Fit for purpose quality management system for military forensic exploitation.

In a previous publication we described a systems approach to forensic science applied in the military domain. The forensic science 'system of systems' describes forensic science as a sub-system in the larger criminal justice, law enforcement, intelligence, and military systems, with quality management being an important supporting system. Quality management systems help to ensure that organisations achieve their objective and continually improve their capability. Components of forensic science quality management systems can include standardisation of processes, accreditation of facilities to national/international standards, and certification of personnel. A fit for purpose quality management system should be balanced to allow organisations to meet objectives, provide continuous improvement; mitigate risk; and impart a positive quality culture. Considerable attention over the last decades has been given to the need for forensic science quality management systems to meet criminal justice and law enforcement objectives. More recently, the need for the forensic quality management systems to meet forensic intelligence objectives has been considered. This paper, for the first time, discusses the need for a fit for purpose quality management system for military forensic exploitation.

International law and law enforcement firearms.

Several international agreements set constraints on the legitimate use of firearms as representing lethal force. Their meaning in terms of weapons technology must take into account their operational frame of reference, and legitimate warfare can be regarded as a law enforcement operation with similar principles on the use of force. Changes in weapons technology, such as new types of ammunition, transforming firearms into weapons with less-lethal and even humanitarian options, require new interpretations of the legislation. A division into lethal and non-lethal weapons is an oversimplification and the separation of international humanitarian law into military and law enforcement provisions can be questioned from the technical aspect. The type of technology acceptable for law enforcement use of firearms should be defined. An assessment for weapon injury should not be based on lethality, but rather on the potential for tissue damage and its reversibility.

Lessons learned from non-medical industries: the tragedy of the USS Greeneville.

In February 200l the nuclear powered submarine USS Greeneville collided with the Japanese fishing trawler Ehime Maru, killing nine passengers. A series of small failures and hurried actions escalated into tragedy. This incident provides lessons learned that can be used by healthcare organizations to improve patient safety. Expertise, training, equipment, and procedures appeared to be adequate protection, yet the presence of multiple defences obscured their faulty functioning, just as they often do in medical settings. A number of other problems occurred aboard Greeneville which we also see in health care. The problem was the total breakdown of communication. The Greeneville team also failed to move from a rigid hierarchical structure to a more flexible adaptive structure. Communication often breaks down in healthcare settings, which are organized to maximize status and hierarchical differences, thus often impeding information flow needed to make decisions. Redundancy failed aboard Greeneville as it often does in medicine. Finally, the Captain of the Greeneville established an artificially hurried situation. Time constrained situations happen all the time in health care. We recommend strategies to mitigate the development of these kinds of processes.

Air Force approach to risk assessment for halon replacements.

Finding safe, environmentally acceptable, and effective replacements for Halon fire-extinguishing agents and other chemicals banned by the Montreal Protocol is a formidable task for Air Force research and development organizations. One factor that makes this task a challenge is the uncertainty in relating toxicology studies in laboratory animals to the human situation. This uncertainty from toxicology studies affects the risk assessment process by calling for very conservative decisions. Because of this uncertainty, public pressure and politics also impact the regulatory process. The Air Force approach to assessing health hazards for Halon replacements is to provide scientific information that directly applies to the parts of the extrapolation process that are responsible for the most uncertainty. Most regulatory agencies readily incorporate scientific information, when it is available, which can reduce uncertainty. These Air Force studies will be used to provide realistic exposure levels for replacement chemicals which will allow mission accomplishment and provide safety for the worker and the populace.