and governments.

Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2018.

This article is the latest in an annual series analyzing federal funding for health security programs. It examines proposed funding in the President's Budget Request for FY2018 and provides updated amounts for FY2017 and actual funding for FY2010 through FY2016. The proposed FY2018 budget for health security-related programs represents a significant decrease in funding from prior years and previous administrations. In total, the President's proposed FY2018 budget includes $12.45 billion for health security-related programs, an estimated decrease in funding of $1.25 billion, or 9%, from the estimated $13.71 billion in FY2017 and an 11% decrease from the FY2016 actual funding level of $13.99 billion. Most FY2018 health security funding ($6.67 billion, 54%) would go to programs with multiple-hazard and preparedness goals and missions, representing a 14% decrease in this funding compared to FY2017. Radiological and nuclear security programs would receive 20% ($2.48 billion) of all health security funding, a slight decrease of 2% from the prior year. Biosecurity programs would be funded at $1.53 billion (12% of health security funding) in FY2018, a decrease of 6% compared to FY2017. Chemical security programs would represent 3% ($389.7 million) of all health security funding in FY2018, a 9% decrease from the prior year. Finally, 11% of health security funding ($1.39 billion) would be dedicated to pandemic influenza and emerging infectious diseases programs, the only category of funding to see an increase (3%) above FY2017.

Synthetic Biology, Genome Editing, and the Risk of Bioterrorism.

The SynBioSecurity argument says that synthetic biology introduces new risks of intentional misuse of synthetic pathogens and that, therefore, there is a need for extra regulations and oversight. This paper provides an analysis of the argument, sets forth a new version of it, and identifies three developments that raise biosecurity risks compared to the situation earlier. The developments include (1) a spread of the required know-how, (2) improved availability of the techniques, instruments and biological parts, and (3) new technical possibilities such as "resurrecting" disappeared pathogens. It is first shown that the general argument from SynBioSecurity needs to be qualified and that many improvements to biosecurity have already been implemented, most notably in the United States. Second, I suggest a new strain of the argument: the situation that most branches of synthetic biology fall under the gene technology regulation in the European Union and that this regulation in its current form does not adequately address SynBioSecurity risks together provide a weighty reason to review and possibly refine the legislation as well as the supervisory practices. Ethically speaking, the rise in the relative risk of bioterrorism brings to the fore new extrinsic issues.

Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2016.

This article assesses US government funding in 5 domains critical to strengthening health security: biodefense programs, radiological and nuclear programs, chemical programs, pandemic influenza and emerging infectious disease programs, and multiple-hazard and preparedness programs. This year's article also highlights the emergency funding appropriated in FY2015 to enable the international and domestic response to the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.

Agroterrorism: the risks to the United States food supply and national security.

Agroterrorism is a collective term that describes an intentional criminal attack against crops or mankind using viral, bacterial, fungal, or insect-borne agents. Agroterrorism also includes attacks against animals using infectious pathogens such as Burkholderia mallei (glanders), Bacillus anthracis (anthrax), viral avian influenza, foot and mouth disease, and several equine encephalitis viruses. Agents that could be used against crops include the causative agents of wheat blast, rice blast, rice brown spot disease, and wheat stem rust. The primary goal of terrorists using agroterrorism is to spread fear and cause massive economic loss. Subsequent goals include causing disease and death to humans and animals. The use of bioterrorism agents is a much more practical approach than using explosives, for example, to achieve those results since many of these biological agents are commonly found naturally in the environment and are difficult to detect with modern technology. The effective use of biological warfare dates back centuries and can still can be employed by terrorist groups, lone wolves, and political and religious groups to cause death and mayhem on a grand scale.

Medical countermeasures for national security: a new government role in the pharmaceuticalization of society.

How do governments contribute to the pharmaceuticalization of society? Whilst the pivotal role of industry is extensively documented, this article shows that governments too are accelerating, intensifying and opening up new trajectories of pharmaceuticalization in society. Governments are becoming more deeply invested in pharmaceuticals because their national security strategies now aspire to defend populations against health-based threats like bioterrorism and pandemics. To counter those threats, governments are acquiring and stockpiling a panoply of 'medical countermeasures' such as antivirals, next-generation vaccines, antibiotics and anti-toxins. More than that, governments are actively incentivizing the development of many new medical countermeasures--principally by marshaling the state's unique powers to introduce exceptional measures in the name of protecting national security. At least five extraordinary policy interventions have been introduced by governments with the aim of stimulating the commercial development of novel medical countermeasures: (1) allocating earmarked public funds, (2) granting comprehensive legal protections to pharmaceutical companies against injury compensation claims, (3) introducing bespoke pathways for regulatory approval, (4) instantiating extraordinary emergency use procedures allowing for the use of unapproved medicines, and (5) designing innovative logistical distribution systems for mass drug administration outside of clinical settings. Those combined efforts, the article argues, are spawning a new, government-led and quite exceptional medical countermeasure regime operating beyond the conventional boundaries of pharmaceutical development and regulation. In the first comprehensive analysis of the pharmaceuticalization dynamics at play in national security policy, this article unearths the detailed array of policy interventions through which governments too are becoming more deeply imbricated in the pharmaceuticalization of society.

Bioterrorismo, riscos biológicos e as medidas de biossegurança aplicáveis ao Brasil / Bioterrorism, biological risks and biosafety measures applicable to Brazil

A história registra o uso de patógenos como potencializadores de recursos bélicos. Considerando os eventos bélicos da contemporaneidade, observa-se a formulação de projetos voltados para elaboração tecnológica sofisticada. Nessa categoria se incluem as armas biológicas, vinculadas aos programas de caráter coercitivo conhecidos como guerras biológicas, que pertencem à lógica da ameaça assimétrica, não definindo território e gerando repercussões econômicas, políticas e sociopsicológicas devastadoras. Esses eventos demandam a elaboração de planos que contemplem o risco, incluindo a capacitação de recursos humanos, investimentos na identificação de materiais empregados em bioterrorismo e também em equipamentos de segurança. Objetiva-se neste artigo discutir a associação entre patógenos, seu potencial de risco e eficácia para o emprego em estratégias de bioterrorismo, destacando as medidas de biossegurança necessárias. Utiliza-se a revisão integrativa para a construção de análises de contextos de risco. O levantamento bibliográfico compreendeu o período 1990/2010, nas bases de dados ISI, LILACS, SciELO e PubMed. Demonstra-se a importância do envolvimento e da capacitação dos profissionais na identificação de agentes biológicos com potencial de risco, considerando que o bioterrorismo pode resultar na sobrecarga dos sistemas de saúde. A biossegurança orienta os procedimentos que devem ser adotados para a contenção dos patógenos, visando ao controle dos riscos...

History records the use of pathogens as improvers of military resources. Considering the events of contemporary war, there is the formulation of projects aimed at sophisticated technological development. They shall include biological weapons, linked to coercive programs known as biological warfare, which belong to the logic of asymmetric threat, not defining territory and generating devastating economic, political and socio-psychological repercussions. These events require the preparation of plans that address the risk, including the training of human resources, investments in the identification of materials used in bioterrorism and also in safety equipment. This paper aims to discuss the association between pathogens, their potential risk and effectiveness for use in bioterrorism strategies, highlighting the necessary biosecurity measures. It uses an integrative review to construct contexts risk analysis. The literature included the period 1990/2010, the ISI databases, LILACS, SciELO and PubMed. It demonstrates the importance of the involvement and training of professionals in the identification of biological agents with potential risk, whereas bioterrorism may result in overload of health systems. Biosecurity guides the procedures to be adopted for the containment of pathogens, aimed at controlling risk...

Preparedness for epidemic disease or bioterrorism: minimum cost planning for the location and staffing of urban point-of-dispensing centers.

Urban health authorities in the United States have been charged with developing plans for providing the infrastructure necessary to dispense prophylactic medications to their populations in the case of epidemic disease outbreak or bioterrorist attack. However, no specific method for such plans has been prescribed. This article formulates and demonstrates the use of an integer programming technique for helping to solve a part of the dispensing problem faced by cities, namely that of providing the federally required infrastructure at minimum cost, using their limited time and resources. Specifically, the technique minimizes the number of point-of-dispensing (POD) centers while covering every resident in all the census tracts within the city's jurisdiction. It also determines the optimal staffing requirement in terms of the number of nurses at each POD. This article includes a demonstration of the model using real data from Cleveland, OH, a mid-sized US city. Examples are provided of data and computational results for a variety of input parameter values such as population throughput rate, POD capacities, and distance limitations. The technique can be readily adapted to a wide range of urban areas.

Health inequalities and infectious disease epidemics: a challenge for global health security.

In today's global society, infectious disease outbreaks can spread quickly across the world, fueled by the rapidity with which we travel across borders and continents. Historical accounts of influenza pandemics and contemporary reports on infectious diseases clearly demonstrate that poverty, inequality, and social determinants of health create conditions for the transmission of infectious diseases, and existing health disparities or inequalities can further contribute to unequal burdens of morbidity and mortality. Yet, to date, studies of influenza pandemic plans across multiple countries find little to no recognition of health inequalities or attempts to engage disadvantaged populations to explicitly address the differential impact of a pandemic on them. To meet the goals and objectives of the Global Health Security Agenda, we argue that international partners, from WHO to individual countries, must grapple with the social determinants of health and existing health inequalities and extend their vision to include these factors so that disease that may start among socially disadvantaged subpopulations does not go unnoticed and spread across borders. These efforts will require rethinking surveillance systems to include sociodemographic data; training local teams of researchers and community health workers who are able to not only analyze data to recognize risk factors for disease, but also use simulation methods to assess the impact of alternative policies on reducing disease; integrating social science disciplines to understand local context; and proactively anticipating shortfalls in availability of adequate healthcare resources, including vaccines. Without explicit attention to existing health inequalities and underlying social determinants of health, the Global Health Security Agenda is unlikely to succeed in its goals and objectives.

Strengthening global health security by developing capacities to deploy medical countermeasures internationally.

In 2014, the United States in partnership with international organizations and nearly 30 partner countries launched the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) to accelerate progress to improve prevention, detection, and response capabilities for infectious disease outbreaks that can cause public health emergencies. Objective 9 of the GHSA calls for improved global access to medical countermeasures and establishes as a target the development of national policy frameworks for sending and receiving medical countermeasures from and to international partners during public health emergencies. The term medical countermeasures refers to vaccines, antimicrobials, therapeutics, and diagnostics that address the public health and medical consequences of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear events; pandemic influenza; and emerging infectious diseases. They are stockpiled by a few countries to protect their own populations and by international organizations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), for the international community, typically for recipients with limited resources. However, as observed during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic, legal, regulatory, logistical, and funding barriers slowed the ability of WHO and countries to quickly deploy or receive vaccine. Had the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic been more severe, the world would have been ill prepared to cope with the global demand for rapid access to medical countermeasures. This article summarizes the US government efforts to develop a national framework to deploy medical countermeasures internationally and a number of engagements to develop regional and international mechanisms, thus increasing global capacity to respond to public health emergencies.