Trends in Hospital Lawsuits Filed Against Patients for Unpaid Bills Following Published Research About This Activity.

Importance: Suing patients and garnishing their wages for unpaid medical bills can be a predatory form of financial activity that may be inconsistent with the mission of a hospital. Many hospitals in the state of Virginia were discovered to be suing patients for unpaid medical bills, as first presented in a 2019 research article that launched 2.5 months of media attention on hospital billing practices and a grassroots public demand for hospitals to stop the practice. Objective: To evaluate the association of a research publication and subsequent media coverage with the number of hospital lawsuits filed against patients for unpaid medical bills. Design, Setting, and Participants: This cross-sectional study of Virginia hospitals that sued patients for unpaid medical bills used an interrupted time series analysis. Data on hospitals suing patients for unpaid medical bills were collected during a preintervention period (June 25, 2018, to June 24, 2019), an intervention period (June 25, 2019, to September 10, 2019), and a postintervention period (September 11, 2019, to September 10, 2020). Exposures: Publication of a research article and subsequent media coverage. Main Outcomes and Measures: The total number of warrant in debt and wage garnishment lawsuits filed by Virginia hospitals and the frequency of those lawsuits filed before, during, and after the intervention period on a weekly basis. Results: A total of 50 387 lawsuits, filed by 67 Virginia hospitals, were included; 33 204 (65.9%) were warrant in debt lawsuits, and 17 183 (34.1%) were wage garnishment lawsuits. From the preintervention period to the postintervention period, there was a 59% decrease in the number of lawsuits filed (from 30 760 lawsuits to 12 510 lawsuits), a 55% decrease in the number of warrant in debt cases filed (from 19 329 to 8651), a 66% decrease in the number of wage garnishments filed (from 11 431 to 3859), and a 64% decrease in the dollar amount pursued in court (from $38 700 209 to $13 960 300). During the study period, 11 hospitals banned the practice of suing patients for unpaid medical bills. The interrupted time series analysis showed a significant decrease of 5% (incidence rate ratio, 0.95; 95% CI, 0.94-0.96) in the total weekly number of lawsuits in the postintervention period. Conclusions and Relevance: The findings of this study suggest that research leading to public awareness can shift hospital billing practices.

Relationship between initiation of 340B participation and hospital safety-net engagement.

OBJECTIVE: The 340B program allows safety-net hospitals to acquire discounted outpatient drugs and charge payers full price. We examined whether 340B participation increases safety-net engagement. DATA SOURCES: 340B participation data, Medicare hospital cost reports, American Hospital Association Survey, and Schedule 990 nonprofit hospital tax returns. STUDY DESIGN: Quasi-experimental difference-in-differences design comparing 340B hospitals (the "treatment" group) before and after participating to changes over time to three alternative "control" groups: all other nonprofit and public hospitals, hospitals that are not participating during our study, and hospitals that were not-yet-participating but started after 2015. Outcome measures include a range of safety-net care measures that are alternatives to the standard uncompensated care: charity care, community benefit spending, charity care policies, and low-profit service-line provision. DATA EXTRACTION: We extracted data on all nonprofit and public hospitals from 2011 to 2015. We linked 340B participation data to Medicare hospital cost reports and American Hospital Association data using Medicare hospital identifiers. 990 Data was linked on name and address. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: New 340B participation was not associated with a change in uncompensated care, but was associated with a 28.9 percent increase in charity care spending (SE = 8.8), or about $880,000 per hospital. However, total community benefit spending (including charity care) did not change. 340B was associated with an increase in the probability of offering discounted care (4.3 percentage points, SE = 1.6) from 84 to 88 percent and an increase in the income eligibility limit for discounted care (18.9 percentage points, SE = 5.6) from 294 to 313 percent. Participation was not associated with the probability of offering low-profit medical care services. CONCLUSIONS: Alternative measures show that newly participating hospitals may increase charity care, potentially through offering more patients discounted care. However, increases appear to be fully offset by reductions in other community benefit programs.

Conditional Financing of Drugs in the Netherlands: Past, Present, and Future-Results From Stakeholder Interviews.

BACKGROUND: Conditional financing (CF) of hospital drugs was implemented in the Netherlands as a form of managed entry agreements between 2006 and 2012. CF was a 4-year process comprising 3 stages: initial health technology assessment of the drug (T = 0), conduct of outcomes research studies, and reassessment of the drug (T = 4). OBJECTIVES: To analyze stakeholder experiences in implementing CF in practice. METHODS: Public and private stakeholders were approached for participation in stakeholder interviews through standardized email invitations. An interview guide was developed to guide discussions that covered the following topics: perceived aims of CF, functioning of CF, impact of CF, and conclusions and future perspectives. Extensive summaries were generated for each interview and subsequently used for directed content analysis. RESULTS: Thirty stakeholders were interviewed. Differences emerged among the stakeholders on the perceived aims of CF. Conversely, there was some agreement among stakeholders on the shortcomings in the functioning of CF, the positive impact of CF on the Dutch healthcare setting, and improvement points for CF. CONCLUSIONS: Despite stakeholders' belief that CF either did not meet its aims or only partially did so, there was agreement on the need for new policy to address the same aims of CF in the future. Nevertheless, stakeholders diverged on whether CF should be improved on the basis of learnings identified and reintroduced into practice or replaced with new policy schemes.

Ninety-Day Readmissions of Bundled Valve Patients: Implications for Healthcare Policy.

Medicare's Bundle Payment for Care Improvement (BPCI) Model 2 groups reimbursement for valve surgery into 90-day episodes of care, which include operative costs, inpatient stay, physician fees, postacute care, and readmissions up to 90 days postprocedure. We analyzed our BPCI patients' 90-day outcomes to understand the late financial risks and implications of the bundle payment system for valve patients. All BPCI valve patients from October 2013 (start of risk-sharing phase) to December 2015 were included. Readmissions were categorized as early (≤30 days) or late (31-90 days). Data were collected from institutional databases as well as Medicare claims. Analysis included 376 BPCI valve patients: 202 open and 174 transcatheter aortic valves (TAVR). TAVR patients were older (83.6 vs 73.8 years; P = 0.001) and had higher Society of Thoracic Surgery predicted risk (7.1% vs 2.8%; P = 0.001). Overall, 18.6% of patients (70/376) had one-or-more 90-day readmission, and total claim was on average 51% greater for these patients. Overall readmissions were more common among TAVR patients (22.4% (39/174) vs 15.3% (31/202), P = 0.052) as was late readmission. TAVR patients had significantly higher late readmission claims, and early readmission was predictive of late readmission for TAVR patients only (P = 0.04). Bundled claims for a 90-day episode of care are significantly increased in patients with readmissions. TAVR patients represent a high-risk group for late readmission, possibly a reflection of their chronic disease processes. Being able to identify patients at highest risk for 90-day readmission and the associated claims will be valuable as we enter into risk-bearing episodes of care agreements with Medicare.

A Unique All-Payer Rate-Setting System Controls the Cost but Not the Racial Disparity in Lower Extremity Revascularization Procedures.

BACKGROUND: Patients with peripheral arterial disease often have high comorbidity burden that may complicate post-interventional course and drive increased health-care expenditures. Racial disparity had been observed in lower extremity revascularization (LER) patterns and outcomes. In 2014, Maryland adopted an all-payer rate-setting system to limit the rising hospitalization costs. This resulted in an aggregate payment system in which hospital compensation takes place as an overall per capita expenditure for hospital services. We sought to examine racial differences and other patient-level factors that might lead to discrepancies in LER hospital costs in the State of Maryland. METHODS: We used International Classification of Diseases, Ninth Revision codes to identify patients who underwent infrainguinal open bypass (open) and endovascular repair (endo) in the Maryland Health Services Cost Review Commission database (2009-2015). Multivariable generalized linear model regression analysis was conducted to report cost differences adjusting for patient-specific demographics, comorbidities, and insurance status. Logistic regression analysis was used to assess quality metrics: intensive care unit (ICU) admission, 30-day readmission, protracted length of stay (pLOS) (endo: pLOS >9, open: pLOS > 10 days) and in-hospital mortality. RESULTS: Among patients undergoing open, costs were higher for nonwhite patients (African-American [AA]: $6,092 [4,682-7,501], other: $3,324 [437-6,212]; both P ≤ 0.024), diabetics ($2,058 [837-3,279]; P < 0.001), and patients with Medicaid had an increased cost over Medicare patients by $4,325 (1,441-7,209). Critical limb ischemia (CLI) was associated with $5,254 (4,014-6,495) risk-adjusted cost increment. In addition, AA patients demonstrated higher risk-adjusted odds of ICU admission (adjusted odds ratio [aOR] [95% confidence interval {CI}]:1.65 [1.46-1.86]; P < 0.001) and pLOS (aOR [95% CI]: 1.56 [1.37-1.79]; P < 0.001) than their white counterparts. For patients undergoing endo, costs were higher for nonwhite patients (AA: $2,642 [1,574-3,711], other: $4,124 [2,091-6,157]; both P < 0.001). Patients with CLI and heart failure had increased costs after endo. AA patients were more likely to be readmitted or stayed longer after endo (1.16 [1.03-1.29], 1.34 [1.21-1.49]; both P < 0.010, respectively). The overall cost trend was rapidly increasing before all-payer rate policy implementation but it dramatically plateaued after 2014. CONCLUSIONS: This study showed that the all-payer rate-setting system has curbed the LER rising costs, but these costs remained disproportionally higher for disadvantaged populations such as AA and Medicaid communities. This underpins the existing racial disparity in LER. AA patients had higher LER costs, most likely driven by extended hospitalization and ICU admission. Efforts could be directed to evaluate the contributing socioeconomic factors, invest in primary prevention of comorbid conditions that had shown to be associated with prohibitive costs, and identify mechanisms to overcome the existing racial disparity in LER within the promising cost-saving payment system at the State of Maryland.

California's Hospital Fair Pricing Act reduced the prices actually paid by uninsured patients.

California's Hospital Fair Pricing Act, passed in 2006, aims to protect uninsured patients from paying hospital gross charges: the full, undiscounted prices based on each hospital's chargemaster. In this study I examined how the law affects the net price actually paid by uninsured patients--a question critical for evaluating the law's impact. I found that from 2004 to 2012 the net price actually paid by uninsured patients shrank from 6 percent higher than Medicare prices to 68 percent lower than Medicare prices; the adjusted collection ratio, essentially the amount the hospital actually collected for every dollar in gross price charged, for uninsured patients dropped from 32 percent to 11 percent; and although hospitals have been increasingly less able to generate revenues from uninsured patients, they have raised the proportion of services provided to them in relation to total services provided to all patients. The substantial protection provided to uninsured patients by the California Hospital Fair Pricing Act has important implications for federal and state policy makers seeking to achieve a similar goal. States or Congress could legislate criteria determining the eligibility for discounted charges, mandate a lower price ceiling, and regulate for-profit hospitals in regard to uninsured patients.

TRICARE revision to CHAMPUS DRG-based payment system, pricing of hospital claims. Final rule.

This Final rule changes TRICARE's current regulatory provision for inpatient hospital claims priced under the DRG-based payment system. Claims are currently priced by using the rates and weights that are in effect on a beneficiary's date of admission. This Final rule changes that provision to price such claims by using the rates and weights that are in effect on a beneficiary's date of discharge.

Hospital reimbursement incentives: is there a more effective option?--Part II.

As discussed in Part I of this article, hospital executives in Canada, Germany, and the United States manage their facilities' resources to maximize the incentives inherent in their respective reimbursement system and thereby increase their bottom line. It was also discussed that an additional supply of available hospitals, physicians, and other services will generate increased utilization. Part II discusses how the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 will eventually fail since it neither controls prices nor utilization (e.g., imaging, procedures, ambulatory surgery, discretionary spending). This article concludes with the discussion of the German multipayer approach with universal access and global budgets that might well be a model for U.S. healthcare in the future. Although the German healthcare system has a number of shortfalls, its paradigm could offer the most appropriate compromise when selecting the economic incentives to reduce the percentage of the U.S. gross domestic product expenditure for healthcare from 17.4% to roughly 12.0%.

[Description of the severely injured in the DRG system: is treatment of the severely injured still affordable?]. / Abbildung von Schwerverletzten im DRG-System : Wird die Schwerverletztenversorgung doch bezahlbar?

BACKGROUND: Due to the heterogeneity of severely injured patients (multiple trauma) it is difficult to assign them to homogeneic diagnosis-related groups (DRG). In recent years this has led to a systematic underfunding in the German reimbursement system (G-DRG) for cases of multiply injured patients. This project aimed to improve the reimbursement by modifying the case allocation algorithms of multiply injured patients within the G-DRG system. METHODS: A retrospective analysis of standardized G-DRG data according to §21 of the Hospital Reimbursement Act (§ 21 KHEntgG) including case-related cost data from 3,362 critically injured patients from 2007 and 2008 from 10 university hospitals and 7 large municipal hospitals was carried out. For 1,241 cases complementary detailed information was available from the trauma registry of the German Trauma Society to monitor the case allocation of multiply injured patients within the G-DRG system. Analysis of coding and grouping, performance of case allocation and the homogeneity of costs in the G-DRG versions 2008-2012 was carried out. RESULTS: The results showed systematic underfunding of trauma patients in the G-DRG version 2008 but adequate cost covering in the majority of cases with the G-DRG versions 2011 and 2012. Cost coverage was foundfor multiply injured patients from the clinical viewpoint who were identified as multiple trauma by the G-DRG system. Some of the overfunded trauma patients had high intensive care costs. Also there was underfunding for multiple injured patients not identified as such in the G-DRG system. CONCLUSIONS: Specific modifications of the G-DRG allocation structures could increase the appropriateness of reimbursement of multiply injured patients. Data-based analysis is an essential prerequisite for a constructive development of the G-DRG system and a necessary tool for the active participation of medical specialist societies.