Lessons learned from 2001-2021 - from the bioterrorism to the pandemic era.

INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVE: The aim of the study was to analyze available literature on the development of biological warfare and combating the SARS CoV-2 pandemic. Against the background of contemporary threats from biological factors, the strengths and weaknesses of response in the event of a bioterrorist attack during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic have been identified. The scope and importance of international cooperation in the fight against the pandemic is assessed. REVIEW METHODS: The more important literature on bioterrorism, biological weapons and the COVID-19 pandemic, both from earlier work and recent publications, was analyzed, emphasizing new threats and adequate defence against them. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE: The bio-warfare threat and the current COVID 19 pandemic that has hit mankind on a global scale has clearly shown how dangerous biological agents are and what effects they can cause, negatively affecting every sphere of human activity with catastrophic consequences. Data on examples of bioterrorist attacks carried out and research on the development of biological weapons and methods of combating pandemic COVID-19, were reviewed. New threats related to technological development,including those resulting from genetic manipulation, biosynthesis, and modern means of delivery, are pointed out. Attention has been paid to the implications of controlling the proliferation of biological weapons and the issues of international cooperation in the fight against bioterrorism and the COVD-19 pandemic. SUMMARY: The lesson learned clearly demonstrates the weakness of states in responding to such threats. The risks of uncontrolled scientific advances are still underestimated. Appropriate international control measures must be taken urgently to prepare for new pandemics, bioterrorist attacks, and the possibility of using modern biological weapons.

Dangerous Pathogens as a Potential Problem for Public Health.

Pathogens are various organisms, such as viruses, bacteria, fungi, and protozoa, which can cause severe illnesses to their hosts. Throughout history, pathogens have accompanied human populations and caused various epidemics. One of the most significant outbreaks was the Black Death, which occurred in the 14th century and caused the death of one-third of Europe's population. Pathogens have also been studied for their use as biological warfare agents by the former Soviet Union, Japan, and the USA. Among bacteria and viruses, there are high priority agents that have a significant impact on public health. Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Yersinia pestis, Variola virus, Filoviruses (Ebola, Marburg), Arenoviruses (Lassa), and influenza viruses are included in this group of agents. Outbreaks and infections caused by them might result in social disruption and panic, which is why special operations are needed for public health preparedness. Antibiotic-resistant bacteria that significantly impede treatment and recovery of patients are also valid threats. Furthermore, recent events related to the massive spread of Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) are an example of how virus-induced diseases cannot be ignored. The impact of outbreaks, such as SARS-CoV-2, have had far-reaching consequences beyond public health. The economic losses due to lockdowns are difficult to estimate, but it would take years to restore countries to pre-outbreak status. For countries affected by the 2019 coronavirus disease (COVID-19), their health systems have been overwhelmed, resulting in an increase in the mortality rate caused by diseases or injuries. Furthermore, outbreaks, such as SARS-CoV-2, will induce serious, wide-ranging (and possibly long-lasting) psychological problems among, not only health workers, but ordinary citizens (this is due to isolation, quarantine, etc.). The aim of this paper is to present the most dangerous pathogens, as well as general characterizations, mechanisms of action, and treatments.

Costs and benefits of provocation in bacterial warfare.

Competition in animals involves a wide variety of aggressive behaviors. One of the most sophisticated strategies for a focal actor is to provoke a competitor into uncontrolled aggression toward other competitors. Like animals, bacteria rely on a broad spectrum of molecular weapons, some of which provoke potential rivals by triggering retaliation. While bacterial provocation is well documented, its potential adaptive value has received little attention. Here, we examine the costs and benefits of provocation using mathematical modeling and experiments with Escherichia coli strains encoding colicin toxins. We show that provocation is typically costly in one-to-one encounters because a provoking strain receives a strong reciprocal attack compared with nonprovoking strains. By contrast, provocation can be strongly beneficial in communities including more than two toxin-producing strains, especially when the provoker is shielded from, or resistant to, its opponents' toxins. In these scenarios, we demonstrate that the benefit of provocation derives from a "divide-and-conquer" effect by which aggression-provoking toxin producers force their competitors into increased reciprocal aggression, leading to their cross-elimination. Furthermore, we show that this effect can be mimicked by using antibiotics that promote warfare among strains in a bacterial community, highlighting the potential of provocation as an antimicrobial approach.

Dual-Use Nano-Neurotechnology: An assessment of the implications of trends in science and technology.

The chemical and biological nonproliferation regime stands at a watershed moment, when failure seems a real possibility. After the unsuccessful outcome of the 2016 Eighth Review Conference, the future of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention is uncertain. As the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) approaches its Fourth Review Conference in 2018, it has almost completed removing the huge stocks of chemical weapons, but it now faces the difficult organizational task of moving its focus to preventing the reemergence of chemical weapons at a time when the international security situation appears to be increasingly more difficult and dangerous. In this article, we assess the current and near-term state (5-10 years) and impact of three related areas of science and technology that could be of dual-use concern: targeted delivery of agents to the central nervous system (CNS), particularly by means of nanotechnology; direct impact of nanomaterials on synaptic functions in the CNS; and neuronal circuits in the brain that might be targeted by those with hostile intent. We attempt to assess the implications of our findings, particularly for the consideration of the problem of state-level interest in so-called nonlethal incapacitating chemical agents for law enforcement at the CWC Review Conference in 2018, but also more generally for the longer-term future of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime.

Federal Funding for Health Security in FY2017.

This latest article in the Federal Funding for Health Security series assesses FY2017 US government funding in 5 domains critical to strengthening health security: biosecurity, radiological and nuclear security, chemical security, pandemic influenza and emerging infectious disease, and multiple-hazard and general preparedness.

An assessment of Chemical, Biological, Radiologic, Nuclear, and Explosive preparedness among emergency department healthcare providers in an inner city emergency department.

INTRODUCTION: Emergency healthcare providers are required to care for victims of Chemical, Biological, Radiologic, Nuclear, and Explosive (CBRNE) agents. However, US emergency departments are often ill prepared to manage CBRNE casualties. Most providers lack adequate knowledge or experience in the areas of patient decontamination, hospital-specific disaster protocols, interagency familiarization, and available supply of necessary medical equipment and medications. This study evaluated the CBRNE preparedness of physicians, nurses, and midlevel providers in an urban tertiary care emergency department. METHODS: This retrospective observational survey study used a previously constructed questionnaire instrument. A total of 205 e-mail invitations were sent to 191 eligible providers through an online survey distribution tool (Survey Monkey®). Respondents were enrolled from February 1, 2014 to March 15, 2014. Simple frequencies of correct answers were used to determine the level of preparedness of each group. Cronbach's coefficient α was used to validate the precision of the study instrument. Finally, validity coefficients and analysis of variance ANOVA were used to determine the strength of correlation between demographic variables, as well as the variation between individual responses. RESULTS: Fifty-nine providers responded to the questionnaire (31.14 percent response rate). The overall frequency of correct answers was 66.26 percent, indicating a relatively poor level of CBRNE preparedness. The study instrument lacked precision and reliability (coefficient α 0.4050). Significant correlations were found between the frequency of correct answers and the respondents' gender, practice experience, and previous experience with a CBRNE incident. Significant variance exists between how providers believe casualties should be decontaminated, which drugs should be administered, and the interpretation of facility-specific protocols. CONCLUSIONS: Emergency care providers are inadequately prepared to manage CBRNE incidents. Furthermore, a valid and precise instrument capable of measuring preparedness needs to be developed. Standardized educational curriculums that consider healthcare providers' genders, occupations, and experience levels may assist in closing the knowledge gaps between providers and reinforce emergency departments' CBRNE preparedness.

A proposal for field-level medical assistance in an international humanitarian response to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear events.

A capacity for field-level medical assistance for people exposed to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) agents or medical support for people potentially exposed to these agents is intrinsically linked to the overall risk management approach adopted by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) for an international humanitarian response to a CBRN event. This medical assistance articulates: ▸the characteristics of the agent concerned (if known) ▸the need for immediate care particularly for people exposed to agents with high toxicity and short latency ▸the imperative for those responding to be protected from exposure to the same agents. This article proposes two distinct capacities for medical assistance--CBRN field medical care and CBRN first aid--that take the above into account and the realities of a CBRN event including the likelihood that qualified medical staff may not be present with the right equipment. These capacities are equally pertinent whether in support of ICRC staff or for assistance of victims of a CBRN event. Training of those who will undertake CBRN field medical care and CBRN first aid must include: ▸knowledge of CBRN agents, their impact on health and the corresponding toxidromes ▸skills to use appropriate equipment ▸use of appropriate means of self-protection ▸an understanding of the additional complexities brought by the need for and interaction of triage, transfer and decontamination. The development of CBRN field medical care and CBRN first aid continues within the ICRC while acknowledging that the opportunities for learning in real situations are extremely limited. Comments from others who work in this domain are welcome.

Shelf-life extension program (SLEP) as a significant contributor to Strategic National Stockpile Maintenance: the Israeli experience with ciprofloxacin.

In the past decade, the 2001 anthrax incident in the U.S. and the 2003 SARS epidemic have highlighted the biological threat to civilian populations. The risk posed by the natural or manmade spread of biological agents among the population dictates a need for better national preparedness. One key component of this preparation is the establishment of a Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) of pharmaceuticals that would provide appropriate medical countermeasures in case of an outbreak. However, to reduce the expense of such a stockpile and to make it worthwhile, there is also a need for a shelf-life extension program (SLEP) through which pharmaceuticals could be extended beyond manufacturer-ascribed shelf life, as long as they meet regulation standards. In this article, we review the Israeli experience with the national ciprofloxacin stockpile procurement and shelf-life extension program.

Preventing biological weapon development through the governance of life science research.

The dual-use dilemma in the life sciences-that illicit applications draw on the same science and technology base as legitimate applications-makes it inherently difficult to control one without inhibiting the other. Since before the September 11 attacks, the science and security communities in the United States have struggled to develop governance processes that can simultaneously minimize the risk of misuse of the life sciences, promote their beneficial applications, and protect the public trust. What has become clear over that time is that while procedural steps can be specified for assessing and managing dual-use risks in the review of research proposals, oversight of ongoing research, and communication of research results, the actions or decisions to be taken at each of these steps to mitigate dual-use risk defy codification. Yet the stakes are too high to do nothing, or to be seen as doing nothing. The U.S. government should therefore adopt an oversight framework largely along the lines recommended by the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity almost 5 years ago-one that builds on existing processes, can gain buy-in from the scientific community, and can be implemented at modest cost (both direct and opportunity), while providing assurance that a considered and independent examination of dual-use risks is being applied. Without extraordinary visibility into the actions of those who would misuse biology, it may be impossible to know how well such an oversight system will actually succeed at mitigating misuse. But maintaining the public trust will require a system to be established in which reasonably foreseeable dual-use consequences of life science research are anticipated, evaluated, and addressed.

From biodefence to biosecurity: the Obama administration's strategy for countering biological threats.

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the first international treaty to outlaw an entire class of weapons, was held in Geneva in December 2011. On 7 December, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton became the highest-ranking US government official to address a BWC meeting. Secretary Clinton told the assembled delegation that 'we view the risk of bioweapons attack as both a serious national security challenge and a foreign policy priority'. At the same time, she warned that a large-scale disease outbreak 'could cripple an already fragile global economy'. Secretary Clinton's speech reflected a new understanding that the range of biological threats to international security has expanded from state-sponsored biological warfare programmes to include biological terrorism, dual-use research and naturally occurring infectious diseases such as pandemics. Recognizing these changes, President Barack Obama released a new national strategy for countering biological threats in 2009. This strategy represents a shift in thinking away from the George W. Bush administration's focus on biodefence, which emphasized preparing for and responding to biological weapon attacks, to the concept of biosecurity, which includes measures to prevent, prepare for and respond to naturally occurring and man-made biological threats. The Obama administration's biosecurity strategy seeks to reduce the global risk of naturally occurring and deliberate disease outbreaks through prevention, international cooperation, and maximizing synergies between health and security. The biosecurity strategy is closely aligned with the Obama administration's broader approach to foreign policy, which emphasizes the pragmatic use of smart power, multilateralism and engagement to further the national interest. This article describes the Obama administration's biosecurity strategy; highlights elements of continuity and change from the policies of the Bush administration; discusses how it fits into Obama's broader foreign policy agenda; and analyses critical issues that will have to be addressed in order to implement the strategy successfully.

DNA synthesis security.

It is generally assumed that genetic engineering advances will, inevitably, facilitate the misapplication of biotechnology toward the production of biological weapons. Unexpectedly, however, some of these very advances in the areas of DNA synthesis and sequencing may enable the implementation of automated and nonintrusive safeguards to avert the illicit applications of biotechnology. In the case of DNA synthesis, automated DNA screening tools could be built into DNA synthesizers in order to block the synthesis of hazardous agents. In addition, a comprehensive safety and security regime for dual-use genetic engineering research could include nonintrusive monitoring of DNA sequencing. This is increasingly feasible as laboratories outsource this service to just a few centralized sequencing factories. The adoption of automated, nonintrusive monitoring and surveillance of the DNA synthesis and sequencing pipelines may avert many risks associated with dual-use biotechnology. Here, we describe the historical background and current challenges associated with dual-use biotechnologies and propose strategies to address these challenges.